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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 
a Delaware Corporation ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
vs ) 
) 
DOUGLASLAWRENCEandBRENDAJ ) 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42326-2015 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671 
AUGMENTED 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the 
County of Kootenai 
HONORABLESTEVEVERBY 
District Judge 
Attorney - Plaintiff 
Susan P Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorney - Defendant 
William J Carr 
P0Box285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seai of the said Court this 
April 6, 2015 
JIM BRANNON 
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Date: 2/26/2015 
Time: 08:41 AM 
Page 1 of 21 
First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
User: HUFFMAN 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date 
11/7/2002 
11/8/2002 
11/13/2002 
11/14/2002 
11/15/2002 
11/21/2002 
12/2/2002 
12/20/2002 
1/14/2003 
5/12/2003 
r12212003 
~/26/2003 
Code 
NEWC 
MOTN 
AFFD 
AFFD 
SUMI 
TROI 
BNDC 
HRSC 
NOTH 
AFSV 
AFSV 
HRHD 
ORDR 
NOAP 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
AFFD 
MNWD 
User 
SATERFIEL 
SATERFIEL 
SMITH 
SMITH 
SMITH 
LEITZKE 
LEITZKE 
SATERFIEL 
SATERFIEL 
SATERFIEL 
THORNE 
SATERFIEL 
SMITH 
SMITH 
THORNE 
THORNE 
GLASS 
GLASS 
SMITH 
HILDRETH 
SMITH 
NORIEGA 
SATERFIEL 
Judge 
New Case Filed John T. Mitchell 
Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No John T. Mitchell 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Owens, James 
Receipt number: 0545626 Dated: 11/07/2002 
Amount: $77.00 (Check) 
Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Conrad Agte in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Temporary Trestraining Order 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Temporary Restraining Order 
Summons Issued 
Temporary Restraining Order Issued 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 545778 Dated 
11/08/2002 for 1000.00) 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of John T. Mitchell 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Owens, James, Vernon & Weeks Receipt 
number: 0545779 Dated: 11/08/2002 Amount: 
$3.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same John T. Mitchell 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Owens, James, Vernon & Weeks Receipt 
number: 0545779 Dated: 11/08/2002 Amount: 
$1.00 (Check) 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction 
11/15/2002 09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Affidavit Of Service 
Affidavit Of Service 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitcheii 
Hearing result for Preliminary Injunction held on John T. Mitchell 
11/15/2002 09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Preliminary Injunction Order John T. Mitchell 
Filing: 11A- Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than John T. Mitchell 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Ian Smith 
Receipt number: 0548182 Dated: 12/02/2002 
Amount: $47.00 (Check) 
Notice Of Appearance ONLY 
Notice of First Access 
Notice of Second Access 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Third Access John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor In Support of Motion John T. Mitchell 
For Temporary Restraining Order 
Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney -- Ian John T. Mitchell 
Smith for Defendants 
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Date: 2/26/2015 First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County User: HUFFMAN 
Time: 08:41 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 21 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
8/26/2003 HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw John T. Mitchell 
10/10/2003 03:00 PM) 
8/27/2003 NOHG LEITZKE Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
9/3/2003 APPL MARTIN-TOM Application for Fifth Access John T. Mitchell 
AFIS MARTIN-TOM Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion/Application for Fifth Access Order 
9/5/2003 HRVC THORNE Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw held on John T. Mitchell 
10/10/2003 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
AFFD GLASS Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
SUBC GLASS Substitution Of Counsel Sanuel Eismann John T. Mitchell 
9/9/2003 ORDR THORNE Order Granting Request For Fifth Access John T. Mitchell 
9/11/2003 ANSW PARKER Answer John T. Mitchell 
9/18/2003 HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference John T. Mitchell 
12/11/2003 04:00 PM) 
NOTC THORNE Notice of Scheduling Conference John T. Mitchell 
NOTC HILDRETH Notice of Fourth Access John T. Mitchell 
NOTC HILDRETH Notice of Fifth Acces John T. Mitchell 
11/4/2003 NOTC PARKER Notice of Substitution of Counsel/Samuel John T. Mitchell 
Eismann 
11/14/2003 NOTO NORIEGA Notice Of Deposition of Harold Funk John T. Mitchell 
12/5/2003 NOAP LEITZKE Notice Of Appearance (Douglas Lawrence, Pro John T. Mitchell 
Se) 
MOTN LEITZKE Defendant Lawrence's Motion Requesting the John T. Mitchell 
Court Enter an Order in Limine Against Plaintiff 
Which is Pertinent to the Unanswered and 
Incomplete Discovery 
iviNCL LEiTZKE Defendant Lawrence's Motion To Compei Piaintiff John T. iviitcheli 
to Answer Defendant Lawrence's First 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents 
12/11/2003 HRHD THORNE Hearing result for Status Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
12/11/2003 04:00 PM: Hearing Held 
12/12/2003 HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
08/09/2004 09:00 AM) 
NOTC THORNE Notice of Trial Setting John T. Mitchell 
12/16/2003 ORDR THORNE Order For Mediation John T. Mitchell 
12/18/2003 NOAP DRAPER Notice Of Appearance/ Brenda Lawrence Pro Se John T. Mitchell 
1/28/2004 HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 04/06/2004 04:00 PM) 
2/26/2004 NTSV NORIEGA Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
3/9/2004 AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
ummary Judgment 
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Date: 2/26/2015 First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County User: HUFFMAN 
Time: 08:41 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 21 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
3/9/2004 AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO VICTORIN Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 
MNSJ VICTORIN Motion For Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
3/16/2004 HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/14/2004 08:30 John T. Mitchell 
AM) 
HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel John T. Mitchell 
04/29/2004 03:00 PM) 
HRVC THORNE Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 04/06/2004 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
3/17/2004 MOTN SWIGART Motion For Extension of Time to Answer John T. Mitchell 
discovery 
FILE DRAPER New File Created John T. Mitchell 
*********** File 2 of 2 ************* 
3/22/2004 NOHG DRAPER Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
3/23/2004 MNCL NORIEGA Defendant Douglas Lawrence's Motion To John T. Mitchell 
Compel Plaintiff Capstar to Answer Defendant 
Douglas Larwence's First Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents 
MOTN NORIEGA Defendants Lawrences' Motion Requesting the John T. Mitchell 
Court Enter an Order in Limine Against Plaintiff 
Capstar Which is Pertinent to the Unanswered 
Discovery 
AFFD NORIEGA Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants Dougias Lawrence's Motion to 
Compel Plaintiff Capstar to Answer Defendant 
Lawrence's First Interrogatories and First 
Request for Production of Documents 
MISC NORIEGA Defendants Lawrences Reply In Opposition to John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD NORIEGA Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
MISC NORIEGA Defendant Douglas Lawrence's First Set of John T. Mitchell 
Requests for Admissions to Plaintiff Capstar 
AFFD NAYLOR Affidavit of John W Mack in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
3/24/2004 NOHG ROBINSON Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
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Page 4 of 21 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
3/31/2004 MOTN SWIGART Defendants Lawrences' Motion To Vacate the John T. Mitchell 
April 14th Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgement and To Request a 
Continuance to Review Plaintiffs Answers to 
Defendants Discovery and To Take the 
Deposition of Harold Fund and Others 
NTSD SWIGART Notice Of Service Of Discovery John T. Mitchell 
4/6/2004 AFFD NORIEGA Affidavit of Kelvin Brownsberger John T. Mitchell 
AFFD NORIEGA Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Opposition to John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence's Motion to Vacate the April 14, 2004 
Summary Judgment Hearing 
MOTN NORIEGA Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
MOTN NORIEGA Motion for Protective Order and Limitation of John T. Mitchell 
Discovery 
MISC NORIEGA Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
MISC NORIEGA Brief in Support of Motion for Protective Order John T. Mitchell 
and Limitation of Discovery 
4/14/2004 HRHD THORNE Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 04/14/2004 08:30 AM: Hearing Held 
4/16/2004 MOTN VICTORIN Motion for Final Entry of Judgment John T. Mitchell 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
4/22/2004 HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell 
05/20/2004 10:00 AM) 
MOTN VICTORIN Defendants Lawrences' Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Reconsideration of the Court's Partial Summary 
Judgment of April 14, 2004 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
4/28/2004 MOTN LEITZKE Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
NOHG LEITZKE Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
4/29/2004 INHD RICKARD Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on John T. Mitchell 
04/29/2004 03:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
5/20/2004 HRVC THORNE Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on John T. Mitchell 
05/20/2004 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
7/27/2004 HRVC THORNE Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on John T. Mitchell 
08/09/2004 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
1/24/2005 NOPD MEYER Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued John T. Mitchell 
2/10/2005 NOAP JANUSCH Notice Of Appearance-John Whalen for Douglas John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence 
AFFD JANUSCH Affidavit of Retention of John Whelan John T. Mitchell 
AFFD JANUSCH Affidavit of Retention John T. Mitchell 
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Page 5 of 21 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
6/7/2005 CVDI VICTORIN Civil Disposition entered for: Capstar Radio John T. Mitchell 
Operating Company, Plaintiff; Lawrence, Brenda 
J, Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant. 
order date: 06/07/2005 
FJDE VICTORIN Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
and Entering Decree of Quiet Title 
STAT DUBE Case status changed: closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action. Closed in District Court. Appeal filed 
7/7/05 and Bond Posted. 
7/7/2005 VICTORIN Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0658477 
Dated: 07/07/2005 Amount: $9.00 (Check) 
BNDC VICTORIN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 658478 Dated John T. Mitchell 
07/07/2005 for 100.00) 
7/8/2005 APSC VICTORIN Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
MISC VICTORIN Clerk's Certificate of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
8/10/2005 NLTR MCCOY Notice of Lodging Transcript John T. Mitchell 
9/8/2005 MISC MO'REILLY Receipt For Records John T. Mitchell 
9/20/2005 BNDC MCCOY Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 667855 Dated John T. Mitchell 
09/20/2005 for 24.80) 
MISC JREYNOLDS Receipt for Records John T. Mitchell 
10/6/2005 BNDV MCCOY Bond Converted (Transaction number 9489841 John T. Mitchell 
dated 10/06/2005 amount 24.80) 
BNDV MCCOY Bond Converted (Transaction number 9489842 John T. Mitchell 
dated 10/06/2005 amount 100.00) 
5/3/2006 BNDE MCCOY Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 1,000.00) John T. Mitchell 
1/31/2007 FILE VICTORIN **********File #3 Created********** John T. Mitchell 
2/1/2007 ORDR PARKER Supreme Court Opinion John T. Mitcheii 
3/30/2007 REMT JANUSCH Remittitur John T. Mitchell 
4/20/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference John T. Mitchell 
05/14/2007 03:00 PM) Set W/CV03-4621 
STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
5/1/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 06/13/2007 03:00 PM) set 
W/CV03-4621 -Weeks 
5/14/2007 MEMO VICTORIN Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
MISC REMPFER Renewed motion for summary judgment John T. Mitchell 
HRHD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
05/14/2007 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Set 
W/CV03-4621 
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First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
User: HUFFMAN 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
5/14/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
12/10/2007 09:00 AM) 4 Days 
5/16/2007 CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
5/29/2007 ANHR VICTORIN Amended Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
5/31/2007 MOTN HULL Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
AFFD HULL Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants' John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Enlargement 
AFFD HULL Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
AFFD HULL Affidavit of John P. Whelan John T. Mitchell 
NOHG LEPIRE Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
6/5/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/13/2007 03:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Enlargement of Time; Shorten Time and 
Disqualification for Cause - Whelan 
6/6/2007 MEMO VICTORIN Reply Memorandum in Support of Renewed John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of John Whelan John T. Mitchell 
APPL VICTORIN Application for Order Shortening Time John T. Mitchell 
MNDQ VICTORIN Motion To Disqualify John T. Mitchell 
6/7/2007 MOTN VICTORIN Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Filed 5-30-07 & Notice of Hearing 
MOTN HULL Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of John John T. Mitchell 
Mack Filed 5/30/07 
NOTH MCCORD Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
NOTH MCCORD Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
6/8/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/13/2007 03:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Set W/CV03-4621 - Weeks - Strike Affd 
John Mack & Portion Affd Doug Lawrence 
6/13/2007 ORDR CLAUSEN Order Shortening Time John T. Mitchell 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Set W/CV03-4621 
- Weeks - Strike Affd John Mack & Portion Affd 
Doug Lawrence 
HRHD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 06/13/2007 03:00 PM: Hearing Held set 
W/CV03-4621 -Weeks 
HRHD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held Enlargement of Time; 
Shorten Time and Disqualification for Cause -
Whelan 
6/25/2007 ORDR CLAUSEN Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause 
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Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
6/26/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 08/07/2007 04:00 PM) Weeks - Set 
w/CR03-4621 
7/9/2007 MOTN VICTORIN Motion for Reconsideration John T. Mitchell 
MOTN VICTORIN Motion for Permission to Appeal from an John T. Mitchell 
Interlocutory Order 
AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of John P Whelan John T. Mitchell 
7/10/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell 
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM) Whelan - set 
W/CR03-4621 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/06/2007 01 :30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Permission to Appeal - Whelan 
NOHG MCCOY Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
NOHG MCCOY AMENDED Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
7/23/2007 AFFD MCCOY Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan John T. Mitchell 
MEMS MCCOY Memorandum In Support Of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Reconsideration 
FILE VICTORIN **********File #4 Created********** John T. Mitchell 
7/24/2007 MISC CLAUSEN Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. John T. Mitchell 
Whelan 
AFFD HULL Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. John T. Mitchell 
Whelan (with Exhibit Attached) 
MISC MCCOY Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff 
MISC MCCOY Request for Judicial Notice John T. Mitchell 
MOTN MCCOY Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
MOTN MCCOY Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
NOHG MCCOY Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
AFFD MCCOY Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Opposition to Summary Judgment 
FILE NAYLOR New File Created--File 5 of 5 John T. Mitchell 
********EXPANDO***** containing Certificates of 
Exhibits dated March 23,2004 
7/26/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Enlargement of Time; Strike & Request for 
Judicial Notice - Whelan 
7/30/2007 MISC MCCORD plaintiff's opposition to def s motion for John T. Mitchell 
reconsideration 
7/31/2007 MISC HUFFMAN Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargement of Time to File Responses 
FILE JANUSCH New File Created ***6***** John T. Mitchell 
8/2/2007 MOTN PARKER Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence filed July 24, 2007 
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User: HUFFMAN 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
8/2/2007 AFFD PARKER Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Testimony 
MOTN PARKER Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
MISC PARKER Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
NOTH PARKER Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
8/6/2007 DENY CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on John T. Mitchell 
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM: Motion Denied Whelan -
set W/CR03-4621 
DENY CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 08/06/2007 John T. Mitchell 
01:30 PM: Motion Denied Permission to Appeal 
-Whelan 
8/7/2007 ORDR CLAUSEN Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell 
and Motion for Permissive Appeal 
CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 08/07/2007 04:00 PM: Continued 
Weeks - Set w/CR03-4621 
HELD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:00 PM: Motion Held Enlargement of Time; 
Strike & Request for Judicial Notice - Whelan 
8/8/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 09/24/2007 04:00 PM) 1 hour 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
8/16/2007 MOTN MCCORD plaintiff's Motion for protective order re. defs John T. Mitchell 
notice of deposition 
OBJT MCCORD Objection to notice of deposition & demand for John T. Mitchell 
production of documents 
NOTC BARKER Notice Of Delivery Of Original Transcript John T. Mitchell 
8/20/2007 MISC HUFFMAN Amended Notice of Deposition and Demand for John T. Mitchell 
Production of Documents 
8/21/2007 MISC MCCOY Subpoena Duces Tecum John T. Mitchell 
NOTC MCCOY Notice of Deposition and Demand for Production John T. Mitchell 
of Documents 
NOTC MCCOY AMENDED Notice of Deposition and Demand for John T. Mitchell 
Production of Documents 
9/10/2007 MOTN VICTORIN Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer John T. Mitchell 
AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of John Whelan in Suppoer of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer 
AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Suppoer of John T. Mitchell 
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
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Date Code User Judge 
9/10/2007 MISC VICTORIN Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
9/11/2007 ORDR CLAUSEN Order Denying Defendants' Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Reconsideration 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Granting Defendants' Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargement and Granting Continuance of 
Summary Judgment 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Granting Defendants' Request for Judicial John T. Mitchell 
Notice of the Court Files 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order on Defendants' Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
9/12/2007 NOTR GBROWN Notice Of Transcript Delivery of Harold Funk John T. Mitchell 
9/17/2007 MOTN PARKER Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Doug John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence filed September 10, 2007 
MISC PARKER Plaintiffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in John T. Mitchell 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
MOTN PARKER Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
NOTH PARKER Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
FILE VICTORIN **********File #7 Created********** John T. Mitchell 
9/18/2007 ORDR CLAUSEN Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' John T. Mitchell 
Pleadings or in the Alternative for Enlargement of 
Time 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence Filed July 24, 2007 
9/21/2007 MOTN GBROWN Motion John T. Mitchell 
MOTN GBROWN Motion John T. Mitchell 
9/24/2007 MOTN HUFFMAN Motion to Correct Judgment John T. Mitchell 
MOTN HUFFMAN Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
HRHD CLAUSEN Hearing resuli for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 09/24/2007 04:00 PM: Hearing Held 1 
hour 
9/26/2007 ORDR CLAUSEN Order on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer John T. Mitchell 
10/11/2007 NTSV GBROWN Notice Of Service of Discovery John T. Mitchell 
10/25/2007 NOTR GBROWN Notice Of Transcript Delivery for Kosta Panidis John T. Mitchell 
and Kent Abendroth 
10/26/2007 NTSV HUFFMAN Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
10/29/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/31/2007 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Allow Access - Weeks 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/31/2007 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Shorten Time - Weeks 
APPL CLAUSEN Application for Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 
MOTN CLAUSEN Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
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Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
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10/29/2007 NOTH CLAUSEN Notice Of Hearing on Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 
NOTH CLAUSEN Notice Of Hearing of Hearing on Motion to John T. Mitchell 
Shorten Time 
10/31/2007 GRNT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 10/31/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:00 PM: Motion Granted Shorten Time -
Weeks 
GRNT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 10/31/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:00 PM: Motion Granted Allow Access -
Weeks 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Allowing for Shortened Time in Which to John T. Mitchell 
Hear Application 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Granting Request for Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 
11/2/2007 MISC HUFFMAN Objection to Form of Order Granting Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 
11/5/2007 NOTC CLAUSEN Notice of Delivery of Transcript of Hearing Dated John T. Mitchell 
10/31/07 
11/7/2007 MNDQ VICTORIN Renewed Motion To Disqualify for Cause John T. Mitchell 
AFFD VICTORIN Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of Renewed John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Disqualification 
NOTH CLAUSEN Notice Of Hearing - Renewed Motion for DQ John T. Mitchell 
11/8/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Renewed Motion for DQ - Whelan 1/2 hour 
NOTC CLAUSEN Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Dated 8/7/07 
NOTC CLAUSEN Notice of Delivery of Original transcript from John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Dated 6/13/07 
NOHG LSMITH Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
11/13/2007 MOTN VICTORIN Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from John T. Mitchell 
an inieriocuiory Order 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue John T. Mitchell 
11/27/2007 03:30 PM) Court Trial - Weeks 
MNCN VICTORIN Motion To Continue Trial John T. Mitchell 
NOTC VICTORIN Notice of Change of Address John T. Mitchell 
NOHG VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
NTSV HUFFMAN Notice Of Service Susan P Weeks by Fax John T. Mitchell 
11/12/07 
NTSV HUFFMAN Notice Of Service Susan P Weeks 11/13/07 John T. Mitchell 
11/14/2007 FILE JANUSCH New File Created****?************** John T. Mitchell 
11/15/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal -
Whelan 
11/21/2007 MISC MC OY Response to Second Motion to Disqualify John T. Mitchell 
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Date Code User 
11/26/2007 MISC HUFFMAN Exhibit List 
MISC HUFFMAN Witness List 
11/27/2007 DENY CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 
03:30 PM: Motion Denied Renewed Motion for 
DQ- Whelan 1/2 hour 
HELD CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 
03:30 PM: Motion Held Renewed Motion for 
Permissive Appeal - Whelan 
GRNT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on 
11/27/2007 03:30 PM: Motion Granted Court 
Trial - Weeks 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on 
12/10/2007 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 Days 
11/30/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled 
06/09/2008 09:00 AM) 5 Days 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing 
ORDR CLAUSEN Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to 
Appeal From an Interlocutory Order 
.. 12/3/2007 MISC SHEDLOCK Expert Witness Disclosure 
12/10/2007 NOTC CLAUSEN Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from 
11/27/07 
1/4/2008 WITD BAXLEY Expert Witness Disclosure of Defendants 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence 
2/6/2008 ORDR CLAUSEN Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on 
06/09/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 Days 
- ; st Priorty 
2/26/2008 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/23/2008 04:00 
PM) Presentment of Judgment 
3/19/2008 VICTORIN Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court 
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this 
amount to the District Court) Paid by: John 
Whelan Receipt number: 0787292 Dated: 
3/19/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
BNDC VICTORIN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 787298 Dated 
3/19/2008 for 100.00) 
APSC VICTORIN Notice of Appeal To The Supreme Court 
3/20/2008 NOTE VICTORIN Clerk's Certificate of Appeal to Supreme Crt 
4/1/2008 ORDR JANUSCH Order-Supreme Court 
ORDR JANUSCH Order Augmenting Appeal 
User: HUFFMAN 
Judge 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
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4/9/2008 HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 04/23/2008 John T. Mitchell 
04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Presentment of 
Judgment 
APSC MCCORD Amended Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
5/23/2008 NOTC JANUSCH Notice of Transcript Lodged-Julie Foland John T. Mitchell 
6/24/2008 ORDR VICTORIN Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to John T. Mitchell 
File Clerk's Record 
7/29/2008 RECT RABROWN Receipt Of Clerk's Transcript on 07/28/08 John T. Mitchell 
8/14/2008 BNDV ROBINSON Bond Converted (Transaction number 9499657 John T. Mitchell 
dated 8/14/2008 amount 100.00) 
9/9/2008 ORDR VICTORIN Order granting motion to Withdraw as Attorney of John T. Mitchell 
Record/John Whelan 
1/23/2009 ROBINSON Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of John T. Mitchell 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Lawrence Douglas Receipt number: 0831372 
Dated: 1/23/2009 Amount: $761.00 (Check) 
ROBINSON Miscellaneous Payment: Community Service John T. Mitchell 
Insurance Fee Paid by: Lawrence Douglas 
Receipt number: 0831372 Dated: 1/23/2009 
Amount: $.60 (Check) 
ROBINSON Miscellaneous Payment: Personal Copy Fee Paid John T. Mitchell 
by: Lawrence Douglas Receipt number: 0831372 
Dated: 1/23/2009 Amount: $.30 (Check) 
RECT ROBINSON Receipt Of Transcript Pd 1-23-2009 John T. Mitchell 
1/28/2009 NOTE VICTORIN Clerk's Record to Boise John T. Mitchell 
3/6/2009 HUFFMAN Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of John T. Mitchell 
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: 
Lawrence Douglas Receipt number: 0837603 
Dated: 3/6/2009 Amount: $761.25 (Cash) 
HUFFMAN Miscellaneous Payment: Bad Check Fee Paid by: John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Douglas Receipt number: 0837603 
Dated: 3/6/2009 Amount: $20.00 (Cash) 
HUFFMAN Miscellaneous Payment: Misc Pennies Paid Paid John T. Mitchell 
by: Lawrence Douglas Receipt number: 0837603 
Dated: 3/6/2009 Amount: $.65 (Cash) 
9/2/2009 REVR MEYER Reviewed And Retained John T. Mitchell 
3/1/2010 REVR MEYER Reviewed And Retained John T. Mitchell 
8/2/2010 OPIN RICKARD Opinion Filed John T. Mitchell 
8/6/2010 NOAP LEU Notice Of Appearance-Douglas Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
NOAP LEU Notice Of Appearance-Brenda Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
8/26/2010 MISC CRUMPACKER Remittitur John T. Mitchell 
8/27/2010 MISC CRUMPACKER Amended Opinion John T. Mitchell 
9/8/2010 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/03/2010 02:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Entry of Judgment - Lawrence 
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Date Code User Judge 
9/8/2010 STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
AFFD CLEVELAND Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment 
MOTN CLEVELAND Defendants Lawrences' Motion Requesting the John T. Mitchell 
Court Enter a Final Judgment 
NOHG CLEVELAND Notice Of Hearing on defendants Motion of Entry John T. Mitchell 
of Final Judgement 
9/30/2010 ORDR VICTORIN Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment and Declaring Easement Rights 
10/29/2010 HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 11/03/2010 John T. Mitchell 
02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Entry of Judgment 
- Lawrence 
11/8/2010 NOTE HAMILTON No exhibit return notice to go out prior to John T. Mitchell 
November 2011 
11/10/2010 HUFFMAN Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal John T. Mitchell 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Lawrence, Douglas 
P {defendant) Receipt number: 0048698 Dated: 
11/10/2010 Amount: $101.00 (Cash) For: 
Lawrence, Brenda J (defendant) and Lawrence, 
Douglas P {defendant) 
NOTC SREED Notice of Appeal - Douglas & Brenda Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
APSC SREED Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
STAT SREED Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
12/3/2010 ORDR SREED AMENDED Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment and Declaring Easement 
Rights 
12/16/2010 FILE CRUMPACKER ***********New File Created #8*********** John T. Mitchell 
12/17/2010 ORDR CLEVELAND Order Augmenting Appeal John T. Mitchell 
2/15/2011 CERT CRUMPACKER Clerks Certificate Of Service John T. Mitchell 
4/4/2011 CERT CRUMPACKER Clerks Certificate Of Service John T. Mitchell 
7/25/2011 STAT ROHRBACH Case status changed: closed John T. Mitchell 
9/15/2011 CVDI VIGIL Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, John T. Mitchell 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
Capstar Radio Operating Company, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 9/15/2011 
FJDE VIGIL Judgment and Decree John T. Mitchell 
9/19/2011 ORDR VIGIL Order Suspending Appeal and Order Directing John T. Mitchell 
the District Court to Enter Final Judgment or, in 
the Alternative, to Show Cause (SUPREME 
COURT ORDER) 
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Date 
1/25/2012 
5/31/2012 
6/6/2012 
6/8/2012 
6/14/2012 
7/2/2012 
7/9/2012 
f/lJ/:.:'.Ul:.:'. 
7/26/2012 
8/13/2012 
8/14/2012 
8/20/2012 
Code 
CVDI 
FJDE 
OPIN 
ORDR 
DISF 
HRSC 
STAT 
HRSC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
DCHH 
ORDR 
HRVC 
REMT 
HRSC 
STAT 
NOAP 
User Judge 
LEU Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, John T. Mitchell 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
LEU 
VIGIL 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
Capstar Radio Operating Company, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 1/25/2012 
Amended Judgment And Decree 
Opinion Filed 
Order of Self Disqualification - Judge John T. 
Mitchell 
Disqualification Of Judge Mitchell - Self 
CLAUSEN Order Assigning Judge On Voluntary 
Disqualification - Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
08/01/2012 03:30 PM) 
SVERDSTEN Case status changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction 
07/09/2012 03:30 PM) Def 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
BAXLEY Defendants' Motion For A Preliminary Injunction Lansing L. Haynes 
Against Plaintiff 
CRUMPACKER Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction 
SVERDSTEN 
MCCOY 
SVERDSTEN 
SVERDSTEN 
LEU 
SVERDSTEN 
Hearing result for Preliminary Injunction 
scheduled on 07/09/2012 03:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: AMY WILKINS 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Def 
Order Re: Lawrences; Motion for a Preiiminary 
Injunction - DENIED 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled 
on 08/01/2012 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Notice Vacating Hearing 
Remittitur 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
08/21/2012 03:30 PM) 
SVERDSTEN Case status changed: Reopened 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing 
HUFFMAN Notice Of Appearance-Douglas Marfice obo 
Defendants 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
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Date Code User Judge 
8/21/2012 DCHH SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 08/21/2012 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: ANNE NUNEMACHER 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
03/18/2013 09:00 AM) 5 DAYS 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
10/19/2012 DFWL CRUMPACKER Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure Lansing L. Haynes 
10/29/2012 NTSV BAXLEY Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
11/5/2012 MOTN ZOOK Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of Final Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment on Order Awarding Costs 
AFFD ZOOK Affidavit of Theron J. De Smet in Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion for Rule 54(b) Certificate 
11/6/2012 STIP ZOOK Stipulation for Issuance of AMENDED pre-trial Lansing L. Haynes 
Order 
11/13/2012 ORDR ZOOK Order Lansing L. Haynes 
11/21/2012 STIP MCCOY Stipulation for Rule 54(b) Certification of Final Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment on Order Awarding Costs 
11/27/2012 CVDI DEGLMAN Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
Capstar Radio Operating Company, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 11/27/2012 
FJDE DEGLMAN Rule 54 (b) Certificate Lansing L. Haynes 
12/13/2012 NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Answer to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants 1st (sic)(Second)Set of 
Interrogatories Requests for Production and 
RAqt1A!':t fnr Arlmi!':!':inm:: tn Pl~intiff 
1/8/2013 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/11/2013 10:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
AM) Motion to Consolidate, Marfice 
1/11/2013 NTSD BAXLEY Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests Lansing L. Haynes 
1/15/2013 NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Capstars 2nd Lansing L. Haynes 
Request for Production of Documents to 
Defendants 
1/28/2013 NOHG CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
MNAM CRUMPACKER Motion To Amend Answer Motion to Substitute Lansing L. Haynes 
Real Party in Interest & Motion to Consolidate 
MEMS CRUMPACKER Memorandum In Support Of Motion to Amend Lansing L. Haynes 
Answer Motion to Substitute Real Party in 
Interest & Motion to Consolidate 
AFFD CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Theron J Desmet in Support of Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
to Amend Anser Motion to Substitute Real Party 
in Interest & Motion to Consolidate 
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2/4/2013 MEMO CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Memorandum in Oppositiion to 
Defendants Motion to Amend Motion to 
Substitute Real Party in Interest & Motion to 
Consolidate 
2/11/2013 DCHH SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
02/11/2013 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Consolidate Motion to 
Amend, Marfice 
HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled 
scheduled on 03/18/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 5 DAYS 
HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled 
04/15/2013 09:00 AM) 5 DAYS 
HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
03/21/2013 03:30 PM) 
SVERDSTEN AMENDED Notice of Trial 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing 
NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaint6iffs Answers & 
Responses to Defendants 3rd Set of 
Interrogatories & Requests for Production of 
Documents to Plaintiff 
FILE MITCHELL New File Created #9 
2/12/2013 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/11/2013 01 :30 
PM) Motion to Serve Add'I Discovery, Desmet 
2/14/2013 NTSD CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses 
2/20/2013 HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
03/11/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Serve Add'I Discovery, Desmet 
2/22/2013 ORDR DEGLMAN Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Amend, Motion 
to substitute Real Party in Interest and Motion to 
Consolidate for Trial Purposes Only 
3/6/2013 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 
03/21/2013 03:30 PM) Weeks 
3/7/2013 MNLI CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs 1st Motion In Limine 
NOHG CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing 
3/13/2013 NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service 
3/14/2013 MISC CLEVELAND Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine 
3/18/2013 HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled 
scheduled on 04/15/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 5 DAYS 
HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on 
03/21/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Weeks 
User: HUFFMAN 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
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3/18/2013 HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference 
scheduled on 03/21/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
MISC CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Reply in Support of First Motion in 
Limine 
AFFD CRUMPACKER Affidavit of John W Mack in Support of 
Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
3/20/2013 ADMR SVERDSTEN Administrative assignment of Judge Verby 
SVERDSTEN Order Assigning District Judge Verby 
5/8/2013 HRSC HOFFMAN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
05/16/201310:00AM) To Be Held In Kootenai 
County 
HRSC HOFFMAN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
06/11/2013 09:00 AM) To Be Held In Kootenai 
County 
HOFFMAN Notice of Pretrial Conference/Trial 
HOFFMAN Notice of Pretrial Conference/Trial 
5/14/2013 HRSC BIELEC Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/16/2013 10:00 
AM) Motion to Quash - Ed Holms 
SUBF MITCHELL Subpoena Return/found - E.H. - Witness and 
mileage fees demanded but not tendered at time 
of service 5/14/13 E.H. 
AFFD MITCHELL Affidavit of Edwin B. Holmes in Support of Motion 
to Quash 
MOTN MITCHELL Motion to Quash Subpoena 
MOTN MITCHELL Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing 
NOTH MITC:HFI I Nntir.P. Of HP.::iring nn Mntinn tn 011;:i~h ;:inrl 
Shorten Time 
5/16/2013 DCHH BIELEC Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
05/16/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 pages Motion to Quash -
Ed Holms -----WITHDRAWN-----
DCHH BIELEC Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference 
scheduled on 05/16/2013 10:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 pages To Be Held In 
Kootenai County 
MEMO MCKEON Plaintitrs Memorandum Of Law Regarding 
Determination Of Equitable And Legal Issues 
User: HUFFMAN 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
~tP.vP. VP.rhy 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
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5/16/2013 HRVC HOFFMAN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Steve Verby 
on 06/11/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated To 
Be Held In Kootenai County - 8 days 
5/17/2013 HRSC HOFFMAN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Steve Verby 
06/11/2013 09:00AM) To Be Held In Kootenai 
County - 6/11-6/20 8 days 
HOFFMAN Notice of Trial Steve Verby 
5/21/2013 SDTI CRUMPACKER Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued KCTC Steve Verby 
5/30/2013 PLTX CRUMPACKER First Amended List Of Exhibits Steve Verby 
PLWL CRUMPACKER First Amended Consolidated Witness List Steve Verby 
DFWL CRUMPACKER Trial Witness List(Consolidated) Steve Verby 
DEFX CRUMPACKER Trial Exhibit List(Consolidated) Steve Verby 
6/1/2013 FILE LEU New File Created-----CREATED------#10 Steve Verby 
6/3/2013 AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-J.C.-5/15/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-J.K.-5/16/3 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-K.B.-5/16/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-C.K.-5/16/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-W.M-5/17/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-J.R.-5/18/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-T. L.-5/ 18/ 13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-B.R.-5/18/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-B.P.-5/19/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-K.B.-5/19/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-J.M.-5/20/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-W.W.-5/21/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-A.f.-5/15/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-E.J-5/14/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-R.K.-5/31/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-M.K.-6/1/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-J.B.-5/14/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-J.M.-5/14/13 Steve Verby 
6/4/2013 SUBI CRUMPACKER Subpoena Issued RSH Steve Verby 
SUBI CRUMPACKER Subpoena Issued JR Steve Verby 
MISC LEU Supplement Trial Withness List Steve Verby 
BRIE LEU Defendants' Trial Brief Steve Verby 
MISC LEU Consolidated Proposed Findings Of Fact And Steve Verby 
Conclusions Of Law 
BRIE LEU Consolidated Trail Brief Steve Verby 
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6/4/2013 SUBI CRUMPACKER Subpoena Issued BA Steve Verby 
MISC LEU Defendants' Proposed Finding ins Of Fact And Steve Verby 
Conclusions Of Law 
6/5/2013 AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-B.A.-6/4/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-J.R.-6/4/13 Steve Verby 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-R.H.-6/4/13 Steve Verby 
6/7/2013 PLTX BAXLEY SECOND AMENDED Exhibit List (Plaintiff's) Steve Verby 
DEFX BAXLEY Defendants' Supplemental Trial Exhibit List Steve Verby 
6/10/2013 SUSI BAXLEY Subpoena Issued to DB Steve Verby 
MISC BAXLEY Plaintiffs' Designation Of Kent Abendroth's, Steve Verby 
Wayne Funk's And Jim Van Sky's Deposition 
Testimony 
ORDR LEU Pretrial Order SteveVerby 
6/11/2013 DCHH BIELEC Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled Steve Verby 
scheduled on 06/11/2013 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: To Be Held In Kootenai County-
6/11-6/20 8 days 
6/18/2013 BRIE BAXLEY Plaintiffs' Supplemental Consolidated Trial Brief SteveVerby 
NOTR BAXLEY Notice Of Transcript Delivery - Deponent JR Steve Verby 
8/20/2013 MISC BIELEC ***************FILE 11 EXPANDO CREATED SteveVerby 
************* 
DF Exhibits 
MISC BIELEC ************FILE 12 EXPANDO Steve Verby 
CREA TED*********** 
PL Exhibits 
9/10/2013 MEMO LEU Memorandum Decision And Order Steve Verby 
9/25/2013 NOTC CRUMPACKER Notice of compliance SteveVerby 
3/24/2014 NOTE MEYER File referred to Civil Dept. to call for Final Steve Verby 
Judgment for signature according to the Memo & 
Decision. - see Note 3/24/14 
NOTE MITCHELL Called Atty. Susan Weeks re: Final Steve Verby 
Judgment--Per Susan - She will send another 
e-mail on Friday 3/28 to the Marfice office. 
Attorneys have not agreed upon an order. 
5/5/2014 HRSC HOFFMAN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/22/2014 09:00 Steve Verby 
AM) Presentment of Judgment 
HOFFMAN Notice of Hearing Steve Verby 
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Date: 2/26/2015 
Time: 08:41 AM 
Page 20 of 21 
First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
User: HUFFMAN 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date 
5/22/2014 
5/27/2014 
6/3/2014 
6/4/2014 
6/5/2014 
6/6/2014 
6/26/2014 
6/27/2014 
7/1/2014 
Code 
DCHH 
CVDI 
FJDE 
STAT 
MOTN 
AFIS 
NOHG 
FILE 
MOTN 
MEMO 
HRSC 
STAT 
NOHG 
MEMO 
MEMS 
MOTN 
DCHH 
ORDR 
RTSV 
User 
PEUKERT 
DIXON 
DIXON 
DIXON 
DEGLMAN 
DEGLMAN 
DEGLMAN 
JLEIGH 
JLEIGH 
JLEIGH 
PEUKERT 
PEUKERT 
DEGLMAN 
DEGLMAN 
DEGLMAN 
DEGLMAN 
LUCKEY 
LEU 
DIXON 
HUFFMAN 
Judge 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Steve Verby 
05/22/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, Steve Verby 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
Capstar Radio Operating Company, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 5/22/2014 
Final Judgment And Decree Of Quiet Title And Steve Verby 
Permanent Injunction 
Case status changed: Closed Steve Verby 
Motion For Leave to Withdraw 
Affidavit of Douglas S Marfice in Support of 
Motion For Withdraw! 
Notice Of Hearing 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
**********NEW FILE CREATED************* #13 Steve Verby 
Motion For Reconsideration Steve Verby 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Steve Verby 
Reconsidertion 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw Steve Verby 
06/26/2014 10:00 AM) Marfice motion - 1 hour 
Case status changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Notice Of Hearing 
Memorandum of Costs 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For 
Enlargement of Time Re: Memorandum of Costs 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Motion For Enlargement of Time to Flie Steve Verby 
Memorandum of Costs 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled Steve Verby 
on 06/26/2014 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages 
Order Granting Leave To Withdraw At Attorney Steve Verby 
Proof Of Service-6/26/14-DL and BJL by certified Steve Verby 
mail 
Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Steve Verby 
to Supreme Court Paid by: W Jeremy Carr obo 
Douglas Lawrence Receipt number: 0027810 
Dated: 7/1/2014 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: 
Lawrence, Brenda J (defendant) and Lawrence, 
Douglas P (defendant) 
Date: 4/9/2015 First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County User: HUFFMAN 
Time: 04:48 PM ROA Report 
Page 21 of 21 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
7/1/2014 BNDC HUFFMAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 27811 Dated Steve Verby 
7/1/2014 for 100.00) 
BNDC HUFFMAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 27812 Dated Steve Verby 
7/1/2014 for 3500.00) 
NOTC HUFFMAN Notice of Appeal Steve Verby 
7/3/2014 NOTC HUFFMAN Notice of Substitution of Counsel Steve Verby 
7/9/2014 NOTC HUFFMAN Amended Notice of Appeal Steve Verby 
7/11/2014 CERT HUFFMAN Certificate Of Mailing - Clerk's Certificate Steve Verby 
7012 2920 0001 8385 4851 
7/23/2014 RTCT CLEVELAND Return Certificate - 7/21/14 - ISC Steve Verby 
8/11/2014 HRSC PEUKERT Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/04/2014 10:00 Steve Verby 
AM) DF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
PEUKERT Notice of Hearing Steve Verby 
9/3/2014 MOTN JLEIGH Plaintiff's Motion For Enlargement Of Time and Steve Verby 
To Shorten To Respond To Respond To 
Defendants' Motion To REconsider And Motion 
To Shorten Time To Hear Enlargement 
MEMO JLEIGH Plaintiff's Memorandum In Response To Steve Verby 
Defendants' Motion To Reconsider 
MEMS JLEIGH Plaintiff's Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Steve Verby 
Enlargement Of Time To Respond To 
Defendants' Motion To Reconsider 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiff's Motion For Steve Verby 
Enlargement Of Time To Respond To 
Defendants' Motion To Reconsider And Motion 
To Shorten Time To Hear Enlargement 
9/4/2014 DCHH MORGAN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Steve Verby 
09/04/2014 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Keri Veare 
DF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
TELEPHONNIC CALL (208) 743-9516 
11/10/2014 MEMO MCCOY Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 1) Motion Steve Verby 
for Enlargement of Time and 2) Motion for 
Reconsideration 
2/5/2015 ORDR HUFFMAN Supreme Court Order Augmenting Appeal With Steve Verby 
Prior Appeal Nos 32090,35120 and 38300 
2/17/2015 FJDE LEU Amended Final Judgment Steve Verby 
3/3/2015 MCAF LUNNEN Memorandum Of Costs Steve Verby 
3/16/2015 MISC HUFFMAN Objection to Memorandum of Costs Steve Verby 
.J/9/2015 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/19/2015 03:00 Steve Verby 
PM) fees and costs 
BNDC HUFFMAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 13583 Dated Steve Verby 
4/9/2015 for 39.10) 
NLTR HUFFMAN Notice of Lodging Transcript Steve Verby 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB #4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DECLARING EASEMENT 
RIGHTS 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
on November 27, 2007. The Court having heard the argument of counsel, being fully advised in 
the premises, and having issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion is Granted and the comi hereby declares that Plaintiff has an 
ingress and egress easement by prescription; an easement implied by prior use and an easement 
by necessity across Lawrences' parcel of property located in Section 21, Township 51 North, 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING 
EASEMENT RIGHTS: 1 
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Range 5 West, which easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
2. That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and 
Plaintiffs tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and egress to its site. 
DATEDthis ~dayof .S<Zfkl;.~05. 
I hereby ce1iify that on the k day of ~ , 20 I 0, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas P. and Brenda J. Lawrence 
P.O. Box I 027 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
D U.S. Mail 
Susan P. Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: (208) 664-1684 
D 
i 
r;J-· 
,' · .. ~l . . ·.-.-:;7,.. 
,, 
.. :·,;;:./ 
·. \ '~. 
) \ .. '.y_:,..':>-''·' 
Telecopy (FAX) 
Telecopy (FAX) 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING 
EASEMENT RIGHTS: 2 
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BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD 
30' ROAD EASEMENT 
That ponion of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 
West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, ldaho, more panic.:ularly described as follows· 
Commencing at the: Southeast comer of Section 21, monumented by a 2 Yi" Zmc 
cap, thence westerly along the south line of said secnon, South 89°27' 43" West, 602.57 
feet to the cemc:rline of Apple Blossom Mountain Ro::id wd the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
thence continuing along said section line South 89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the 
North right-of-way of Apple .Blossom road, 
thence leaving said section line and comini..nng along the said North right-of-way 
the following courses and distances; 
thence 255.30 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of750.23 feet, and a 
long chord that bears Nonh 12°42'32" East, 254.07 feet; 
thence North 18°35'46" East, 164.80 feet; 
thence North 26°21' 12" East, 43.85 feet; 
thence 157.70 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of 90.06 feet, and a 
long chord that bears North 79°21 '30" East, 138.32 feet; 
thence South 50°55'04" East, 163.40 feet; 
thence South 58°42'22" East, 163.84 feet; 
thence South 61 °12'45'' East, 54 65 feet; 
thence South 64°56'20" East, 41.65 feei to the East line of Section 21; 
thence leaving said right-of-way along said Section Jme South 00°19'03" East, 
33 2U feet to tht: South nght-of-way of Apple Blossom Road; 
thence continuing along said right-of-way th~ following courses and distance; 
thence North 64°56'20" West, 56.86 feet; 
thence North 61 °12'45" West, 56.28 feet; 
thence North 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet; 
thenct: Nonh 50°55'03" West, 165.66 feet; 
thence 104.52 feet along a curve to the left having a radius of 60.06 feel and a 
long chord which bears South 79u4J '04" West, 91.82 foet; 
thence South 26°21 '12" West, 40 99 fet!t, 
thence South 18°35'46" West, 163.79 feet; 
EXHIBIT___:.A_ 
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~ 
Engm~ers SurveyLlr::; Planners 
thence 244.25 feeI along a curve to the left, having a radius of 720.23 frer, and a 
long chord thal bears South 12°49' 18" West, 243.09 fet!t to the South line of Section 
21; 
thence leaving said right-of-way Westerly .ilong said Section line South 
89°27'43'' West, 15.03 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 0. 704 acres, more or less. 
END OF DESCRIPTION 
Prepared by: 
J-U-B ENGINEERS, Inc. 
Ronald M. Hodge, P.L.S. 
RMH/!ll.C.: 
J' \Pr()J.;cm20-<)."1-087 Wcck:Hilus~ulTI Mtn/b1no.u111_lt!J .. cJSCITl~n1.oe>c 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB #4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF ID/1HO 1 ss 
.COUNTY OF KOOT~t-J.AI ~ 3 1 FILE~: 1 ¢: -- . ,- D 
AT :. 6 0 O'CLOCKtM (JJlfERK, D. IS~O~· 
... l(J{l!i1 C 
.. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
~7.>E.--D 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DECLARING EASEMENT 
RIGHTS 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
on November 27, 2007. The Court having heard the argument of counsel, being fully advised in 
the premises, and having issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion is Granted and th~ court hereby declares that Plaintiff has an 
ingress and egress easement by prescription; an easement implied by prior use and an easement 
by necessity across Lawrences' parcel of property located in Section 21, Tovmship 51 North, 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING 
1:"/\QCl\A'Cl\TTPTr.T-TTC:, 1 
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Range 5 West, which easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
2. That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and 
Plaintiffs tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and egress to its site. 
DA TED this ~ day of 
I hereby certify that on the lL_ day of c):.Jc- , 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas P. and Brenda J. Lawrence 
P.O. Box 1027 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
D U.S. Mail 
D Telecopy (FAX) 
Telecopy (FAX) 
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BLOSSOM MOUNTAm ROAD 
JO' ROAD EASEMENT 
That ponion of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 
West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, ldaho, more particularly described as folJows· 
Commencing at lht: Southeast corner of Section 21, monumented by a 2 Yz'' Zmc 
cap, thence westerly along the south line of said seen on, Sou.Th 89°27' 43" W c:st, 602.57 
feel to the cem~rline of Apple Blos:=.om Mounrain Ro~d ~nd the PO TNT OF 
BEGINNING. 
thence continuing along said section line Sourh 89°2 7' 43" West, 15 .03 feet to the 
Nonh right-of-way of Apple .Blossom road, 
thence leaving said section line and cominu.mg along rhe said Nonh right-of-way 
the following course$ and distances; 
thence 255.30 feet along a curve to !he right, having a radius of 750.23 feet, and a 
long chord that bears North 12Q42 '32" East, 254.07 feet; 
thence North 18°35'46" East, 164.80 feet; 
thence North 26°21' 12" East, 43.85 feet; 
thence 157.70 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of 90.06 feet, and a 
long chorq that bears North 79°21 '30" East, 138.32 feet; 
thence South 50°55'04" East, 163.40 feet; 
thence South 58°42'22" East, 163.84 feet; 
thence South 61 °12'45'' East, 54 65 feet; 
thence South 64 °56 '20" East, 41.65 feei to the East line of Sect10n 21; 
thence leaving s::iid right-of-way along said Section lme South 00°19'03" East, 
33 2U feet to tht: South nght-of-way of Apple Blossom Road; 
thence continuing along said right-of-way th~ following courses and distance~ 
thence North 64°56'20" West, 56.86 feet; 
thence North 61 °12'45" West, 56.28 feet; 
i:hence North 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet; 
thenct North 50°55'03" West, 165.66 feet; 
thence 104.52 feet along a curve to the lefl having a radius of 60.06 fe~t and a 
long chord which beur.s South 79"41 '04" West, 91.82 feet; 
thence Somh 26°21 '12" West, 40 99 feel, 
thence South 18°35'46'' Wesi, 163.79 feet; 
EXHIBIT___..:..A _____ 
---- - - - . 
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~ 
Engme:er.s Survey0~ Planners 
thence 244.25 feer along a curve to the left, having a radius of 720.23 fcer, and a 
long chord thal bears South 12°49' 18" Wesr, 243.09 fecr IO the South line of Secrion 
21; 
thence leaving said right-of-way Westerly ~long said Section line South 
89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Comaining 0. 704 acres, more or less. 
END OF DESCRIPT10N 
Prepared by: 
J-U-B ENGINEERS, Inc. 
Ronald M. Hodge, P.LS. 
RMH/Gl.C 
f- \PruJ.:ci;\20-()4-087 w~~~.5-)-;lu,.sum rvlln/tilno,1.h11_1W __ cJ5C!'n.:n!.Ooc 
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-..- , 11 ~ ~6D11~\~j\~Ai} SS In tne ~upreme Court of the StaftEOf .tua110 
CAPSTARRADIO OPERATING ) 
COMP ANY, a Delaware corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE andBRENDAJ. ) 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
2010 OFC 17 PM Ii: 4J3 
C ~K Dl~T~l~yebUR,~ / 
I~{ a_~ o, ~!IT yV ,._,,. 
\ 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38300-2010 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671 
A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed February 2, 2009, in appeal 
No. 35120, Capstar v. Lawrence; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record m this case shall be 
AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Cierk's Record filed in prior appeal 
No. 35120. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the 
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included 
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 35120. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and 
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court, which shall 
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings 
included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 35120. The LIMITED CLERK'S 
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement. 
Further, the exhibits submitted in prior appeal No. 35120, are not covered by this Order and they 
will not be sent to the Supreme Court unless specifically requested by the parties. The party 
requesting any or all of the prior exhibits must specifically designate those exhibits being requested. 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL- Docket No. 38300-2010 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 32 of 214
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
For the Supreme Court 
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Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-221 O 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH, CLERK 
Attn: TODD IN CIVIL 
KOOTENAI COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
PO BOX 9000 DC 
COEUR DALENE, ID 83816-9000 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED (C) 
Docket No. 38300-2010 CAPSTAR RADIO 
OPERATING COMPANY v. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE 
Kootenai County District Comi 
#2002-7671 
A NOTICE OF APPEAL in the above-entitled matter was filed in this office on 
NOVEMBER 26, 2010. The DOCKET NUMBER shown above will be used for this appeal 
regardless of eventual Court assignment. 
The CLERK'S RECORD must be filed in this office on or before FEBRUARY 9, 2010. 
12/08/2010 DB 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Co mis 
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Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH, CLERK 
Attn: TODD IN CIVIL 
KOOTENAI COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
PO BOX 9000 DC 
COEUR DALENE, ID 83816-9000 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE FILED 
Docket No. 38300-2010. CAP ST AR RADIO 
OPERATING 
COMPANYv. 
DOUGLASP. 
LAWRENCE 
Kootenai County District Court 
#2002-7671 
Enclosed is a copy of the CLERK'S CERTIFICATE for the above-entitled appeal, which 
was filed in this office on NOVEMBER 26, 2010. 
Please carefully examine the TITLE and the CERTIFICATE and advise· the District Court 
Clerk (or the Agency secretary, if applicable) AND this office of any errors detected on this 
document. 
The TITLE in the CERTIFICATE must appear on all DOCUMENTS filed in this Court, 
including all BRIEFS. An abbreviated version of the TITLE may be used if it clearly identifies the 
paiiies to this appeal when the title is extremely long. 
12/08/2010 DB 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF''t:i-IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff1Respondent, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_________________ ) 
Appeal from: First Judicial District, Kootenai County 
Honorable: JOHN T. MITCHELL, Presiding 
Case Number from Court: CV-02-7671 
CIVIL CASE NO. 
CV 02-7671 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 
)> 
w 
.r;:: 
U'I 
Orders or Judgments appealed from: 1. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, dated February 6, 2008; 
2. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING 
EASEMENT RIGHTS 
Attorney for Plaintiff: Susan P. Weeks 
Attorney for Appellants: Pro Se 
Appealed by: Defendants 
Appealed against: Plaintiff 
Notice of Appeal Filing Date: November 10, 2010 FILED - ORIGINAL 
NOV 2 6 20!0 
SuprL.em~e~C~ou".':"rt~---;:c::-:.osu7::+rtb~~eaJi:ls~ 
Entered on AT 
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Amended Notice of Appeal Filing Date: N/A 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: NIA 
Appellant Fee Paid: Yes 
Request for Additional (Clerk's) (Agency's) Filed: No 
Name of Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Was Repmier's Transcript Requested? Yes 
Dated: November 23, 2010 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
Clerk of District Court 
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09/15/2011 09:45 2085545741 
SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB #4255 
JA11ES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln. Way 
Coeur. d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JAMES VERN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RAD TO OPERA TING COMP ANY, 
a Delaware corporation, · 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE~ husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
.JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
The Court having previously issued. its opinion and orders in the above matter, and 
pursuant to Rule 54(a), J.R.C.P., final judgment is entered as follows: 
TT JS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 1 L 
PAGE 02/10 
.(«- j11M"'-1 ::iuJ.'1-k -"' 1),ec;;l.n..:, U\l~ ~~~'{> l&.7--
1. Plaintiffs Motion \Et Gra11ted and the court hereby declares that Plaintiff has an 
··· ·· · -·· . " ~ .s'1'4~l.,... 3"1 20.to, . .. 
ingress and egress casement by prescription; an easement implied. by prior u.se and an. easement 
by necessity across Lavnences' parcel of property located in Section 21, Township 51 North, 
Range 5 West, which easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A'' attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
Receivea Timer}Sep, 15.J2011>I 9:43AM No. 1848 
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2. That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and egress to its site. 
DATED this \ S'"~day of S e.-p\.-e-.~r , 2005. 
~--~~ JO T. CHELL rnstriJu ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / 5 day of ~- , 2011, I caused. to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method -indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas P. and Brenda J. La.vnence 
P.O. Box 1027 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
D U.S. Mail 
Susan P. Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 8 .l 4 
Fax: (208) 664-1684 
::£-~~- s~ c~ 
*\t~i 
Received Tirnel\Sep.15.M011E 9:43AM:No. 1848 
D Telecopy (FAX) 
Telecopy (FAX) 
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No-!, 5. 2010 .. 9:49AM- ' 'EDLAIWER HAYMES MITCHELL PETE- ---No.6092-P, 4/5---/ • . • 
// / 
BLOSSOM MOUNTATNR.OAD 
30' ROAD EASEME:t-.r"T 
That portion oftb1: Southeast 1/4 of Section. 21. Town'shli, 50 North. Range 5 
W!:!st., Boise Meridian, Koohmai County, Idaho, more partii::ularly de:scribed as. follows: 
Commencing at the South~a.i:::t corner of Sectioo. 21. mcmumeb.too by a. 2 i;;·• Zinc 
c.i.p,. thence westerly along the south line of said section. South 89°.27'4r West, 602.57 
feet to the centerline of App1e tll.osi-om Mountain Rn~~ .:i..Tlr! t1J¢ PO!N'i OF 
BEGJNN'TNG. · 
thence continuing along said bOction line South 89?27'43" West. 15 .. 0J feet to the 
Nort.h right .. of~way of Apple B)os~om mad; · 
thencl!: kaving 1:;aid section line and continuing along the: said North right-of-way 
the: fo11owing courses and dist<tnces; 
th~noe 255.30 fc~t aiong a curve to fbe right, hrrving a radius of 750 .. 23 feet, and a 
k,ng chord that bta.rs North 12~42'3.2" East, 25&.07 fuc~ 
thence North 18°35"46" :Ea~t 16&..80 feet; 
thence North 26021 '12" East. .13.85 fei:,t; 
thenc;e 157. 70 fce::t along a curve to the right.. having a radius of 90.06 feet. ancl .a 
long chord that bears North 79°21 '30" East. 138.32 feet: 
thence South 50°55 ·oi:t··· Ea.~t, 163 .40 feet: 
thence South sg~.a.2 · 22" East. 163.84 feet; 
thimcc South 61 c-12'45" :East.. 54.65 fo~. 
thence South 64°56~20'"'I East 4 l w65 feet t.n the East hn~ of Section 2 l~ 
thence leaving saJd right-of-,vay along said Section line South 00° 19"03 •· East, 
3.3 .. 20 fr;e.t to the South rigl,t-of-way of App)e. Blos~.om P--oad:, 
thcricc c:onfinu.ing along sa.id right-of~wzy the following coUrses a.nd dista.."1.c:.c: 
thence North 64°56'20"' We.st. 56.86 focc.:t 
thel"lce North. 61 fl 12··i15· .. We:s;t, 56.28 feet: 
thence North 53ti42·2r W~, 166.54 foet; 
thence North 50°55'03" West. 165.66 feet: 
thence 10..:1..52 fec:t along A curve to the left having a radius of 60. OG fet!t and :a 
lcmg r.hord which bears S01!th 79°&. J ·04·· W~st. 91.82 feet: 
thence South 26°21. '12"' West, A.0.99 feot: 
thence South 1 8° 35 '&.G'" We1<t, 163. 79 feel, 
Rec e i v e d T i rn e Se p. 15. 2 0 11 9 : 4 3 AM No, 1 8 4 8 EXHIBfT__,_d~ 
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Mov. 5. 2010• 9:d9AM- EDLANDER HAYMES MITCHELL PETE-
--•No.6092EmP. 5/5--• 
.r. 
.it! 
./ e e 
:ii!'" 
;;f 
;fl· 
.,·}!f;J/:~ j.?:-'''(,f·Q·~ 
?~a-inccn; Surv~yo~ Planners 
thenc~ 244.2.5 fo!?t along a curv-e to the lc:ft, h2.ving a.1'ad1us of 720.23 feel and a 
long chord that bears South 121)49'1&··· West. 243 .. 09 feet to the South line of Section 
2L 
th£tIC.e k:avm,g said rlgbt-of~way Westerly along said Section line. South 
89~27'43"' West. 15.03 feet to the POTNT OF BEGJNNlNG. 
Containing 0 .. 704 acres .. m.ore or less. 
END Of DESCR1PTION 
Prepared. by; 
J ~U~B ENGINEERS. !De .. 
Rol"lald M .. Hodge, P.L..S 
Rl-{1-JtBI..C 
F •ll",nJr.41,tl.20-D<I~' 1.1,'J:('h-B lti~s11m Mtn/Bl~~1:t>1T1_1tD_car.eme111 ,doc 
Re c e i v e d T i me Se p, 15, ·2 0 11 9 : 4 3 AM No, 1 8 4 8 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tt 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMP ANY a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LA WREN CE and 
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, husband 
Aand wife, 
Defendants/ Appellate, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 
CV 2002-7671 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce1iify that I picked up a copy of the Clerk's record on Appeal 
X a. f ...J.--· . 7"'I . / . l , , .'..,c..1t-V 111 r;.-U tr1 
1626 Lincoln Way · 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Susan Weeks 
STATE OF 10~\HO I sc 
;:OUNTY OF KOOTENAd ~ 
Flt.ED: 
2011 APR -l; PM I: 39 
IN WITNJ;:~S WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this I. day of Fel3rua-r;', 20lfr. 
~~II 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT~}!fk~ k~AfW~ Li: 38 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTE~)\:THK o~,TR 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING ) \~---.....!-..=-.::.----' 
COMPANY a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LA WR.ENCE and 
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, husband 
Aancl wife, 
Defendants/ Appellate, 
) OEPIITV 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 
CV 2002-7671 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce1iify that I picked up a copy of the Clerk's record on Ar:~~ 
Douglas Lawrence ~---~ / · 
PO Box I 027 , _______ ,,. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
----~ 
/ 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have un o set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 1 ;-- day of February, 20 I 0. 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of the District Court 
/ 
I 
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, I' 
, , . · STAT£ GF IDAHG ·1 
. COUNTY OF ~.PQ..TQ'Att SS In the Supreme Court of .the State 011aano 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERA TING ) 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
2011 SEP 19 PH 3: 57 
CLERK DISTR~T COURT 
~lle ~t~) ~J DEPUTY 
ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL AND 
ORDER DIRECTING THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SHOW 
CAUSE ___.. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38300-2010 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671 
On November 10, 2010, Appellants filed their notice of appeal. As it appears that no final 
judgment has been entered, IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal shall be SUSPENDED, 
pending entry of a final judgment. 
WHEREAS, informal efforts by a staff attorney for this Court to resolve the procedural 
difficulty presented in this appeal have not been fruitful; and 
WHEREAS, on August 25, 2010, this Court released its opinion in this matter, dismissing 
the appeal for lack of a final judgment, Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 623, 
238 P.3d 223 (2010); and 
WHEREAS, on September 8, 2010, Appellants filed their Motion Requesting the Court 
Enter a Final Judgment; and 
WHEREAS, on December 3, 2010, the district court entered its Amended Order Granting 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaring Easement Rights, effective nunc pro tune 
-···----·· ··--·---
- ---- -- - ·-- - . - ····-· ·- .... ·---·· . -
to September 30, 2010; and 
WHEREAS, the district court's Amended Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Declaring Easement Rights appears to resolve all claims for relief, except costs and 
fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action; and 
WHEREAS, it appears to this Court that the district court has willfully refused to comply 
with the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a), by failing to denominate a document 
ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL AND ORDER DIRECTING THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT O~., IN THE ALTERNTIVE, TO SHOW CAUSE - Docket No. 
38300-2010 
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which effectively resolves the controversy between the parties as a "Judgment" or "Decree," 
effectively depriving Appellants of their ability to obtain appellate review of the decisions of the 
district court; 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to the authority granted the Idaho Supreme 
Court by Article V, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution, that the Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge of 
the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, shall, within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, 
either enter a judgment complying, in all respects, with the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(a) in Kootenai County Case No. CV 02-7671, or alternatively, SHOW CAUSE why 
this Court should not enter forthwith its Order compelling him to enter a judgment complying, in all 
respects, with the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a). 
DATED this JL{t- dayofSeptember,2011. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, 'lerk 
cc: Douglas P. Lawrence, pro se appellant 
Brenda J. Lawrence, pro se appellant 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge John T. Mitchell 
ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL AND ORDER DIRECTING THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT OR, IN THE AL TERNTIVE, TO SHOW CAUSE - Docket No. 
38300-2010 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB #425 5 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JAMES VERN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
PAGE 02/10 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERA TING COMP ANY, 
a Delaware corporation, · Case No. E~-7671 ~7'-' !pft2-
~NT ANDDECREE Plaintiff. 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE~ husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
The Court having previously issued. its opinion and orders in the above matter, and 
pursuant to Rule 54(a), J.R.C.P., final judgment is entered as follows: 
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: .., l. h. 1&1""'-
.(«-J,~"Y-1 ::;vi,_\. ~ 1).ec,~ u~~ ~')"\-
1. Plaintiff's Motion. liEf Gra11ted and the court hereby declares that Plaintiff has an 
A. A I 
"""" .s~,~l ,- 3 fJ1 ~to, 
ingress and egress casement by prescription; an easement implied. by prior u.5e and an. easement 
by necessity across Lawrences' parcel of property located in Section 21, To'WnShip 51 North, 
Range 5 West, which easement is more particularly described in Exhibit 0'A~' atta.ched hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
Rec e i v e a T i m eff18 e o. 15. ,'/'? 0 111 f 9 : 4 i AM No. 18 4 8 
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2. That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and egress to its site. 
iv~ 1-,, 
DATED this \ 5"°-«,..day of s er.\-e-.-S r '100j_ Z-o ~ '\.-~~ ( 1,;( fo .,,_ V 
0 ,rt, ( S 1,, µ t) 1/\6- I / {<,.J""" I 
-to 7{,,t ~--~~ JO~CHELL 
Djstd Ju ge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of c[44;v:, . , 201~ I ca.used to be served a 
true and. correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas P. and Brenda J. La"WI'ence 
P.O. Box 1027 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
D U.S.Mail 
Susan. P. Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Ale11e, ID 838 l.4 
Fa.x: (208) 664-1684 
~---~ s~ c~ 
-*\t6i 
'f/1)~(\ 
D 
-~ 
I 
Telecopy (FAX) 
Telecopy (FAX) 
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---No,60~2-p. 4;5---
// 
No,;. 5, 2010- 9:49AM- ' EDLANDER HAYMES MITCHELL PETE-/ : . w / 
BLOSSOM MOUNT A TN R.O.A.D 
30' ROAD EASEMENT 
e 
That portion of tbc Southeast 1/4 of Section 21. Towo'shlp .50 North. Range 5 
W~st., Boise Meridian, Xoobmai County, Idaho1 more pa.tii::ularly d~scribed as follows: 
Comrncnc:ing at the South~.z..~t corner cf Sectfoti. 21. mcmumen.too by a. 2 W' Zinc 
cap. i:henc~ westerly along the south line of said section. South 89°27'43'. West, 502.57 
fo.et to the centerline of Appfo 'Bl,osi-om Mountain R.n~c1.:i."lr! t1,c: 'POJ~'i OF 
BEGJ'NNING. · 
thence continufn,g .along said 5octtcm line South 89?2 7" 43" West. 15,,0J foct to the 
North right~of·way of Apple B}o~om rnad; · 
thencir: lE:aving ~aid seot\on line and continuing along ths said North right-of.way 
the: fo11ow;ng courses and d;stances; 
thi::11oe 255.30 fo~t a'Jong a curve to fbe right. having a t~clius of 7S0 .. 23 feet, and a 
lon,g chord, that bta,rs North 12~ 42 '3:Z" Ea.st. 254.07 .fr:ct:, 
thence North 18°35.46" Eas:t. l6A._80 feet; 
thence North 26021 'l 2" Easl .13.85 feet; 
thenc;e 157.70 fce:talong a curve to the righl having a radius of90-06feet, and a 
long chord tha.t bears North 79°21 '30 .. East. 138.32 feet: 
thence South 50°55'0'1"" Ea.~t. 163 .40 feet: 
thence Sou1ii. 58~.d2 ·22" East. 163.84 feet; 
thsnccSouth 6l"'l2'45"Ea.st. 5A..6S fr~. 
t.hcnce South 6.::1. 056'20'" East. 4 J.65 feet to the East line of Section 2 L 
thence leaving sai.d right-of-way along said Section line Sciuth 00,;,1 ro,3•· East, 
33 .. 20 fre.t to the South righH:,f-way of App)e. Bloss.om Roa.d; 
thence: continuing along said rignt-of .. way the following cou.rses and d1sta.."1c:.c: 
thence North 64°56"20"' West. 56.86 feet 
the:.hce North, 61 ei 12''d.S'" W~s;t;, 56.28 fee:t: 
thenc~ North 5Sti42·22·" W~. 166.S4 met: 
thence North $0°55'03"' West. l 5S.6G feet 
th~ni;e 104..52 feet a.long A curve to the left having a radius of 60.0G f~t and :a. 
li:mg- c:hord which bears S011th 791.1&.J ·o&·· W~t. 91.82 feet: . 
thence South 26"'21. ·1r West, A.0,99 fe~: 
thmcc Se>uf:h J Bt.1 35 'd.f' W e~t. 163. 79 feel, 
Poeo:\/crl T:mc ~en 1~ 1011 Q,,:1.~AM ~In 1A,:1.A EXHIBft ___ d,....__ 
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Nov. 5. 2010• 9:d9AM- EDLANDER HAYNES MJTCHELL PETE-
--•No. 6092DIIP. 5/5---• 
.r.· 
if 
d' • a 
,,.;ir .. .. 
.~ 
.# 
'fl· 
.. ~:::.~: .. :t.~U-B ~ 
,r-· .. ~·,,: V ~
t~r.iiinccn; Surv~yo~ Planners 
thence 24d..2.5 fe~t along a curve to the kfl. ha.ving Hadius of 720 .23 feet. a.nd ii 
long c:hord that bears South 121)49' 18" West. 243 .. 09 feet to the Soulh line of Section 
21: 
tbqice kav111,g said right-of-way Westerly along said Section lin.c. South 
89~27'.d3" West. 15.03 fe~tto thcP01NT OF BEGIN1-J1NG. 
Containing 0 .. 704 acres .. m.ore or less .. 
Et-.1D OF DESCR1PTION 
Prepared. oy: 
J~U-B ENGINEERS, I.cc .. 
Ronald M, Hod.ge; P.L..S 
R.M!-JIBLC 
F' •11',l'IJr.,t.~~1.0-D<I~~, \.l.'~1:.-Slt>~svm M1 .. 1Blciciwm_RD _~.:i.r.emer1z ,cioc 
RuPivP~ TimP ~Pn 1~ ·?011 0·41AM Nn 1R4R 
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••:man~ '' IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO fOU_NTY OF KOOTEH.6-Jl' JS 
Docket No. 38300 , ILED: 
2012 MAY 31 AH 11: 38 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
) 
: Coeur d'Alene, April 201\!C frl}ISTRICT CUtJ 
) 2012 Opinion No. 80 ·OE ur 1ld Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
) 
) Filed: May 29, 2012 
) 
DOUGLASP.LAWRENCEandBRENDA 
J. LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) 0..\1 c2DD~ / Lil I 
) 
) 
Appeal from the district court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
The order of the district court granting summary judgment is reversed and this 
case is remanded for trial on remaining easement theories. The district court's 
decision denying the Motion for Disqualification is affirmed and the district 
court's ruling that appellants' defenses of laches and statute of limitations 
were without merit is affirmed. No attorney's fees on appeal are awarded and 
costs on appeal are awarded to appellants. 
Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, Coeur d'Alene, appellants prose. 
James, Vernon & Weeks, Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Susan P. Weeks 
argued. 
W. JONES, Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a dispute over whether Capstar Radio Operating Company, 
("Capstar"), holds an easement over the property of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence. Capstar 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging in the alternative, that an easement existed based 
on the theory of either an easement by implication, an easement by necessity, or a prescriptive 
easement. The district court filed its Order granting summary judgment, finding that Capstar 
holds an easement implied by prior use, an easement by prescription, and an easement by 
necessity. The Lawrences appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court erred in granting 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 50 of 214
summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist. The Lawrences also argue that 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itseif for aiieged bias, and that the 
lower court' erred in determining that the La'vvrences' defenses of latches and statute of 
limitations were meritless. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Appellants, Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, and the Respondent, Capstar, own 
parcels of property on Blossom Mountain, which is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The 
Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Capstar parcel is 
located just to the east of the Lawrence parcel in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Section 21 
lies directly west of Section 22. At one time, both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel 
were part of a larger tract of land owned in unity by Harold and Marlene Funk, referred to herein 
as the "Funk parcel." The Funks purchased the Funk parcel in 1969 which consisted of parts of 
land in Section 15, Section 21, and Section 22. 
In 1966, the General Telephone Company, (the "GTC"), obtained an easement to access 
its acre of land in Section 22 (not the Capstar parcel) over a private road owned by Wilber Mead 
that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Mead's property), then moved south and 
entered the north half of Section 28 1 where it then turned northeast and entered the southeast 
quarter of Section 21 (over the Lawrence parcel) and into the southwest quarter of Section 22 
(near the Capstar parcel). Mead included a condition that the GTC was to erect and maintain a 
locked gate on the property. Harold Funk testified that when he and his wife purchased the Funk 
parcel, the private easement road -that was used by the GTC to access its parcel, was the 
exclusive means of accessing the Funks' property in the southeast quarter of Section 21 and in 
the southwest quarter of Section 22. In 1972, Mead granted the Funks an easement over the 
private road which crossed Mead's property in the southwest quarter of Section 21. There is a 
dispute about whether Funk used the access road prior to Mead granting the easement. Funk 
testified that, prior to Mead granting the easement, Mead allowed Funk to drive across his 
property, but Funk wanted to purchase the easement so that any successors in interest would 
have the same easement access. However, in his affidavit, Mead testified that "[f]rom the gate's 
construction until the time I granted Harold Funk an easement in 1972, the [GTC] had the only 
1 Section 28 lies directly south of Section 21. The owner of Section 28 is not a party to this lawsuit. 
2 
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other key to this gate. To my knowledge, Harold Funk did not use this gate to access his 
property." 
In 1975, the Funks broke off the Lawrence parcel and sold it to Human Synergistics, Inc., 
but retained their land in Section 22. The sales agreement to Human Synergistics stated that the 
"Section 21 parcel was being sold subject to an ingress/egress easement over the existing road on 
the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." The contract was a title retaining 
contract in which the grant of the Lawrence parcel, and any easement over it, was contingent 
upon the fulfillment of the sales contract. Human Synergistics paid off the contract in 1992 and 
the Funks issued a warranty deed conveying title to Human Synergistics on October 29, 1992. 
Funk testified that after the sale, he and his wife continued to use the private easement road in 
Section 21 to access their property in Section 22. In 1989, the Funks broke off the Capstar parcel 
and sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. John Rook, the owner 
of Kootenai Broadcasting, testified that at the time of the purchase, the private easement road 
crossing over Section 21 was the only access to its property in Section 22, now the Capstar 
parcel. 
The respective parcels passed through several other hands before either the Lawrences or 
Capstar purchased them. The chain of title established for the Lawrence parcel is as follows: 
Funks to Human Synergistics; Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh; Johnston & McHugh 
to N.A.P.; N.A.P. to Farmanian; Farmanian to the Lawrences. The Lawrences purchased their 
property in 1996. The chain of title established for the Capstar parcel is as follows: Funks to 
Kootenai Broadcasting; Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting; Rook Broadcasting to 
AGM; AGM to Capstar. Capstar purchased its parcel in 2000. 
From a public road, known as Signal Point Road, Capstar seeks an easement to access its 
property over an unimproved private road known as Blossom Mountain Road. Signal Point 
Road lies to the west of the Lawrence parcel. Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the 
Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In 2002, the Lawrences questioned 
Capstar' s right to access its property over the p01iion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed 
the Lawrences' property. On November 7, 2002, Capstar filed suit for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, seeking to have an easement declared based on the following four alternative theories: 1) 
express easement, 2) easement by implication, 3) easement by necessity, and 4) prescriptive 
easement. Capstar moved for summary judgment on the four theories and the district court 
found that Capstar held an express easement over the Lawrence parcel based upon an earlier 
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contract between two other parties. The lower court did not address Capstar's other easement 
theories. The Lawrences appealed, and this Court vacated the district court's decision, finding 
that no express easement over the Lawrences' property was retained by Capstar's predecessor in 
interest, and remanded the case back to the district court. Capstar Radio Operating Co., v. 
Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 708, 152 P.3d 575, 579 (2007). 
On remand, Capstar renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining 
theories of easement by implication from prior use, an easement by necessity, and a prescriptive 
easement. The Lawrences subsequently filed a motion to disqualify District Judge Mitchell for 
cause. The district judge heard evidence and issued a written decision declining to disqualify 
himself. On February 6, 2008, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that an easement by implication, or 
in the alternative, that an easement by necessity, or a prescriptive easement existed over the 
Lawrences' property. The district court also rejected the Lawrences' defense of laches and 
statute of limitations as meritless. The Lawrences again appealed, but this Court dismissed the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no separate final judgment entered. Capstar 
Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 623, 625-26, 238 P.3d 223, 225-26 (2010). The 
Lawrences then moved the lower court to enter a final judgment, and the district court issued a 
separate Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaring Easement 
Rights. On November 10, 2010, the Lawrences properly filed their Notice of Appeal to this 
Court. The district court entered final judgment on September 15, 2011. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in granting Capstar's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to disqualify itself for cause? 
3. Whether the district court erred in determining that the Lawrences' defenses of laches 
and statute of limitations were meritless? 
4. Whether the Lawrences are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal? 
IV. ST ANDARDOF REVIEW 
On appeal from the grant of a '11otion for rnmmary judgment, this Court utilizes the same 
standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). Summary judgment is 
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The facts must be liberally construed 
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in favor of the non-moving party. Renzo v. Idaho State Dep 't. of Agric., 149 Idaho 777,779,241 
P.3d 950, 952 (2010). 
When an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court may, in ruling 
on the motions for summary judgment, draw probable inferences arising from the 
undisputed evidentiary facts. Drawing probable inferences under such 
circumstances is permissible because the court, as the trier of fact, would be 
responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial. However, if reasonable 
persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper. 
Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,222,220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment Because Genuine Issues 
of Material Fact Exist 
All the evidence relating to the three easement theories present genuine issues of material 
fact and these issues were not properly resolved on summary judgment. Summary judgment was 
not a proper method to dispose of a case with so much conflicting evidence. No request for a 
jury trial has been made in the case at hand. Although the court, as the trier of fact, may draw 
the most probable inferences from the undisputed evidence, there are enough genuine issues of 
material fact to warrant deciding the rnerit3 of the case at trial. There is a fine line between 
drawing the most probable inferences and weighing the evidence, and this Court holds the belief 
that the district court should have allowed the case to go to trial in order to weigh the conflicting 
evidence and test the credibility of the witnesses. 
1. Easement by Implication 
"An easement by implication requires a showing of ( 1) unity of title and subsequent 
separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use of an access; and (3) 
reasonable necessity for an easement." Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681 
P.2d 1010, 1017 (1984) (citing Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. 
App. 1983)). This doctrine presumes that if an access was in use at the time of severance, such 
use was meant to continue. Bob Danie_ls & Sons, 106 Idaho at 542, 681 P.2d at 1017. Strict 
necessity is not required to establish an implied easement by prior use. Davis v. Peacock, 133 
Idaho 637, 642-43, 991 P.2d 362, 367-68 (1999). The party seeking to establish the easement 
must prove reasonable necessity. Id. "Reasonable necessity is something less than the great 
present necessity required for an easement implied by necessity." Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. 
The district court found that Capstar established an easement by implication from prior 
use. The district court relied on Funk's affidavit testimony to support its finding that after the 
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1975 sale to Human Synergistics, the easement road crossing Blossom Mountain was the only 
existing road to access the Funks' property in Section 22. The court aiso found apparent and 
continuous use of the private easement road to access the Funks' property in Section 22 after the 
sale of the Capstar parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting in 1989. 
This Court agrees that Capstar proved the first element because the Funks originally held 
the Funk parcel, which included the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel, in unity of title and 
then subsequently severed the unity when the Funks sold the Lawrence parcel to Human 
Synergistics. A central question, however, is when separation occurred; as such a determination 
is relevant to how the "apparent continuous use" is measured. In 1975, the Funks entered into a 
sales contract to sell the southeast quarter of Section 21 (the Lawrence parcel) to Human 
Synergistics, but retained legal title of the Lawrence parcel until Human Synergistics paid off the 
contract in 1992. The question of whether separation occurs at the time of a sales contract or 
whether separation occurs at the time legal title passes is a matter of first impression for Idaho 
courts. The district court and the parties assumed that 1975 (the date of the sales contract) was 
the relevant date but did not discuss their rationale for doing so. In deciding this question, we 
find that the district court and the parties were correct and that it is the creation of a possessory 
interest that creates the necessary separation. In this, we follow the Washington courts that have 
found that the "substantial rights in the land" created through the real estate contract create the 
relevant separation. Bays v. Haven, 777 P.2d 562, 564 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). For instance, 
generally, a "vendee under a real estate contract has the right to possession of the land, the right 
to dominion and control of the land, and the right to cultivate and harvest the crops grown on the 
land." Id. If implied easements are based on the presupposition that the parties would not have 
agreed to this transa.ction except with some tacit understanding that an easement would exist, that 
presupposition should arise at the time of the contract as that is when the understanding would 
arise. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses§ 24 ("The basis of the general principle as to 
the implication of an easement from a preexisting use is the presumed or probable intention of 
the parties to the conveyance as disclosed by all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.") 
(Footnotes omitted). 
However, the record presents genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the 
Funks' use of the easement road was apparent and continuous and whether it was reasonably 
necessary to use the Blossom Mountain access road to reach their property in Section 22. The 
Lawrences submitted evidence through the affidavit of Bruce Anderson, a Kootenai County 
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surveyor, testifying that Mellick Road, which was made public in 1910, extended into land 
owned by the Funks in Section 15 when the Funks took titie to their land. Capstar argues that 
Mellick Road did not extend all the way into the Funks' Section 22 property and that it was not 
constructed or maintained past its enhy point in Section 15. In his deposition, Funk also 
acknowledged the presence of an old logging road that had been in Section 22 (near the Capstar 
parcel) at the time he first purchased the Funk parcel in 1969. Funk also testified that the 
logging road was in poor shape and that he "didn't care to" drive along the road. According to 
Funk's deposition, the "X" marked on the 1959 Metsker map indicates the location where the 
logging road was accessible and Funk testified that he could not access his property from the 
logging road without cleaning out the road first. A property owner cannot create a necessity 
through his or her own actions. B & .! Dev. & Jnvs .. Inc. v. Parsons, 126 Idaho 504, 507, 887 
P.2d 49, 52 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 80,665 P.2d at 1090). 
A dispute exists over whether the Funks could have extended the logging road to Mellick 
Road in order to access the property in Section 22. Capstar argues that it was impossible for the 
Funks to connect the logging road with Mellick Road because it meets in the northeast quarter of 
Section 21, which the Funks did not ovm. However, the Lawrences argue that the Funks could 
have redirected the logging road to connect with Mellick Road in their Section 15 property, but 
chose not to do so. The Lawrences proffered evidence that such a task was possible through the 
affidavit of Mr. Mack, who connected the old logging road to Mellick Road to access his 
property in Section 22, which sunnunds the Capstar parcel. Although this info1mation is 
relevant, the record does not disclose the costs or difficulty involved with Mack's connection of 
the two roads. Without more evidence, it rernai11s unclear whether connecting the logging road 
with Mellick Road would have been a reasonable task for Funk to perform. 
Furthermore, the record presents multiple instances in which witnesses have made 
contradictory statements regarding material facts. For instance, Funk's deposition testimony is 
inconsistent with his affidavit testimony regarding the location and formation of the GTC access 
road. Moreover, Funk's affidavit stated "we continuously utilized the existing road in Section 21 
to access our property in Section 22 without interference." Yet when deposed, Funk testified 
that the uses of the property were huckleberry picking and shooting and that this occurred on an 
infrequent basis, approximately 20 to 30 times. Further, Mead stated that he had no knowledge 
of Funk's ~se of the property. The conflicting testimony presents a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether Funk's use of the easement road was apparent and continuous. In cases where 
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this Court has found apparent continuous use, that finding has been based on use that would have 
been apparent to the outside world. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 
(2006) (finding use of a driveway apparent); Akers v. DL White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,302, 
127 P.3d 196, 205 (2005) (finding "regular use" to be required); Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 
637, 641, 991 P.2d 362, 366 (1999) (requiring open and cominuous use to "ensure[] that the 
buyer of the servient property will have notice of the preexisting use") (abrogated on other 
grounds by Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 
(2010)). Assuming that Funk's "continuous" use of the easement road was limited to Funk's 
infrequent trips for huckleberry picking and shooting practice, it would not likely constitute 
apparent continuous use. Bear Island Water Ass 'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d 
528, 536 (1994) (finding no apparent continuous use where a well was drilled but not used 
before separation); Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 77-78, 501 P.2d 1383, 1388-89 (1972) 
(finding use of access roads was limited and diminished further after sale); see also Cordwell, 
105 Idaho at 78, 665 P.2d at 1088 (holding use by other parties to be insufficient to establish 
apparent continuous use). 
Moreover, Rook's deposition testimony contradicts his affidavit testimony regarding 
Rook's knowledge of Funk's use of the easement road. Due to medication, Rook could not 
recall the circumstances surrounding the signing of his affidavit and could not verify its 
accuracy. In his affidavit, Rook testified that "[t]he existing private access road was visible and 
in use by Funks at the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel." During his deposition, 
when asked how he knew that the Funks were using the private easement road to access their 
property, Rook replied: 
The only thing - the only answer to that is that's what Bill Gott would have told 
us - whether Funks used it, 1 don't know ·,vhether Funks had been up on that hill 
1t)e_I"1_0_f __ e_ T>-1 11-----• ---+ +1-- ---- l'~ :,,n+ nc,c,Hm;.,,-, th,:,f th,;,f'c, fhp nnlV r{)l'J_] 
... l u lt;Vta lilt;~ LIJt; l~.ltlJ ! ..•. 1 111 J !.J.;:)L a.:-.:u..;.1.1.11.1.15 l..l.lU.'. - LJ...lL•U .. L.1 1..1..A.- "'-J.A..U.J .a. ....,._u 
that I knew about and the road we had to go up for several years in and out of 
there. 
This presented the district court with another evidentiary conflict regarding a material 
fact of whether Funk's prior usage of the acce.ss road was apparent and continuous over a 
number of yea,·s and whether Rook had adequate knowledge to testify to that matter. See Baxter 
v. Craney, 13:3 Idai10 166, 172, 16 P.3d 263, 269 (2000) (stating "it is not proper for the trial 
judge to assess the credibility of an affiant r.t the summary judgment .stage when credibility can 
be tested in court before the trier of fact."); Argyle v. S!emaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 
1283, 1285 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that even when the court will serve as trier of fact, 
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credibility determinations "should not be made on summary judgment if credibility can be tested 
by testimony in court before the trier of fact"). Yet, here, the iower court seems to have weighed 
the conflicting evidence and judged the affiants' credibility in making a ruling on summary 
judgment. 
2. Easement by Necessity 
"An easement by necessity requires ( 1) unity of ownership prior to division of the tract; 
(2) necessity of an easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the 
easement." Bob Daniels & Sons, 106 Idaho at 542, 681 P .2d at 1017 ( citing Cordwell, 105 Idaho 
at 79, 665 P .2d at 1089). If an alternate access exists, even one which is thought to be expensive 
or inconvenient, then an easement by necessity must not be granted. Id. The district court found 
that Capstar had proven all the elements of an easement by necessity. 
A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether it was necessary for the Funks 
to use the easement road to reach their property in Section 22 when Mellick Road provided legal 
access to the Funk Parcel in Section 15. The requirements of necessity do not require that there 
be access to all portions of a parcel or that there be the most convenient access possible. Rather, 
it simply requires that there be some public access to the parcel. On the record before us, there is 
an issue of material fact regarding whether the remaining Funk parcel would have retained 
access via Mellick Road in Section 15. The Lawrences have provided evidence that the portion 
would still have provided access and, assuming they were successful, such a finding would 
defeat the required necessity. Nor is it entirely clear how the district court found the easement by 
necessity over the Lawrences' land when that easement would not, in fact, lead to a public road. 
As the Lawren:)es point out, Capstar did not have the legal right to travel over the road in Section 
28 and where "land over which the way of necessity is claimed has no access to a public road," 
no necessity can arise. Rathbun v. Robson, 661 P.2d 850, 853 (1983). Therefore, the district 
court erred in determining this issue on summary judgment because the conflicting evidence 
presented a genuine issue of material fact regardir:g whether the evidence proved an easement by 
necessity. 
3. Easement by Prescription 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is riddled with er:ors, many of which are pointed out in the Lawrences' 
briefs and are acknowledged by Capstar. These discrepancies include erroneously spelling the 
names of material witnesses as well as confusing the legal property descriptions between Section 
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21 and Section 22. Although most of the district court's errors are harmless, the court made 
substantial errors in its analysis of whether Capstar established an easement by prescription. 
Even Capstar admitted that the lower cotui erred in analyzing the correct period of time to serve 
as the five ·year prescriptive period to determine a prescriptive easement. In its brief to this 
Court, Capstar stated: 
Lawrence correctly notes that the trial court made an e1Tor in its ruling regarding 
the prescriptive period as applied to Funk. The trial court correctly noted that in 
looking at the :orescriptive period it was required to examine t'1e six year period 
following Funk's sale of the Lavvrence parcel to Human Synergistics. Funk owned 
-che entire parcel for a six year period :frmn 1969 to 1975. Afte:r selling the 
r ,awrence parcel, he personally used the road from 1975 to 1981, another six year 
period. The trial court discussed the six year prescriptive as being from 1969 to 
1975. It is cle:ar the trial court b,eurne confosi~d regarding the years 
encompassed in the six year prescriptive use perfod. The evidence in the 
record before the trial court was that after moving to Aberdeen in 1975, Funk only 
visited the prope1ty two or three times and stopped visit1ng after 1981 .... 
(Emphasis added). 
"In orde:: to establish an easerncr.;t by pr,:.scription, a claimant must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence use of the suqject property that is (1) oren and notorious, (2) continuous 
and uninte1rnpted, (3) adverse and under a claim -:-Jf righ, (4) with the actuat or imputed 
knowledge of the oumer of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory period of five years." 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006) (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 
139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003)); see I.C. § 5-203.2 The lower court analyzed the 
requisite elements of a prescriptive easement under the wrong period of time. In explaining its 
reasoning, the district court stated: 
Lawrences fail to realize that Funk's use of his property and the use he made of 
Ihe Lawrence property frorn 19'15 to present is not relevant. The unccmtradicted 
evidenc~ is that Funk used the pro'.Jerty consistently for the six year period from 
the day he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he mcved from the area. This is 
one more year t.oan the five years required for the prescriptive: use .... The use 
Capstar se~ks is no different than the prescriptive use Funks made of the 
Lawrences' land for that six year period from 1969 to 197 5. 
The trial court incorrectly determlned that the relevant prescriptive period was from 1969 
(the time the Funks purchased the Funk parcel) to 1975 (the time the Funks sold the Lawrence 
parcel to Human Synerg.istics). This time period is flawed because the Funks were in actual 
--------------·-----·-
2 In 2006, Ichho Code s::ction 5-'.:!03 was 2mePded to extend the statuttxy time pe0·iod from five years to twenty 
years. However, the twenty year time period dc,es not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the 
amendmen:. 
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possession of the Lawrence parcel during that six year period and a landowner cannot create an 
easement in his own iand. "An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific 
purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the -property by the owner." Hughes, 142 
Idaho at 480, 129 P.3d at 1229 (citing Hodgins. 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973). In other 
words, '"an easement is defined .2s a ri~'.ht in the lands of another, and therefore one cannot have 
an easement in his own lands."' Zingiber Inv., L.L.C, v. Hagerman Highway Dist., 150 Idaho 
675, 681, 249 P.3d 868, 874 (2011) (quoting Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 771, 450 P.2d 
990, 994 (1969)). Capstar argues that the court's confusion should not invalidate the court's 
holding because Funk continuously used the easement road from 1975 to 1981. This Comt finds 
Capstar's argument to be rneritless because it is inconsistent with Idaho's easement law and it is 
not supported by the facts. 
In 1969, the Funks entered into a sales comract with :he Radens to purchase the Funk 
Parcel consisting of property in Government Lot 3 of Section 15, property in the southeast 
quarter of Section 21, and prope1ty in the southwest quarter of Secticn 22, except that portion 
conveyed to the OTC, and took possession of the property. In 1974, the Funks paid off the real 
estate contract and were given a warranty deed dated April 11, J 974. In 1975, the Funks entered 
into a sales contract to sell the southeast quarter of Section 21 (the Lawrence parcel) to Human 
Synergistics, but retained title in the Lnvrence parcel until Human Synergistics paid off the 
contract in 1992. In his deposition, Fur.k testified that from l 969 to 1975, he made twenty to 
thirty trips up to Blossom Mountain. In his affidavit, Funk stated that following the 1975 sale of 
the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, "we continuously utilized the existing road in 
Section 21 to access our property in Section 22 without interference." Yet, Funk also testified 
that he moved to Aberdeen in the fall of 1975 and then made only two or three trips to the 
mountain over the next five years (the relevant time period to establish a prescriptive easement). 
Funk further testified that he did not go back to the mountain afi:er 1931. Eight years later, in 
1989, Funk sold a pmiion of his property in Section :~2 (the Capstar parcel) to Kootenai 
Broadcasting. 
When analyzing the elements r::quired for a prescriptive casement to exist under the 
correct time period (1975 until 1980), it is difficult to see lmw the district court could determine 
that the Funks' use of the easement road \.Vas continuous and cmintenupted for a period of five 
years. The Funks continuously used the private aco::ss road ov,::!r the Lawrence parcel from 1969 
until the Funks moved. to Aberdeen in 1975.. During that time frame, the Funks were in 
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possession of the Lawrence parcel. However, Funk testified that he only used the road two or 
three times from 1975 to 1981. Such iimited use of the road does not constitute open and 
continuous use. After 1 981, the Funks' use of the easement road over the Lawrence parcel was 
interrupted and unused for eight years, until the time Funk sold the Capstar parcel to Kootenai 
Broadcasting in 1989.3 
This case is highly complex and presents multiple issues of material fact which the lower 
court should address at trial. The testimony of several material witnesses presented conflicting 
information and the parties should be cross-examined to determine their credibility. Thus, the 
district court erred in granting Capstar summary judgment because the case presents multiple 
issues of material fact that preclude the court from deciding oE a motion for summary judgment 
whether an easement exists. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Lawrences' Motion 
fov- Disqualificatim1 fo1· Cause 
The Lawrences filed a Nk,tion fr,r Disqualification for Cause, alleging that District Judge 
Mitchell was biased or prejuc.Eced against them or their c:ase. [!1 a~cordance with Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedme 40(d)(2.), 1},e Lav.cences filed an affidavit frcm their attorney of record at the 
time,4 John P. ·whelan, stating the grounds for dlsqualiiication. The first conce;:n raised by the 
Lawrences was that Judge Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in Yovichin v. Bush (CV 
2001-2116) i:i1 200 ·t b1:.ca.us~ cf an ai.k:,~cd '·perscJJ.1ality .:onf iCt" •• L·h ~-1r. \,Vhelan, wh0 was 
counsel for the defense. A copy of the Order for Self Disqualification was attached to Mr. 
Whelan's affidavit. The Lawrences further argued that the r:ourt was prejudiced against Mr. 
Whelan based on the court's prior rulings in cases where Mr. Whelan was the attorney of record 
and his clients did not prevail. The Lawrences also asserted that the lower court was biased 
because Capstar's counsel, Susan Weeks, is a law fim1 partner with Lee James, who is a friend of 
3 Neither ha: thf,rc- b'!rn a ~howing ofadversi!'.'· !:fa.ho coJJrts t-2:ve applie.:: the not:on that "[w]hen one claims an 
easement by prescription m·er wile! or unenclosed lands of anm:her, mere use of the way for the required time is not 
generally sufficie!1t !ogive rise to a pres!m'ption that th? use is adverse-." T,.unnell v. Ward, 86 Idaho 555, 560, 389 
.P.2d 221, 224 (l 964); .accord Christie \=. Scott, U.O Idaho 829, 83-1, 718 P.2d .I 267, .1269 (Ct. App . .1986). _Under 
such a pri:lciplc and fror.1 the record b.::for:: ·:hi.; Cour1, th0 Lawrer.ces' land ar.pears ::o qualify as wild and 
undeveloped lands. Capsmr argues that this iss;,>,e was not raised oelow and shon!d be deemed waived. We address 
this issue here because l) the Lawrence& have r:i.ised the question ofwhethe, any use was permissive and this is part 
of the legal standard required to show permis~iveness and. as suci1, the is~.:.1e is fairly encompassed in the question 
presented to this Court; and 2) because the di5trict court indisputably erred in measuring the prescriptive period from 
1969 to 1975, the question of whether tlh! distdct cotirt's cler;ision should b1:. affirmed must include consideration of 
the proper legal standard. 
4 At the ti1r:c the motion to disqm::if'.'r was filed on June €, 20,)7, John P. \ 1/helan v.as the attorney of record. Mr. 
Whelan later withdrew as counsel and the Lawrences are cmTent1y pro se lit:gants . 
. . , 
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Judge Mitchell, as well as the former pre~.ident of the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association.5 Lastly, 
the Lawrences argued that because they appealed TO the Idaho Supreme Court and this Court 
overturned the district court's original grant of summary judgment on the express easement 
theory, the lo\ver court's bias and prejudice against the Lawrences has increased as a result of the 
appeal. 
On June 13, 2007, the district court held a hearing on the Lawrences' motion to 
disqualify. In addition to the aforementioned arguments, the Lawrences raised a new issue at the 
hearing concerning campaign contributions. The Lawrences argued thEt Susan Weeks' law firm, 
of which she is a ~1artner, contributed $1,000 to Judge Mitchell's reelection campaign in the 
spring of 2006. On June 25, 2007, the district com1 issued a l\11.emorandum Decision and Order 
Denying the Motion for Disqualification for Cause in which the court addressed all of the 
Lawrences' arguments in great detail. 
The district court began its analysis by addressing the Lawrences' first concern regarding 
Judge tvlitchell 's disquc1lification in Yo'Jic:hin. The com1 stlted thv.t it had no independent 
recollectio:i. of why the court voluntarily d:~qua1ified itself in Yovichin in 2001. The Order for 
Self Disqualific2Jion, which was included in 1J1e record as an exhibit, did not include any 
relevant facts of the Yovichin case. T:ierefore, Judge Mitchell investigated facts outside the 
record to determine why he had previously disqualified himself. However, the court file in 
Yovichin was purged, so Judg~ Mitchell was left to speculate his motivation for disqualification. 
The court noted t~1at the Order for Self D:squalific:ation was entered on November 20, 2001, 
which was Judge Mitchell's first day as a distric:t Judge. The comt also recalled one lawsuit 
where Ivfr. ··whr~lan was the opposing attorney while Judge f,.1itchell was still acting as an attorney 
and mentionu:l that that case vvas still pending at the time J udg;:; Mitchell \Vas transitioning from 
serving as an attorney to becoming a d:stric~ judge. The co;ir1 explained that this was the most 
likely reason the court disqualified itself 'fhe coert stated its n::asoning as follows: 
Self disqualificajons in those cases were made to 2.void any P.ppearance of bias 
since just prior to Novemoer '.L. L 2001, the G1dersigncd aD.d 0r.e of the ccunsel in 
those crrses assigned to the underc;igned judge 'Nere in 2,11 adv~rsarial relationship. 
Those self-di:,qualifications v1ere only lT,ace to case:, in which counsel were 
involved who Vvcre opposir::g adv';;r~acir,~ cc,un:~el ir1 .:,G1c:r cases tha.t were still 
p~,s~.ing 'Nhich the 1-m<lcrsigrr:rl Wf1s an Dttorney at the time he hecam~ district 
judge. Those self-disqualification:, were ma.de in sev:::ral ca::es in an effort to 
---------·------
5 Prior to beccmL-:g a di.strict judg,;, John T. Mitchel! served as couns·~l for i:-1~ :L~aho Trial Lawyers Association. On 
November 16, 2001, four days before becoming a cEstrict jc1dge, Leand.~r L. Jc.mes (Lee fames) was substituted for 
counsel for the \Jar,o Tria! i,awvcrs Assaci"lior:. 
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avoid the appearance of impropri,~1:y 1hat \\'<.rnld occur w}1en one day the 
undersigned was your adversarial O:)ponent in a litigated case, a.nd the next day he 
was assigned to be the judge in 2.nother one of your cases. 
(Emphasis in original). The court also stated that Mr. Whelan gave no reason to explain why the 
court might have a "perso1121ity conflict" with Mr. 'Whelan. The court reiterated that it had no 
bias or pr~judice against ~.;1r. Whelan m1d that any appearance of bias that may have existed in 
2001 had been ameliorated with the passage of time. 
Next the court &.ddressed the Lawrences' claim that the court'~ prior rulings against Mr. 
Whelan demonstrate bias or prej11dice. Th= court revi~wed the previm,s cases and expfained the 
independent legal basis supporting its conclusions. In its decision, the district court explained 
that "O]ust because one side wins does not mean the judge's decision was based upon bias or 
prejudice against the party who lost or their attorney." The court then addressed the concern that 
it was biased because of a friendship with a partner of the firm representing the Plaintiff. The 
court acknowledged that Capstar's counsel, Susan Weeks, works in the same law firm as a 
friend, Lee James. However, the court also stated that it did rot know whether Ms. Weeks and 
Mr. James are partners in the firm. The Court also explained that while Mr. James is considered 
a professional bend, Judge Mitchell k!S riot se~n Mr. James in any social capacity in the last 
fourteen n:onths, the last (JC::asicn b.::ing a fundraiser for child abuse prevention. Furthermore, 
the court ::;tnted that Mr. Jan1es' connection !o the Idaho Trial Lav.,ryers Association was 
irrelevant as Judge Mitchell i~ no longer a member and was unaware that Mr. James was in fact 
President of the organization. 
The coi..::rt addressed the ::ssue of campaign contributions made by the law firm of 
Capstar's .~ounsd. The Court states that it had 110 knowledge of the fact that Ms. Weeks' law 
fim1 made a $1,000 contribution to its reelection campaig~ because of Idaho's non-disclosure 
policies. E.ve11 vvith this k . t~O\vledge, the court ren1ained convin.ccr1 .tttat it \Vas not biased or 
prejudiced as a result of the conation because r,Is. Weeks' firm consists 0f three attorneys and 
the identity of the donor was still ::onc,ealed. 
L::1stly, the court addressed the Lm:vrences' concern that the cow·t would be biased against 
them for appealing to the lfaho Supreme C::mrt. The :listrict ccmrt too:-:: tt:e time to relieve these 
concerns aad sLted: 
This [c]ourt is humac. It i" quite a di£foren~ thing to argue thit be:::ause this [c]oLEi 
COli,rnilted ,::rr0:·, whi,:h rh.~ Idaho ~'.upreme Court corrected, faat this [c]ourt 
wc,u)d then hold a1:',:~inst Mr. \V\lrlan the "''qct ~1e r>revailed on bf-half of his clients 
on those a.ppea!s. Quite the contrn.ry. Mr. Whelan is to b::; eon:mcnded for 
!4 
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bringing those appeals and having the Idaho Supreme Court correct the mistake. 
He did the right thing. 
The court also explained that it was "neither insulted nor inconvenienced" by the filing of the 
Lawrences' motion to disqualify, recognizing that it was :t-.fr Whelan's duty to raise these 
concerns. 
The Lawrences filed a Motion to Reconsider the districT court's denial of the Lawrences' 
motion to disqualify, arguing that the c:011rt improperly engaged in independent fact finding 
outside of Yhe. ::ecm d and speculated foe rnasor, for its volt.nt.:1.1 y disq uaEficatic,n in the Yovichin 
case. The district court reviewed the evidence and denied the Lawrences' Motion to Reconsider. 
The Lawrences argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recuse 
itself for cause. The Lawrences claim they have noticed a partern of favoritism throughout the 
nine years of litigation and question the court's ii:1partiality. Moreover, the Lawrences also 
contend that the court erred when it investigated facts outside of the record. 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion to disqualif:1 pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 40(d)(2) for an abuse of discretion, and the burden is on the person asserting the court 
abused its discretion. Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 843. 87. P.3d 949, 952 (2004) (citing 
Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982)). "A trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it (I) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of 
discretion and applies the conect legal standards, and (3) teaches the decision through an 
exercise of reason." O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Tnc:., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 
(2008) (citing ?lest Wood Invs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82 .. HlS P.2d 401,408 (2005)). 
A review of the record shows that the district court spe:ificc..lly re~ognized that 
disqualification is a matter committed to the court's discretion. "Whether it is necessary for a 
judicial officer to disqualify himself in a given case is left to the sound discretion of the judicial 
officer himself." Bradbwy v. Maho Judicial Cow1cil, 149 Idaho 107, 113, 233 P.3d 38, 44 
(2009) (citing Sivak v. State. 112 Idah8 197, 206, 731 P.2d 192, 201 (1986)). The court 
articulated its reasoning for finding that it v1as not bia~.ed or :Jre:iudic,c;d against the Lawrences 
and this Co:1rt finds that the district court z.cted within -~he bomds of its discretion and reached its 
conclusion through an exercise of reason. Therefore, this Cot:rt affirms the disrrict court's 
decision not to disqualify itself. 
Furthermore, the fact that the d.i1,trict court independently investigated fa.cts outside of the 
record does not disturb this Couri given thE.: context of the inquiry. Tl~e Lawrences brought up 
the Yovichin c2se without any facts or details to help substanti.:Jte their claims. In order to truly 
15 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 64 of 214
consider whether this argument had merit, the court r.,eeded to 1nvestigate the facts surrounding 
the voluntary disqualification. This Court conciudes that the district court did not err by 
independently investigating facts that are not relevant to the pending ca3e. See I.C. § 1-1802 and 
§ 1-1803. Therefo:e, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Lawrences' 
Motion for Dis.qualification for Cause. Nevertheless, becau~:e this case has such a long and 
complex history, with close to ten years of litigation, this Court believes that a new judge would 
provide a much needed fresh perspecti~1e an_d would eliminate any concern of bias. Therefore, 
this Com1 Orders that the case on remand be assigned to a new district judge. 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretnon by Finding the Defenses of Laches 
aiilid Statut~ olf Lhnitations to ti;; ;\.leritles~ 
1n theii· Answer, the Lawcences rnis~:d foe defense of 31atui:e of limitations and then 
amended theii· Answer :o 1ndude the additk,niJ ce:fcnse of lacl:cs. :u :1s Men1urandum Decision 
and Order Gianting Plaintiffs l\.1otion for Summ:: .• ry JLidgment, foe district cour.: found that there 
was no merit to either defense:. Specific;:.,_!ly, 1:he lo\vir court four,..: that there was no legal 
analysis to support the Lawrences' statu~c c,Lim;tations argament, anc\ that the Lawrences failed 
to prove -~.hy ,:::apstar's predec~s:,0/s .:blms shouL:: have beer, perfoc.~d tlu::,i.:gh litig2i'i.i0n. On 
appeal, the Lawrences argue that the district court erred in denying their equitable defenses. 
''Whether a party is guilty of iaches primarily is a question of fact and therefore its 
determination is within the province of the trial court. The dec:sion to apply laches is committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court." Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,249, 92 P.3d 492,499 
(2004) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, this Court reviev,rs whether the trial court properly 
found (1) a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense of laches is asse11ed, and (2) 
that the ~arty a:,se:rting the defrnse wa:-: ;n;;j ndiced. Id (citing Preservation Coal .. Inc. v. Pierce, 
667 F.2~ 851,, 354 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
1. The D'!fetist: of Laches 
The Law:rences assert that Ca?st2r rE1d its predecess::m; are guilty of !aches because the 
Lawrenc~s have been prejudi;::ed by hr.v:ng -~,J locate witnesses ai1d find evidence pertaining to an 
easement cbirn that orig1nated more thrm thirty :.,·ears :igo. Th'.; Lawren~es claim that they have 
also been r:rnjuclic:e:l b) th·-~ ,.mdue ciela~ in Cr.psti:ir or its predt:c<.:S"so:-~ ,,sserting their legal right 
to the {:aserne-~1t. The easement ace,::~~; pDble;T1. origi~1ated f·om Funk's sale of property to 
Human Synerg:istics in 1975. Due to the deby in perfe~ting title over the casement, the 
Lawrences were unable to locate any ,:xisting company named Human Synergistics and were 
thus unable to depose the business ,;vhen this suit began in 200:2. The Capstar pam~l was owned 
16 
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by several different bm:inesses before Capst.c1.r purchased it, and the Lawrences assert that those 
predecessors in interest did not ;_1erform t}ic:ir due diligence by perfecting a legal right to the 
easement through liti_gation and now the I..,f,V\Tences are prejudiced by the delay, 
The district court did ne,t abuse its discretion in der:cying the Lawrences' defense of 
laches. The trial court acted within its discr::tion when it detem1ined thg,t the Lawrences failed to 
prove why Cap.sta•:'s predecessor's chims should hf'.ve been perfe~ted earlier through litigation. 
It is true that Capstar did not assert its legal right to the easement until the Lawrences' interfered 
with Capstar's access. However, Capst<tr and it:) predecessor:. believed they had permission to 
use the road and in fact had been using the road for years prior to this lawsuit. The law does not 
compel people to perfect all property rights thrnugh litigation. In fact, many people acquire 
property rights through open, notorious. and continuous use of prope1iy for a specified period of 
time. Therefore, the Lawrences have not been prejudiced by th~ passage of time because prior to 
the Lawrences denying Capstar access, there was no need to litigate the easement rights. 
2. The Defense of'Statute ofLirrtitations 
On apr:eal, the Lav,rences simp\ a:,:::ert rbat Capstar's predecessor's rights to access the 
easeme1;.:. a.re "stale :md barred by the .sLltut.e of J.imi'.ations." The Lav;rences do not cite which 
statute cf limitation is serving as 2. bar to Capstar' s easement rights. This Comi will not consider 
the Lawrences' statu::e ·Jf limitations cbm oG appeal because they failed to support their claim 
with any relev:1.nt legal :iuthority or arg1r11t.:1t. This Comi !1a~- C\)nsistently held that it will "'not 
consider assigmnents of error not ~upporl:ecl by argument and authority in the opening brief." 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, ·:t.':-5 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 4S4 (200g); see a.'so Idaho App. R. 
35(a)(6) ("The argument shall contain be contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented on i.ppesl, the' reasons the::efor, 'Nith citations to a.u-ihorities. statutes and pans of the 
transcript and the record relied upon."). Tbr; Lawrences merely ass,::1i that because the easement 
originated more tr.an thirty ~iears age. C:,pstr,.r's c:laim should be barred by the statute of 
limitations. Su:.h nn a:;se1i-Jn, without any legal aL:thority er analysis tied to the facts, is not 
sufficient. This Court should not have to ~:i.:fttch the record to find the e1Tor on appeal. As such, 
the LawrcnG-es statute of lim.itaticns deiens;: is de:er:ned v,·ai.ved on appeal. Therefore, this Court 
affirms the· district comi's ruling findir.g tLe defonses of lachcs and s~atute of limitations to be 
without me:r.it. 
D. No A1ttom1;;y1s Fees 1J.u /~.p,per.R 
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The Lav.rrences request attorney's fees on appeal, arguing that Capstar frivolously filed 
its Complaint "simply to tie this matter up in litigation for years under the expectation of running 
the Lawrences out of ffOney, energy, 2.nd hope." The Lawrences are pro se litigants and did not 
cite to any specific statutory provision authorizing an award of attorney fees. The Court will not 
award the Lawrences attorney's fees because this Court has previously held that pro se litigants 
are not entitled to attorney's fees. Mich:.Ilk v. Miclwlk, 148 kaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 
(2009). 
VL CONCLL1Sff0N 
This Court reverses the district court's order granting summary judgment and remands 
the case for trial on the remaining easement theories: 1) an easement implied by prior use, 2) an 
easement by necessity, and 3) a prescriptive easement. The Court affirms the district court's 
decision denying the Motion for Disqualification for Cause and affinns the court's ruling that the 
Lawrences' defenses of laches and statute of limitations were without merit. Nevertheless, this 
Court orders that a new judge: shall be :1ssigned to preside ovc;r a!l further proceedings in this 
case. No art0rney's fees me a'iNarded on appeal. Costs on appeal arc awarded to the Lawrences. 
Chief Jmtice Bl:RDICK, Justices EIS::\1AN1\, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
STATE or IDAHO ·} ss COUNTY OF ·KOOTENAI 
FILED: 
2013 MAY 30 PH if: 31 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMP ANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LA WREN CE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
SPECTRA SITE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LA WREN CE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, 
And JOHN DOES 1-6, Third Party Defendants. 
~o:cY-02~ 
Case No. CV-03-4621 
TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
(CONSOLIDATED) 
COME NOW Defendants/Counterclaimants, Douglas and Brenda Lawrence 
("Defendants"), by and through their attorneys of record, Ramsden & Lyons, LLP and hereby 
TRIAL WITNESS LIST (CONSOLIDATED) - 1 ORIGINAL 
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submit a witness list of persons who may be called to testify at trial. Defendants reserve the 
right to supplement or withdraw any of the witnesses listed and call any witnesses listed by 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant. 
1. Mike Kahoutec 
5122 S. Signal Point Road 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
(208) 457-0828 
2. John Rook 
8301 W. Sausser Dr. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-4014 
3. Wes Hamilton 
11118 E. Grace Ave. 
Spokane, WA 99206-4662 
(509) 924-0078 
4. Greg Stern 
4933 E. French Gulch Road 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 664-7729 
5. Mike Wallace 
(Address Unknown) 
6. John Bedini 
Clo Bedini Electric 
10183 N. Aero Dr., Ste. 2 
Hayden, ID 83835 
(208) 667-8300 
7. Raymond Goodwin 
Spectra Site Communications 
100 Regency Forest Dr., Ste. 400 
Cary, North Carolina 27511 
(919) 466-5983 
8. Pamela Waitman 
(Address Unknown) 
(425) 278-7569 
TRlAL WITNESS LIST ( CONSOLIDATED) - 2 
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9. Sheila Bernard 
Spectra Site Communications, Inc. 
2301 Dupont Dr., Ste. 200 
Irvine, CA 92612 
(949) 255-2325 
10. Jim Hollis 
1620 N. Marner Rd., Ste. C-400 
Spokane, WA 99216 
(509) 893-9600 
11. Alexander Macheras 
American Tower Corporation 
10 Presidential Way 
Woburn, MA 01901 
(781) 926-4921 
12. Tony Rosa 
American Tower Corporation 
10 Presidential Way 
Woburn, MA 01901 
(781) 926-4921 
13. Perry Satterlee 
ClearWire Corporation 
1475 120111 Ave. NE 
Bellevue, WA 98005 
(425) 216-7600 
14. Daniel Kawakami 
Trinity Broadcasting Network 
P.O. Box A 
Santa Ana, CA 92711 
(714) 832-2950 
15. Bruce Anderson 
Kootenai County Surveyor 
451 Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 446-1000 
TRIAL WITNESS LIST (CONSOLIDATED)- 3 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 70 of 214
16. Tom Reese 
Spectra Site Communications, Inc. 
2301 Dupont Dr., Ste. 200 
Irvine, CA 92612 
(949) 255-2325 
17. Wilber Mead ( deceased) - Via Deposition/ Affidavit 
15429 W. Mead Road 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
18. Colby M. May 
American Center for Law and Justice 
Washington DC 
1-800-684-3110 
19. Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy D. Milhalek 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
20. Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy R.E. Lyons 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
21. Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy C.P. Kerzman 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
22. Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy J.M. Shiflett 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
23. Kootenai County CRT A. Lamanna 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
24. Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy R.P. Higgins 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
TRlAL WITNESS LIST (CONSOLIDATED)-4 
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25. Kootenai County CRT A. Funk 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
26. Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy D. Moyer 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
27. Kootenai County Sheriff Sargent K. Edmondson 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
28. Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy D.C. Sciortino 
5500 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 446-1300 
29. R. Scot Haug 
Post Falls Police Department 
1 717 E. Polston Ave. 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
(208) 773-3517 
30. Chris Renaldo 
Renaldo Land Surveying 
711 Center A venue 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
(208) 245-0218 
31. Michelle Jirava 
First American Title Company 
1866 N. Lakewood Drive 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 667-0567 
32. Justin Sternberg 
1677 E. Miles Avenue 
Hayden Lake, ID 83835 
(208) 659-4800 
TRIAL WITNESS LIST (CONSOLIDATED)- 5 
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33. William Giebel, Jr. 
10311 E. Montgomery Dr. 
Spokane, WA 99206 
(509) 995-6876 
34. William Giebel, Sr. 
10311 E. Montgomery Dr. 
Spokane, WA 99206 
(509) 991-9534 
35. Meckel Engineering and Surveying 
7600 N. Government Way, Ste. #3 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-4638 
And any witness called or listed by Plaintiff/Counterdefendant and such other 
witnesses as may be necessary for rebuttal. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2013. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of May, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
TRIAL WITNESS LIST (CONSOLIDATED) - 6 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail X Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 664-1684 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
STA.TE OF IOAHO l SS 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlf 
FILED: 
2013 MAY 3·0 PH ~: 31 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMP ANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
SPECTRA SITE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, 
And JOHN DOES 1-6, Third Party Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST - 1 
~~=~0 
Case No. CV-03-4621 
TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 
(CONSOLIDATED) 
ORIGINAL 
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COME NOW Defendants, and submit the attached Exhibit List identifying the 
Defendants' proposed trial exhibits. 
Defendants reserve the right to supplement and amend this Exhibit List prior to trial. 
DATED this £day ofMay, 2013. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: -;jki S: Jt(y{:-r Therofi J. De Smet, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30 ~day of May, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST - 2 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
7 Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 664-1684 
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DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' EXHIBIT LIST 
(CONSOLIDATED) 
Case No: CV-03-04621 I CV-02-7671 (Consolidated) Trial Date: June 11, 2013 
Title of Cases: Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence 
Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS (list numerically) 
__x__ DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (list alphabetically) 
NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED RECEIVED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. 
A Warranty Deed-Lawrence 
B Access License Agreement between 
Nextel West Corp and Douglas and 
Brenda Lawrence 
C Assignment of Leases - Deposition 
Exhibit 4 from the Deposition of 
Thomas Martinich 
D Certificate of Merger - Deposition 
Exhibit 5 from the Deposition of 
Thomas Martinich 
E Communications Lease Agreement -
Deposition Exhibit 3 from Deposition of 
Thomas Martinich 
F Statement signed by Don Snodgrass on 
May 8,2000 
G May 8, 2000 statement referenced in 
incident report 00-9842 
H Kootenai County Sheriffs Incident 
1 - 7 Reports filed against Douglas Lawrence 
(2000-2002; 7 total) 
I April 13, 2002 SpectraSite Letter 
noticing Defendants of renewal of 
License Agreement 
J August 28, 2002 Kootenai Electric 
Letter requesting to lock Defendant's 
gate 
K October 10, 2002 signed 
acknowledgment of receipt of key by 
Nextel employee Jim Hollis 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - I 
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I L October 17, 2002 de •.• ery confirmation 
of key to Tom Grapenster with AT&T 
M October 16, 2002 signed receipt of key 
to Adelphia 
N October 9, 2002 signed receipt of key to 
Kootenai Electric 
0 October 9, 2002 signed receipt of key to 
Verizon 
p October 15, 2002 email from Shelia 
Bernard (SpectraSite) to Douglas 
Lawrence-Subject [RE: Blossom 
Mountain Access Agreement] 
Q October 15, 2002 email from Shelia 
Bernard - Subject [Attention Doug] 
R October 21, 2002 email from Pamela 
Waitman (Nextel)- Subject [Blossom 
Mtn cell site access] 
s October 24, 2002 undeliverable letter to 
Nextel Communications 
T October 24, 2002 returned (unaccepted) 
delivery confirmation 
u October 31, 2002 letter from Raymond 
Goodwin (SpectraSite) to Defendants 
V Kootenai County Sheriffs Crime 
1-7 Reports 2002 - 2003 by Douglas 
Lawrence (2002-2003; 7 total) 
w January 13, 2003 Letter from Raymond 
Goodwin (SpectraSite) to Defendants 
X January 9, 2003 Letter from Nextel 
noticing Defendants of assignment 
y Envelope of March 14, 2003 Letter from 
Nextel 
z Defendant Mack's Affidavit in Support 
of Defendants Lawrences' Motion in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Leave to A...uend Complaint to Include 
Punitive Damages 
AA Kootenai County Sheriffs Crime Report 
03-21559 
filed September 16, 2003 by Douglas 
Lawrence 
BB Check receipt for April 2007 payment 
for license agreement 
cc April 16, 2007 Letter from American 
Tower offering lump sum payment 
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, DD July 18, 2007 Notice vi. Default sent to 
American Tower 
EE Delivery confirmation of July 18, 2007 
notice of default 
FF Kootenai County Sheriffs Department 
Law Incident Table showing incident 
07-23671 
GG License Agreement between Tower 
Asset Sub Inc and Infinity 
Communications 
HH Tower Attachment License Agreement 
between Tower Asset Sub Inc and 
Wired or Wireless, Inc. 
II Site Schedule to the Master Site Lease 
Agreement dated April 20, 1999 
JJ Affidavit of James Stillinger provided in 
CV03-5003 
KK Record of Road and Gate Locations in 
Parcel 21-8500 
LL November 17, 2000 Business 
correspondence between Colby May and 
John Rook and copied to Defendants 
MM Antenna Tower Building and Real 
Property Lease Agreement between John 
Rook and Trinity Broadcasting Network 
NN Lease agreement between Adelphia 
Cable and John Mack and the 
Defendants 
00 March 13, 2000 affidavit of Wilber 
Mead 
pp February 1, 2002 Statement from Blue 
Sky Broadcasting 
QQ Access License Agreement between 
Great Northern Broadcasting and the 
Defendants 
RR Copy of Metsker Map dated March 1959 
ss June 28, 2007 Affidavit of Kootenai 
County Surveyor Bruce Anderson 
TT 1907 Viewers report for Mellick Road 
uu June 17, 1910 Plat of Survey for Mellick 
Road 
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'vv July 1977 Easement .iuaho Forest 
I I I 
Industries granted to Don Johnson and 
John McHugh and recorded as 
instrument #773361. 
WW August 13, 2007 Deposition Transcript 
of Harold Funlc 
xx Aerial Photographs of Subject Area by 
1 - 3 Kootenai County KCWebMap (3 total) 
yy Aerial Photographs of Subject Area by 
1 - 5 GoogleEarth (5 total) 
zz Affidavit of John Mack in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Enlargement 
AAA Emails from Sheila Barnard dated 
1-2 10/15/2002 (2 total) 
BBB Email from Pamela Waitman dated 
10/21/2002 
CCC Email from Scott Haug dated 
10/27/2003 
DDD Aerial Photographs of Subject Area by 
GoogleEarth showing roads 
EEE Aerial Photographs of road system and 
1 - 32 gates in subject area (32 total) 
FFF Photographs of gates on subject area 
1 - 5 roads 
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05/313/2013 . 1.:1·: 45 2086646741 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
ISB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JAMES VERN t-'A\:lt:. tl4/ J.J. 
STATE OF IL;.;L, i , 
C.'Ol/PTV OF :.tnr,T:·11 •. I :,.s~ ~ 'i ' ) I '1 ~ \... 1 ! ' f'f ~ i r i:_~D: - . 
N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, Case No. CV 02-7671 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and .BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through its attorneys of record, James, Vernon & Weeks, 
P.A. and hereby submit its First Amended Exhibit List as required by the Court's scheduling 
order in the form attached hereto. In addition to the exhibits listed, Plaintiff may use any exhibit 
contained on Defendants' Exhibit List. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2013. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
By~G?~ 
ANP.WEEKS 
FIR8T AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST: 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ·3D-\~ay of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy o:f the :foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Doug Marlice 
Theron J. Desmet 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: (208) 664-5884 
FIRST AMENDED EXHIBIT LIST: 2 
0 
Cl 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) 
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CASE NO.: 
TRIAL DATE: 
CASETITIE: 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 
CV-02-7671 
June 11, 2013 
CAPSTARRADI0v. LAWRENCE 
NO. DESCJUPr.ION BY OFFERED ADMITTED STIP. 
l. Illustrative depiction of 
Sections 15, 22 and21 
2 Sales Contract, :filed in 
Book 55, Page 118 on 
August 28, 1968 
3 Real Estate Contract, 
filed in Book 57, _page 
119 
4 Warranty Deed filed as 
Instrument No. 613471 
5 Sale Agreem.ent 
Instrument No. 672112 
6 Sale Agreement 
JnstrumentNo. 672113 
7 Sale Agreement 
InstrumentNo. 672114 
8 Sale Agreement 
lnstrumentNo. 672115 
9 Sale Agreement 
Instrument No. 672116 
10 Sale Agreement 
lnstTurnent No. 67211 T 
11 Sale Agreement 
Instrument No. 672118 
12 Statutory Warranty Deed 
InstrutnentNo. 653865 
PAGE 06/11 
REFUSED RESERVE 
RULING 
1 
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NO. DESCRil'TION BY. OFFERED ADMITTED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
13 Warranty Deed 
Instrument No. 653864 
J.4 Memorandum of 
Contract, filed on as 
Instrument No. 732027 
15 Roadway Easement Inst. 
No. 773361 
16 Memoran.dum of Sale 
Agreement Inst. No. 
1098895 
17 Corporation Deed Inst. 
No. 1114689 
18 Warranty Deed Inst. No. 
1279685 
19 Warranty Deed. Jnst. No. 
1283911 
20 Deed Inst. No. 1452670 
21 Co:tporation Deed Inst. 
No.1452959 
22 Easement Inst. No. 
1454068 
23 Mutual Agreement Grant 
of Easement and Quit 
Claim Deed. Inst. No. 
1462711 
24 Memorandum of Sale 
Agreement Inst. No. 
1464206 
25 Quitclaim Deed Inst. No. 
1.533768 
26 Quitclaim Deed Inst No. 
1543875 
27 Warranty Deed Inst. No. 
1551840 
2 
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NO. DESCRIPTION BY OF.FERED ADMITTED REF.USED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
28 Warranty Deed J.nst. No. 
1551841 
29 Deed. In.st. No. 720411 
30C Warranty Deed 
Instrument No. 1161438 
and re-recorded as 
Instrument No. 1167510 
31C Quitclaim. Deed 
Jnstn1ment No. l 168384 
32C Quit Claim Deed 
Instrument No. 1326440 
33C.l Warranty Deed 
Instrument No. l 565152 
33C.2 W ar.ranty Deed 
Instrument No. 1656413 
34 Chicago Title Insurance 
Company Policy No. 13 
0035 106 00001140 
35 Deed lnst. No. 708987 
36 Deed Inst No. 993113 
37 Warranty Deed Inst. No. 
497858 
38 Right of Way Easement 
Imt. No. 494343 
39 Right of Way Easement 
Inst. No. 494344 
- ----- - -
--
40 Blossom Mountain. 
Estates Plat Book I, Pa.ge 
42 
41 Record of Survey Inst. 
No. 15421875 
42 Kootenai County 
Assessor Office 
Segregation Revisions 
Section 22 
3 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 84 of 214
05/30/2013 14:45 2086545741 JAMES VERN PAGE 09/11 
NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED ADMITI'ED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. RUUNG 
43 Kootenai County 
Assessor Office 
Segregation Revisions 
Section 21 
44 GLO Survey of 
Township 50 No, Range 
· No. 5Wcst 
45 BJow up of GLO map in 
Section 15, 21 and 22 
46 1957 USGS Historical 
Map of Sections 15, 21 
and 22 
47 1959 Metsker Map 
48 
49 1981 USGS map of 1975 
aerial 
50 Funk Ownershtp Exhibit 
51 2010 USGS map 
52 ' 
53 Viewer Report 271 and 
bra11ch change Mellick 
Road 
54 Mack Affidavit 
55 Deed Inst No. 1558483 
56 Deed Inst. No.1758296 
4 
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NO. DESCRIP1ION BY OFFERED ADMITTED RERJSED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
57 Mellick Road Overlay 
58 Mellick Road Overlay 
59 Conditional Use permit 
C-593-86 
60 Conditi.onal Use Permit 
No. C-658-88 
61 Conditional Use Pennit 
No. C-686-89 
62 Conditional Use Permit 
No. C-841-94 
63 Conditional Use Permit 
No. C-940-97 
64 Conditional use Permit 
No. C-1058-01 
65 Conditional Use Penn.it 
No. C-1092-03 
66 Notice Inst. No. 1403054 
67 Civil Violation No. CV-
4306.06.B 
68 Harold Funk deposition 
69 Gate Picture 
70 Gate Picture 
71 Gate Picture 
72 Gate Picture 
- ... 
73 Gate Picture 
73A Look Picture 
74 Sims Liesche 3/l 9/99 
letter of County Officials 
75 2/29/00 Lawrence letter 
to Douglas 
5 
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NO. DESCRIPrION BY OFFERED ADMITTED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
76 S/31/99 Sim.s Liesche 
Statement 
77 Lawrence 6/J./2000 
submittal to Kootenai 
County Planning 
78 6/14/99(00) Lawrence 
letter to Kootenai County 
Prosecutor 
79 6/26/00 Lawrence letter 
to Kootenai County 
Plan.rung Dept 
80 6/30/00 Letter to Sheriff 
81 12/5/00 Petition for 
Judicial Review Kootenai 
Case CVOO-7756 
82 l 0/.19 Vernon key letter 
and 11/19/01 Verizon 
Key Receipt 
83 6/10/03 Verizon Jetter to 
Lawrence 
84 10/10/03 Stimson letter 
to Lawrence 
85 Great N orthem Broadcast 
Access License 
Agreement 
86 Blue Sky Statement dated 
2/1/02 
-· 87 Tower License - . 
Agreement 
ANY EXHIBIT ON 
DEFENDANTS' LIST 
6 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB No. 4255 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, ISB No. 6935 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
STATE OF IDAHO ~ss 
COUHTY OF KOOTENAH 
FILED: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
SPECTRA SITE, LLC., a Delaware limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff~ 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LA WREN CE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
CONSOLIDATED PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No.: CV 03-4621 
PLAINTIFFS' CONSOLIDATED PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW: 1 
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Plaintiffs Capstar Radio Operating Company and Spectra Site L.L.C., by and through 
Susan P. Weeks and Cynthia K.C. Meyer, of JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A., their 
attorneys, submits the following Consolidated Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
If any of the following Findings of Fact are deemed Conclusions of Law, they are 
incorporated into the Conclusions of Law. 
A. Parties 
1. The lands encompassed in this case are located in Township 50 North, Range 5 West, 
Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
2. Plaintiff Capstar Radio Operating Company is a Delaware corporation which owns 
property in the SW V4 of Section 22. 
3. Plaintiff Spectra Site, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company that leases a site for 
its communication facilities on a parcel of property owned by Robert Hall. 
4. Defendants Doug and Brenda Lawrence are husband and wife, and own property in the 
SE V4 of Section 21. 
B. The Access Road 
5. Access to the SW V4 of Section 22 is provided by a road commonly known as 
Blossom Mountain Road. 
6. Blossom Mountain Road does not show on the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) maps for 1957. 
7. Blossom Mountain Road appears on a 1959 Metsker map. 
PLAINTIFFS' CONSOLIDATED PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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8. In 1966, Pike and Agnes Reynolds sold a parcel of property to General Telephone 
Company of the Northwest (GTC) together with an access easement across the SW Yi 
of Section 22 and an easement across the SE Yi of Section 21 for construction of a 
microwave tower and facilities. 
9. In 1966, GTC also obtained an easement from Glen and Florence Blossom and their 
son, Wilbur Mead, and his wife, Ethel Mead across the SW 1/.i of Section 21. This 
easement gave GTC the right to make minor alterations on the existing road and 
required GTC to construct a gate to be owned by Blossom/Mead following its 
construction. 
10. Also in 1966, GTC obtained an easement from William and Edna Ulrich across the 
existing access road, together with the right to make minor alterations to the road. 
GTC was required to build two gates on the road which would become the property 
of Ulrich. 
11. In 1969 when Harold and Marlene Funk purchased their property the access road was 
an improved road with gravel on it. 
C. Unity and Severance of Title 
12. Equitable title to Government Lot 3 in Section 15; Government Lot 4, the SW Yi of 
the NW Yi and the SW Yi of Section 22, and the SE '/,i of Section 21 vested in Funk in 
1969. Legal title was not vested in Funk in these_parcels until 1974. 
13. Funk purchased the properties for investment purposes. 
14. Funk obtained an easement for the benefit of these lands from Mead in 1972 across 
the SW Yi of Section 21. 
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OF LAW: 3 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 90 of 214
15. In 1975, Funk entered into a series of Sales Agreements whereby he conveyed 
equitable title in Government Lot 3 in Section 15, Government Lot 4 and the SW V4 
of the NW 11,i in Section 22 and the SE 11,i of Section 21 to Human Synergistics, Inc. 
At the same time, Funk executed and deposited with Washington Trust Bank 
fulfillment deeds. These deeds were not used when Funk conveyed legal title to these 
properties to Human Synergistics in 1992. 
16. Funk subsequently split off and sold four parcels in the SW V,i of Section 22 to 
individuals. Kootenai Electric Cooperative obtained a parcel in August 1976. The 
Hall parcel was sold to John Rasmussen and Neil Chamberlain in August 1976. In 
1984, Funk sold a parcel to John Sonneland. In October 1989, Funk sold a parcel to 
Kootenai Broadcasting, which is now the Capstar parcel. 
17. Funk sold his remaining lands in the SW V,i of Section 22 to John Mack in 1992. 
D. Use of the Blossom Mountain Access Road 
18. When Reynolds sold their property, it was contemplated that future sales of the land 
would be to individuals who intended to use it to place microwave towers. 
Reynolds'sales agreement required their buyers to pay one-half of any proceeds to 
Reynolds if the property were sold to another individual for use as a microwave tower 
site. 
19. The GTC access road was the only road used by Harold Funk and led to the top of the 
mountain where GTC's property was located. The road was used by Funk 
20. There exists a conglomeration of tower sites on Blossom Mountain located in the SW 
V,i of Section 22. 
PLAINTIFFS' CONSOLIDATED PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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21. The Access Road has been used primarily for commercial purposes in servicing the 
tower sites. 
22. The Sales Agreements (Funk to Human Synergistics)contained a clause which 
expressed an intent by Funk to continue using the access road as the access to Funk's 
retained property in the SW V,i of Section 22. 
23. Fulfillment deeds were deposited by Funk with Washington Trust Bank at the time 
the Sales Agreements were executed. The fulfillment deed for the SE V4 of Section 
21 deposited by Funk with Washington Trust Bank in 1975 was not used to transfer 
legal title. Instead, a new deed was prepared in 1992 which did not contain the 
reservation of easement discussed in the Sale Agreement. 
24. The access road was used by Funk's tenant, Kootenai Broadcasting, commencing in 
1988. This tenant subsequently entered into a lease agreement with Mack and 
Lawrence and continued to use the road. 
25. Several conditional use permits were submitted to Kootenai County relating to the 
parcels sold by Funk. These permits all reflect that the access road was the travel 
way being used by Funk's successors to access the parcels sold by Funk. 
26. Mack filed a subdivision plat which claimed the road as the primary access to Mack's 
lands in the SW V4 of Section 22. 
27. Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian, predecessors to Lawrence, acknowledged the road 
as the historic access to Funk's parcel in the SW V4 of Section 22. A Trust Easement 
recorded by Farmanian gave constructive notice of this fact. This easement was 
included in Lawrence's title commitment and gave constructive notice of its terms. 
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28. Lawrence's title commitment included the Sale Agreement with the reservation of an 
easement gave actual notice that Funk and their successors claimed a right to use the 
road. 
29. Soon after closing on the SE V4 of Section 21, Lawrence posted the property with "no 
trespassing" signs. Some of these signs were located near the gate sitated near the 
boundary of Lawrence's parcel. 
30. Lawrence worked logging his land m 1996 and 1997 and was aware of the 
commercial traffic crossing his land. 
31. After acquiring equitable title in the property, Lawrence researched county records to 
learn the identity of individuals using the road. 
32. Lawrence took several actions indicating that use of the access road was without his 
permission. These included posting the land, stopping and informing users they did 
not have his permission to cross, locking the gate located near his property boundary 
to prohibit access; writing county officials seeking prosecution for use of the road, 
attending public hearings and denying users had a right to use the road, and filing 
police reports. 
33. When Funk bought the property in 1969, it was not forested. When Lawrence 
purchased the property in 1996, it was forested. A survey from 1998 showed an old 
fence lin~ exis_ted ~l911g thesouthem_portion of Section 21. 
34. In 1996, the conjunction of Signal Point Road and Blossom Mountain Road was 
gated at the request of the landowners who owned property on Blossom Mountain 
with the permission of Post Falls Highway District. The gate was locked and only 
authorized users of the road were provided keys. 
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35. There were three other gates on the road, which gates were likely placed by GTC 
pursuant to the terms of the license agreement. 
36. Idaho Forest Industry owned Section 28 at one point in time. A forester for IFI 
stopped John Mack in 1994 and told him that no one had permission to use the access 
road as it crossed the IFI property and demanded he cease using the road. Mack 
testified IFI took the position it would not give anyone access across their property. 
37. Hall's predecessor, Van Sky, regularly used the road for access to the Hall parcel. 
Hall's predecessor and tenant, Switzer Communication, regularly used the site. 
38. Two of Hall's tenants, Switzer Communication and Pass Word, obtained default 
judgments on their quiet title countersuit against Lawrence in Kootenai County Case 
No. CV-99-6215. 
3 9. John Rook was contacted by Lawrence about use of the road and Rook claimed his 
company, Rook Broadcasting, had the right to use the road. 
40. Rook's company had tenants on his site, Trinity Broadcasting and EEK Broadcasting, 
who also used the road. 
41. Capstar continued the tenant leases on the site and continued to use the road after 
acquiring the Rook parcel. 
E. Mellick Road Access 
42. I11 _1907_, the Government Land Office resurveyed the lands in question in this 
litigation. That survey revealed that a road had been in Section 15 that followed a 
creek bed and branched toward the middle of the section. The east branch extended 
in the East 12 of the SW Y4 of Section 15 to the homestead of Charles Steele. The 
western branch extended southwesterly through Government Lot 2 in Section 15, 
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continued southwesterly through the SE V,i of Section 16 and continued southerly 
through Section 21. The GLO survey was conducted May 17, 1907 through June 14, 
1907. 
43. In September 1907, AB. Mellick and four others petitioned the Board of County 
Commissioners to lay out a county road with a branch to run to the home of AB. 
Mellick and sons, and an eastern branch to extend to an existing road to the place of 
Charles Steele. The requested road was estimated to be approximately one mile long. 
The road was to commence at the end of Walker Road, then run south along Spring 
Branch Creek to the fork of the creek, at which point it was to divide with one branch 
(the western branch) to run by the most feasible route to the place of A.B. Mellick 
and the other branch to run to the place of Charles Steele and connect with the road 
already made to the end of the east branch of Spring Branch Creek. 
44. The Board of Kootenai County Commissioners approved the petition for Mellick 
Road and the county surveyor was appointed as viewer to view out and survey the 
road and report back to the Board of County Commissioners. 
45. The commissioners accepted Mellick Road as viewed on October 15, 1907. 
46. Mellick road was placed in the Kootenai County Road Map book and designated as 
Road No. 217. 
47_._I_µ 191_0, a cha11ge in the east branch of Mellick Road, shown as Road No. 299, was 
accepted by the Kootenai County Board of commissioners . which altered the 
previously viewed branch of the road going to Charles Steele's place. 
48. Nothing in the county record indicates the roads were constructed by Kootenai 
County after being laid out and accepted by the commissioners. 
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49. In 1957, a United States Geological Survey (USGS) topography map was prepared 
which included the Blossom Mountain area. It included a portion of a road in Section 
15 on Blossom Mountain extending a short distance south of the area now known as 
Schilling Loop, and shown on the 1907 Viewers' Report as Walker Road. 
50. The legend on the map indicates the road portrayed is an unimproved dirt road. The 
map does not show Mellick Road existing as laid out in 1907. 
51. The same map shows Signal Point Road, but does not show Blossom Mountain Road. 
52. A 1959 Metsker map shows Blossom Mountain Road and Mellick Road as dirt roads. 
A portion of the north face road lies outside the alignment laid out in 1907 for the 
Mellick Road right of way and a portion of the road lies within the alignment. 
53. Post Falls Highway District is the governmental agency responsible for maintenance 
of the public roads in the area of Blossom Mountain. It was created by statute in 
1971. It retains the prior records of former highway districts which previously 
serviced this area, as well as county records regarding this area. Post Falls Highway 
District has no record that Mellick Road was ever constructed through its entirety as 
shown on the Viewers' Report. 
54. Post Falls Highway District maintains a portion of Mellick Road to an area adjacent 
to property previously owned by the Loudin family. 
55. A USGS tQpogntphic map published in 1981, and prepared using data from a 1975 
aerial and data checked in the field in 1977, showed the existence of Blossom 
Mountain Road. The map showed Schilling Loop improved as a light duty road. It 
also showed a small segment of Mellick Road as an unimproved road with two home 
on the east side of the unimproved portion. 
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56. The Loudin family sued their neighbor, Stokes, in 1987 seeking to prohibit travel 
beyond the maintained portion of Mellick Road. The Stokes family had property in 
the vicinity of Charles Steele's place, off the east branch laid out for Mellick Road, in 
an area now shown on maps as Monument Drive in the North Yi of the SW 11,i of 
Section 15. There existed a dirt road to this home. The Stokes family prevailed and 
Gary Haman, District Judge, entered an order prohibiting Loudins from blocking the 
public road known as Mellick Road particularly as it traversed the SW 11,i of the NE 11,i 
and the SE 'i4 of the NW 'i4 of Section 15. 
57. Although laid out in 1907, Mellick Road beyond the Stokes home was undeveloped 
and unimproved. Post Falls Highway District never issued any permits to any person 
to improve Mellick Road beyond the Monument Drive segment. 
58. It was impossible to reach the top of Blossom Mountain using the improved portion 
of Mellick Road during the 1970's through the early 1980's. 
59. In 2004 the Fritz Heath Forest Tracts showed a road labeled "Mellick Road" outside 
the road laid out and accepted by Kootenai County. 
60. When John Mack purchased his property in 1992, the road on the north face appeared 
that it had not been used for nearly 20 years, and the road was overgrown with trees 
over 20 feet tall. 
61. Mack was an excavator. In 2006, Mack brought in heavy equipment and blazed a 
logging road down the north face of Blossom Mountain which roughly followed the 
same road shown on the 1959 Metsker map. As with the road shown on the 1959 
Metsker map, Mack was unable to contain to the road to land originally owned by 
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Funk or Reynolds. The road veered outside the public right of way alignment in 
Sections 21 and 16. 
Conclusions of Law 
If any of the following Conclusions of Law are deemed Findings of Fact, they are 
incorporated into thet Findings of Fact. 
A. Jurisdiction 
1. The party has jurisdiction of this matter as it involves real property in Kootenai 
County, Idaho. 
B. Conveyances 
2. A conveyance embraces every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in 
real property is created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered, or by which the title to 
any real property may be affected, except will. LC. § 55-813. 
3. A conveyance of an estate in real property may be made by an instrument in writing, 
subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. LC. § 55-601. 
4. An easement may be created in a contract of sale, in a lease, or in a declaration of 
condominium. 
5. A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in favor 
thereof an eas~ment to use other real propei:_ty of the person whose_ estate is 
transferred, in the same manner and to the same extent as such property was 
obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the 
benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed. LC. § 
55-603. 
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6. A document must be properly acknowledged to provide constructive notice of its 
contents. LC. § 55-805. 
7. There was unity of title in Funk in the properties at issue in this matter. 
8. Funk's unity oftitle was severed when Funk entered into a contract of sale for the SE 
Y4 of Section 21 in 1975. Funk retained a part of the adjoining parcel. 
9. The recorded 1975 Contract of Sale on the SE V4 of Section 21 recorded by Funk was 
not properly acknowledged by Funk and did not provide constructive notice of its 
contents, even though it was acknowledged by the buyer, Human Synergistics. 
10. The 1996 easement recorded by Farmanian provided constructive notice of its 
contents. 
11. The 1992 deed from Funk to Human Synergistics transferred legal title of the SE V4 of 
Section 21, and merged all covenants in the Sale Agreement. 
C. Easement Implied by Prior Use 
12. Before Funk conveyed the SE V,i of Section 21 to Human Synergistics, there was 
usage of the access road existing between the SE V,i of Section 21 and Funk's portion 
of the SW V,i of Section 22 that, had the two parcel been separately owned, the access 
road could have been an easement appurtenant to the SW V,i of Section 22. 
13. The usage of the road was apparent to anyone viewing the property. 
14. The executed Sale Agreement between Funk and Human Synergistics demonstrates 
that Funk intended to reserve an easement across the SE V,i of Section 21, but it was 
omitted in the final written instrument executed seventeen years later from Funk to 
Human Synergistics. 
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15. It was the intent of the parties as shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the Human Synergistics transaction that Funk should retain an easement for the 
benefit of Funk's remaining parcel in the SW Y-t of Section 22. 
16. Mellick road was undeveloped and unopened at the time that Funk severed his 
property. 
1 7. At the time of severance, the access road provided the only usable means of access to 
the SW Y-t of Section 22. 
18. The usage made by Funk of the access road, including the portion crossing the SE V,i 
of Section 21, was reasonably necessary to access Funk's property in the SW V,i of 
Section 22. 
19. Funk's remaining parcel is entitled to an implied easement by prior use. 
20. This easement is appurtenant to Funk's lands in the SW V,i of Section 22, runs with 
the land, and is not extinguishable. 
D. Easement by Prescription 
21. Each Plaintiffs' prescriptive use must be measured from their own use, although some 
elements may be mutual. 
22. The access road was clearly visible on the SE Y-t of Section 21. Its existence was 
known to Human Synergistics at the time it acquired equitable title in 1975. 
23. Human Synergistics was aware from the sales transaction that Funk claimed a right to 
cross over the road based upon the facts and circumstances evidenced in the Sale 
Agreement. 
24. The attempt to reserve an easement by Funk in the Sales Agreement was ineffective, 
but established a claim of title for such easement. 
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25. Funk continued to use the access road after the sale to Human Synergistic. Although 
Funk was seldom in the area after moving in 1975, in 1988, Funk's tenant Kootenai 
Cable, Inc, leased some of Funk's land in the SW Yi of Section 22 to build a 40' 
microwave tower for cable television transmission in t. After Mack purchased the 
property, this tenant continued on as a tenant of Mack and Lawrence and continued to 
use this transmitter site. 
26. Hall's predecessor purchased their property in 1976. Hall's predecessors were aware 
that Funk claimed a right in the sale to Human Synergistics to continue using the 
access road. Hall's predecessors continued using the road under this claim. When 
challenged by Mack on behalf of Lawrence in 1997 about using the access road, Hall 
maintained he had a right to use the road and his tenants continued to use it. 
27. Capstar's predecessors purchased their property in 1989. The road was used by Rook 
under a claim of right that he had an easement originating with Funk. When 
Lawrence contacted John Rook to challenge his use of the road, Rook claimed an 
easement in the access road. 
28. Lawrence had actual notice and constructive notice from his title commitment that 
Funk and his successors claimed a right to use the access road. 
29. To protect his property rights, in 1996 Lawrence posted his property "no trespassing", 
includi!)-~ an area near the gate entering his property. At a later date, Lawrencebegan 
locking the gate. Lawrence took other measures to protect his property from trespass. 
30. Lawrence's predecessors understood that Funk and his successors in title claimed a 
right to use the access road across the SE 1/.i of Section 21. 
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31. The use of Hall and Hall's predecessors was continuous according to the nature of the 
use and the needs of Hall and their tenants. 
32. The use of Capstar and Capstar's predecessors was continuous according to the nature 
of the use and needs of Capstar and their tenants. 
33. Hall and Hall's predecessor's use of the road was adverse and under a claim of right. 
34. Capstar and Capstar's predecessor's use of the road was adverse and under a claim of 
right. 
3 5. Hall and Hall's predecessors use has met the statutory period. Hall's predecessors 
began using the road in 1975 under a claim of right, and such use continued until suit 
was filed. Further, Hall's tenants continued to use the road after it was posted by 
Lawrence with a no trespassing signs in 1996. Under either measure, Hall's use of 
the road meets the statutory period. 
36. Capstar and Capstar's predecessors use has met the statutory period. Capstar's 
predecessors began using the road in 1989 under a claim of right, and such use 
continued until suit was filed. Further, Hall's tenants continued to use the road after 
it was posted by Lawrence with a no trespassing signs in 1996. Under either 
measure, Capstar' s use of the road meets the statutory period. 
E. Easement by Necessity 
37. There was unity of title in Funk in the properties at issue in this matter. 
38. The only usable access at the time Funk severed the SE 1/.i of Section 21, the SW 1/.i of 
the NW Y4 of Section 22, and the Government Lot 3 in Section 15 was Blossom 
Mountain Road. 
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39. The road depicted on the north side of Blossom Mountain in the 1959 Metsker map 
did not exist in 1975 when Funk segregated title. 
40. A portion of Mellick Road that was laid out was unopened and undeveloped, 
including the portion of the right of way that touched Government Lot 3 in Section 
15, when Funks segregated title in 1975. 
41. Funks failure to include an easement m the 1992 warranty deed to Human 
Synergistics landlocked the Capstar parcel. 
42. Funks failure to include an easement m the 1992 warranty deed to Human 
Synergistics landlocked the Hall parcel. 
43. Mack constructed a road on the north face of Blossom Mountain. Although Mack 
was an excavator by trade, he was unable to contain the road to lands previously 
owned by Funk. To utilize this road, Capstar and Hall would be required to obtain 
easements from landowners whose title is unrelated to Funks title. 
44. Spectra Site has a license from Stimson Lumber to use the access road in Section 28. 
45. While it owned the property, Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. denied permission to users 
of the road to pass over the road. 
46. A prescriptive easement vests at the end of the statutory period, not at the time the 
court quiets title in the easement. 
47. Ft1nk an4 his successors have used the _pr~perty previously owned by Idaho Forest 
Industries in Section 28 for a period longer than the statutory period. 
48. An easement by necessity exists for Capstar. 
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49. An easement by necessity exists for Spectra Site. 
T 
. ,,/ T1, 
DA ED this~ day of June, 2013. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Susan P. Weeks 
Attorney for Plaintiff Spectra Site L.L.C. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 //A-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _j______ day of June, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Douglas Marfice 
Theron J. DeSmet 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: (208) 664-5884 
~ 
D 
D 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPS TAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMP ANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LA WREN CE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
SPECTRA SITE CO.MMUNICATIONS, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, 
And JOHN DOES 1-6, Third Party Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-7671 
Case No. CV-03-4621 
DEFENDANTS'PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COME NOW Defendants/Counterclaimants, and submit their proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in accordance with this Court's Pretrial Order. 
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This is an easement dispute. The issue before the Court on the first phase of trial is: 
Whether Plaintiffs Capstar Radio Operating Company ("Capstar") and Spectrasite 
Communications, LLC ("Spectrasite") hold easements over property owned by Defendants 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (the "Lawrences"). 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Lawrences are the fee simple owners of three parcels of real property on 
Blossom Mountain described as the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and the East half of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township, 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai 
County, Idaho (the "Lawrence Property"). 
2. In 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk (the "Funks") purchased a large tract of real 
property on Blossom Mountain consisting of land in parts of Section 15, Section 21 and Section 
22, in Kootenai County, Idaho (the "Funk Property"). The original Funk Property contained 
the parcels of property now owned by the Lawrences and Capstar and a parcel leased by 
Spectrasite, which are relevant to this action. 
3. In 1966, the General Telephone Company, ("GTC") obtained an express 
easement to access one acre of land located in Section 22. GTC's easement was over a private 
road owned by Wilber Mead ("Mead"). The road crossed over the southwest quarter of Section 
21 (the "Mead Property"), then went south into the north half of Section 28, where it turned 
northeast and entered (what is now) the Lawrence Property and then into the southwest quarter 
of Section 22 near what is now the Capstar Property. 
4. This private road is sometimes called "Blossom Road" or "West Appleblossom 
Road." 
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5. In 1975, the Funks severed what is now the Lawrence Property from the Funk 
Property and sold it to Human Synergistics. 
6. From there, the chain of title to the Lawrence Property is as follows: Human 
Synergistics to Johnson & McHugh; Johnson & McHugh to National Associated Properties 
("NAP"); NAP to the Farmanians; and the Farmanians to the Lawrences. 
7. The Lawrences purchased the Lawrence Property in July of 1996. The only 
express easement identified at the time of Lawrences' purchase of the Lawrence Property was 
the GTC easement. 
8. Capstar became the owner of real property on Blossom Mountain in Kootenai 
County, Idaho, described in Appendix "A" attached hereto (the "Capstar Property"). 
9. In 1989, the Funks severed what is now the Capstar Property from the Funk 
Property and sold the Capstar Property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. 
10. From there, the chain of title to the Capstar Property is as follows: Kootenai 
Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting; Rook Broadcasting to AGM; and AGM to Capstar. 
Capstar purchased the Cap star Property in 2000. On March 31, 2011, Cap star conveyed the 
Capstar Property to SpectraSite Communications, LLC (not to be confused with Plaintiff 
Spectrasite ). 
11. Mark Hall and Robert Hall are the owners of a parcel of real property located in 
the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, 
Kootenai County, Idaho ("HaHProperty"). 
12. On August 26, 1976, the Funks severed the Hall Property from the Funk 
Property and sold the Hall Property to John Rasmussen and Neil Chamberlin. 
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13. From there, the chain of title to the Hall Property is as follows: 
Rasmussen/Chamberlin to James and Teresa Van Sky; Van Sky to Switzer Communications, 
Inc.; Switzer Communications, Inc. to Term Corp.; and Term Corp. to Mark Hall and Robert 
Hall. 
14. Before selling it to Human Synergistics, the Funks owned the Lawrence Property 
from 1969 to 1975. During this time, the Funks visited the Funk Property infrequently to pick 
huckleberries and for target practice. 
15. After the Funks severed the Lawrence Property and sold it to Human 
Synergistics in 1975, the Funks moved to Aberdeen, Washington and only visited the 
remaining Funk Property on two or three occasions. 
16. Wilbur Mead, a neighboring property owner, had no knowledge of the Funks use 
of the Funk Property for any purpose. 
17. In 1975, at the time of severance of the Lawrence Property from the Funk 
Property, Mellick Road (a public road) provided access to portions of Blossom Mountain. 
Mellick Road extended to the Funk Property in Section 15 ( directly North of Section 22). The 
Funk Property in Section 15 was contiguous to the Funk Property located in Section 22, thus 
the Funks had access to their property holdings on Blossom Road via a public road. 
18. In 1975, an old logging road extended from the Funk Property in Section 22 to 
Mellick Road in the Northeast Quarter of Section 21, which was not owned by the Funks. The 
Funks could have redirected the logging road to connect to Mellick Road in the Funks' Section 
15 Property. The time and expense associated with redirecting the logging road to provide such 
access would have been reasonable. (In fact, John Mack later did redirect the logging road to 
connect to Mellick Road and provide access to his property in Section 22. Mack's property 
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smTounds what is now the Capstar Property.) 
19. In 1989, the Funks severed the Capstar Property from the Funk Property and 
sold the Capstar Property to Kootenai Broadcasting. Kootenai Broadcasting was owned by 
John Rook. Kootenai Broadcasting then transferred the Capstar Property to Rook 
Broadcasting, which then sold the Capstar Property to AGM in 1998. While the Capstar 
Property was owned by Kootenai/Rook, the companies' agents accessed the Capstar Property 
via Blossom Mountain Road. Kootenai/Rook either had permission to use Blossom Mountain 
Road or they used the Road under the belief that the companies had permission to use Blossom 
Mountain Road. 
20. Mark Hall and Robert Hall leased a telecommunications site on the Hall 
Property to Nextel West Corp. 
21. On November 3, 1997, the Lawrences entered into an access license agreement 
with Nextel West Corp. The access license agreement allowed the Nextel West Corp. to travel 
across the Lawrence Property to access its telecommunications lease site on the Hall property. 
In January of 2003, Nextel West Corp. assigned the access license agreement to Tower Asset 
Sub, Inc. Tower Asset Sub, Inc. subsequently assigned the access license agreement to 
Spectrasite. 
22. From November of 1997 to April of 2007, the Lawrences received monthly 
payments under the access license agreement from it assignee(s). Since May 2007, Spectrasite 
has not made monthly payments to the Lawrences pursuant to the access license agreement. 
23. Since May 2007, Spectrasite and Capstar have continued to use the Lawrence 
Property to access their respective telecommunications equipment. 
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24. From 1997 to present, Spectrasite and Capstar have authorized or directed other 
persons to travel across the Lawrence Property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Easement by Implication. 
• An easement by implication reqmres a showing of (1) unity of title and 
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use of an access; 
and (3) reasonable necessity for an easement. Capstar Radio Broadcasting Company v. 
Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 416, 283 P.3d 728, 733 (2012); quoting, Bob Daniels & Sons v. 
Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (1984). Implied easements are not favored 
by courts because they are in derogation of the rule that written instruments speak for 
themselves. Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 77, 655 P.2d 1081, 1087 (1983); citing, Davis v. 
Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403 (1961). 
The Plaintiffs have satisfied the first required element for an easement by implication. 
The Funks originally held title to a larger tract of land which encompassed the Lawrence 
Property, Capstar Property and Hall Property. And, the Funks eventually separated the subject 
Properties from the larger tract. However, Plaintiffs have failed to carry the burden of 
demonstrating the second and third elements required for an easement by impiication. 
• The apparent and continuous use required for an easement by implication is 
measured from the point unity of title is severed and a possessory interest is created in the 
severed parcel. Capstar at 417, 734; citing, Bays v. Haven, 55 Wash.App. 324, 777 P.2d 562, 
564 (1989). The Lawrence property was severed in 1975, when the Funks entered into a sales 
contract with Human Synergistics. Capstar at 417, 734. 
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• Apparent and continuous use requires a showing of use that would be apparent to 
the outside world. Capstar at 418, 735.1 
Plaintiffs argue that Funks' use of Blossom Mountain Road was apparent and 
continuous prior to 1975. The evidence does not support this. 
• Harold Funk ( deceased) testified (via deposition) that he purchased the Funk 
Property in 1969. Funk severed the Lawrence Property portion of his larger tract and sold it to 
Human Synergistics in 1975. Mr. Funk testified that during this six year period of time, the 
Funks visited the remainder of the Funk Property infrequently (approximately 20 to 30 times) 
for the purpose of picking huckleberries and target practice. 
• Wilber Mead (deceased) testified (via deposition) that he had no knowledge of 
Mr. Funk's use of the property. Plaintiffs did not present any other evidence of the Funks use 
of the Funk Property between 1969 and 1975. 
• Funks use of the Funk Property was not apparent to the outside world and, 
therefore, does not constitute an apparent continuous use necessary for an implied easement.2 
For this reason, Plaintiffs' easement by implication claim fails. 
• "The party seeking to establish the easement [by implication] must prove 
reasonable necessity." Capstar at 417, 734. "Reasonable necessity is something less than the 
great and present necessity required for an easement implied by necessity." Id.; citing, Davis v. 
1 Citing, Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006) (Finding use of a driveway apparent); 
Akers v. DL White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 302, 127 P.3d 196, 205 (2005) (Finding "regular use" to be 
required); Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,641,991 P.2d 362, 366 (1999) (Required open and continuous use to 
"ensure [] that the buyer of the servient property will have notice of the preexisting use"). 
2 See, Bear Island Water Ass'n v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1994) (Finding no apparent 
continuous use where a well was drilled but not used before separation); Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 77-78, 501 
P.2d 1383-89 (1972) (Finding use of access roads was limited and diminished further after sale); see also, Cordwell 
v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 78, 665 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Ct.App. 1983) (Holding use by other parties to be insufficient to 
establish apparent continuous use). 
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Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999). Plaintiffs assert that use of the road 
across the Lawrence Property was necessary for the Funks to access their remaining property in 
Section 22. This proposition is not supported by the evidence. The Funks were able to access 
their Section 22 property via Mellick Road, a public road, which extended to the Funks' 
contiguous property in Section 15. 
Because the public road access (Mellick Road) did extend to the Funks Property in 
Section 15 which was contiguous to Funks Property located in Section 22, Funks could have 
accessed their Section 22 property via Mellick Road. Thus, the Funks had no reasonable 
necessity to use the Blossom Mountain access road. 
• Even if Mellick Road did not extend all the way to Funks Section 22 property, a 
logging road extending from Mellick Road could have provided direct access to the Funks 
Section 22 property, or alternatively could have been redirected, with minimal effort, to extend 
into the Funks Section 22 property. 
• At the time of Funks ownership, a logging road existed from the point where 
Mellick Road ended in Section 15, leading into to the Northeast Quarter of Section 21. The 
logging road did not extend to Funks Property in Section 22 and that the logging road was over 
grown and in somewhat poor condition, but it still existed. "[A] property owner cannot create a 
necessity through his or her own actions." Capstar at 418, 73 5; citing, B & J Dev. & Invs., Inc. 
v. Parsons, 126 Idaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, 52 (Ct.App. 1994). The logging road could have 
been improved and redirected a short distance to extend into Section 22 property. At some 
point, John Mack actually did connect the logging road to Mellick Road in order to access 
Mack's property in Section 22. Because the Funks could have redirected the logging road to 
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provide access to their Property, and the time and expense required to do so would not be 
unreasonable, the use of the Blossom Mountain access road was not reasonably necessary. 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to prove the required elements for an 
easement by implication. Plaintiffs do not have an easement by implication to cross the 
Lawrence Property. 
B. Easement by Necessity. 
• An easement by necessity requires (1) unity of ownership prior to division of the 
tract; (2) necessity of an easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for 
the easement. Capstar at 419, 736; quoting, Bob Daniels & Sons at 542, 1017. 
• If an alternate access exists, even one which is expensive or inconvenient, then 
an easement by necessity must not be granted. The requirement of necessity does not mean that 
there must be access to all portions of a parcel or that there be the most convenient access 
possible. Capstar at 419, 736. 
"Reasonable necessity" in the context of an easement by implication is a lower standard 
than the necessity showing required for an easement by necessity. Bear Island Water Ass 'n, Inc. 
v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,725,874 P.2d 528,536 (1993). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the 
"great present necessity for an easement" required to obtain and easement by necessity. Capstar 
at 419, 736. Plaintiffs do not have an easement by necessity to cross the Lawrence Property. 
Even if plaintiffs had established an easement by necessity, such necessity no longer 
exists. " ... An easement by necessity continues only as long as the need exists." Bob Daniels & 
Sons, at 542, 1017. Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Mack testified (via affidavit) that the Lawrence 
Property can be accessed by other means, namely Mellick Road and roads constructed by Mr. 
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Mack. Thus, even if plaintiffs had proven it was absolutely necessary, or even reasonably 
necessary to use Blossom Mountain Road to access the Lawrence Property at the time of 
severance, such necessity no longer exists and plaintiffs claim for an easement by necessity 
fails. 
C. Easement by Prescription. 
• In order to establish an easement by prescription, a claimant must prove use of 
the subject property that is (1) open and notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3) 
adverse and under a claim of right, ( 4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of 
the servient property (5) for the statutory period of five years. Capstar at 420, 736; quoting, 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006). 
• "It is no trivial thing to take another's land without compensation, easements by 
prescription are not favored by the law." Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 
1229 (2005); quoting, Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 143, 118 P.3d 740, 744 (1941); 
Backman at 396, 81; citing Elder v. NW Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356, 358, 613 P.2d 367, 369 
(1980). 
In establishing an easement by prescription the plaintiff carries the burden of 
demonstrating each of the five elements by reasonably clear and convincing evidence. Backman 
v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 396, 210 P.3d 75, 81 (2009); citing Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 
12, 784 P.2d 339, 342 (Ct.App. 1989). Ordinarily, once a plaintiff has carried such burden, 
"[t]he burden then shifts to the owner of the servient estate to demonstrate that the claimants' 
use was permissive." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969, 976 (2003). 
However, "[t]his presumption does not apply where the claimed easement is over wild and 
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unenclosed lands." Id. "Rather, where the easement alleged is over wild and unenclosed lands, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that use of such lands is permissive, and the burden is on the 
party asserting the easement to establish adversity." Id.; citing Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 
675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Mr. Lawrence testified that the Lawrence Property over 
which the plaintiffs claim an easement is not fenced or otherwise enclosed and lies in rather 
forested areas. The Lawrence Property is wild and unenclosed land. As a result, plaintiffs have 
the added burden at trial of proving, by reasonably clear and convincing evidence, that the use 
upon which the easement theory is based was adverse. Plaintiffs have failed to carry this 
burden. 
Plaintiffs claim a prescriptive easement based upon the Funks' use of the access road 
from 1975 (when Funk severed what is now the Lawrence Property and sold it to Human 
Synergistics) to 1981 and Kootenai Broadcasting/Rook's use of the road beginning in 1989 
when Kootenai Broadcasting/Rook purchased the Capstar Property. 
The relevant "prescriptive period" for the Funks' use of the access road is 1975 to 1981. 
Capstar at 420, 737. Between 1975 and 1981, Funk lived in Aberdeen, Washington and only 
visited the Property on two or three occasions. Funk did not visit the Property after 1981 and 
sold the remaining portion of the Funk Property in 1989. Funks "... limited use of the 
easement road does not constitute open and continuous use." Capstar at 421, 738. For this 
reason, Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement theory based upon Funks' use fails and this Court need 
not address the remaining elements required for a prescriptive easement. 
John Rook was the owner of Kootenai Broadcasting, which purchased the Capstar 
Property from the Funks. Rook was also the owner of Rook Broadcasting which succeeded in 
interest to the Capstar Property from Kootenai Broadcasting. Between 1989 and 1998, when 
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Rook's companies owned the Capstar Property, those companies maintained radio 
telecommunications equipment on the Capstar Property. During this period, Rook and other 
representatives of the companies accessed the Capstar Property via the Blossom Mountain 
access road. This access was permitted. 
Idaho law is well settled; an easement by prescription cannot arise when "the use was 
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract or agreement." West v. smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 
511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973); see also, Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,680, 947 P.2d 975,980 
(1997) (holding "[a] prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was 
by permission of its owner; because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of the 
owner). 
Mr. Rook's use of the Blossom Mountain access road and that of his companies' 
representatives was a permissive use. A permissive use cannot give rise to a prescriptive 
easement. No prescriptive easement exists. 
Plaintiffs have failed to prove the existence of a prescriptive easement by reasonably 
clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiffs do not have a prescriptive easement to cross the 
Lawrence Property. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4111 day of June, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
US Mail 
~ Overnight Mail 
----A- Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 664-1684 
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APPENDIX "A" 
A parcel of land as referenced in the Warranty Deed filed as Instrument Number 156152, Records of Kootenai County, said 
parcel located in the'Southwest Quarter, Section 22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, 
Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at an aluminum capped monument marking the southwest comer, said Section 22, from which a brass capped 
monument marking the south quarter corner, said Section 22,.bears S 89°42'31" EA distance of 2628.33 feet; thence; 
N 66°21 '00" E A distance of 932.27 feet to an iron pipe monument marking the southwesterly corner of said .deed parcel.· 
The true point-of beginning for this description. · · · · · 
Thence, N 13°37'25" W along the west line of said parcel a distance of 365.98 feet (N13°37' W 365.96 feet, deed) to the 
northwesterly comer thereof; · 
Thence, N 76°21 '14" E along the north line of s11id parcel a distance of 594.87 feet (N 76°22' E 595.09 feet, deed) to the 
northeasterly comer thereof; · 
Thence, S 13°39'47" E along the east line of said parcel a distance of 366.22 feet (S 13°37' E 366.09 feet, deed) to the 
southeasterly comer thereof; · 
Thence, S 76°22'38" W along the south line of said parcel a distance of 595.13 feet (S 76°23' W 595.09 feet, deed) to the 
true point-of-beginning. 
Said described parcel contains 5.00 acres (217,829.4 squa,re feet), more or less. 
Together with a 20-foot right-of-way to construct a road from the existing road to the above-described parc~l. 
Also, together with a right-of-way for utilities, running from the existing power box, in the SE !4 of Section 21, Township 50 
North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian to the above-described property. 
"r~pstar Property" 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A .. 
1626 Lil.lcoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
ISB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JAMES VERN PAGE 01/11 
2013 JUN-7 PH I: 25 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
~~/ 
N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTARRADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware co:rporation, Case No. CV 02-7671 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and w.ife, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED EXHIBIT 
LIST 
CO:MES NOW Plaintiff, by and through its attorneys of record, James) Vernon & Weeks, 
P.A. and hereby submit its First Am.ended Exhibit List as required by the Court's scheduling 
order in the fonn attached hereto. In addition to the exhibits listed, Plaintiff may use any exhibit 
contained on Defendants' Exhibit Li.st. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 2013. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
By ~c?~ 
SUSANP. WEEKS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the7th day of June, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy oftbe foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Doug Mar.flee 
Theron J. DeSmet 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: (208) 664-5884 
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CASE NO.: 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 
CV-02-767l 
TRIAL DATE: June 11, 2013 
CASE TITLE: CAPSTAR RADIO v. LAWRENCE 
NO. DESCRIPTION BY STIP. OFFERED ADMinED 
1 Illustrative d.e_piction of 
Sections 15, 22 and 21 
2 Real Estate Sales 
Contract, filed in Book 
55, Page 118 on August 
28, 1968, Reynolds to 
Raden 
3 Real. Estate Contract, 
filed in Book 57, page 
119, Raden to Funk, 
April 14, 1969 
4 Warranty Deed filed as 
Instrument No. 613471 
Mead to Funk, 
November 9, 1972 
5 Sale Agreement 
Instrument No. 672112 
Fuuk to Human 
Synergi.stics, Inc. 
July 10, 1975 
6 Sale Agreement 
Instrument No. 6721 l 3 
Funk to Human 
Synergisti.cs, Inc. 
__ Julv l0,J9_75 
7 Sale Agreement 
In.strument No. 6721 l 4 
Funk to Human 
Synergistics, Inc. 
Julv 10, 1975 
8 Sale Agreement 
Instrument No. 672115 
Funk to Hwnan 
Synergistics, Inc. 
July 10, 1975 
PAGE 03/11 
REFUSED RESERVE 
Rtn.ING 
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NO. DESCRIPTION BYSTIP, OFFERED ADMI1TED REFUSED RESERVE 
RULING 
9 Sale Agreement 
Instrument No. 672116 
Funk to Human. 
Synergistics, In.c. 
July 10, 1975 
10 Sale Agreement 
Instnunent No.672117 
Funk to Human 
Synergistics, Inc. 
July 10, J.975 
11 Sale Agreement 
Instrument No. 672118 
Funk to Human 
Synergistics, I:n.c. 
July 10, 1975 
12 Statutory Warranty Deed 
Instrument No. 653865 
Rynolds to Raden an.cl 
Marcoe, signed April 15, 
1974, recorded July 25, 
1974 
13 Statutor.y Warranty Deed 
InstrutnentNo. 653864 
Raden and Marcoe to 
Funk, Signed April l l, 
1974, recorded July 25, 
1974 
14 Mem.o:randwn of 
Contract, filed. on as 
Instrument No. 732027 
Hum.an Synergistics to 
Johnston. an.cl McHugh 
Signed May 16, 1977, 
recorded June 1, 1977 
15 Roadway Easement Inst. 
No. 773361, IFI to 
Johnston and McHugh 
signed July 11, 1977 
recored July 6, 1978 
16 Mem.orandum of Sale 
Agreement Inst. No. 
1098895, Johnston and 
McHuizh to NAP, signed 
2 
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July 3, 1987, recorded 
October 13, 1987 
NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED ADMITIED REFUSED RESERVE $TIP, RULING 
17 Corporation Deed Inst. 
No. 1114689, Human 
Synergistics to Johston 
and McHugh, signed 
May 16, 1977, recorded 
April 21, 1988 
18 War.ra.n.ty Deed Inst. No. 
1279685, Funk to Mack, 
October 22, 1992 
19 Warranty Deed Inst. No. 
1283911, Funk to 
Human Synergistics, 
signed October 29, 1992, 
recorded November 29, 
1992 
20 Deed Inst. No. 1452670 
NAP to Farmanian 
July 3, l 996 
21 Corporation Deed Inst. 
No. 1452959, NAP to 
Farmanian, July 8, 1996 
22 Easement Inst. No. 
1454068, NAP to Other 
Property, July 16, 1996 
23 Mutual Agreement Grant 
of Easement and Quit 
Claim. Deed Inst. No. 
1462711, Farm.anian to 
. Ma,ck,.Septembe.r ZO, 
1996 
24 Memorandum of Sale 
Agreement Inst. No. 
1464206,Fannanianto 
Lawrence., signed July 
12, 1996,recorded 
October 1, 1996 
3 
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NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED ADMITTED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
25 Quitclaim Deed Inst. No. 
1533 768, Lawrence to 
Lawrence,April 17, 1998 
26 Quitclaim. Deed. Inst. No. 
1543875, Lawrence to 
Lawrence, June 29, 1998 
27 Warranty Deed. Inst. No. 
1551.840, Johnston and 
McHu.gh to NAP, signed 
July 16, 1996, recorded 
August 27, 1998 
28 Warranty Deed Inst. No. 
1551841, Fam1anian to 
Lawrence, sigi1ed July S, 
1996, recorded August 
27, 1996 
29 Deed In.st. No. 720411, 
Funk to Rasmussen and 
Chamberlain, sl gned 
August 26, 1976, 
recorded JantlaJ)' 7, 1977 
30C Warranty Deed 
Instrument No. 1161438 
and re-recorded as 
ln.strument No. 1167510 
Funk to Idaho 
Broadcasting, September 
25, 1989 
31C Quitclaun Deed 
Instrument No. 1168384, 
Id?:ho ~road~ast_ing to 
.. - .. 
Kooten.ai Broad.casting, 
November 29, 1989 
32C Quit Claim Deed 
Instrument No. 1326440 
Kootenai. Broadcasting 
to Rook Broadcasting, 
October 25, 1.993 
4 
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NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED ADMIITED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
33·c.1 W arran.ty Deed 
Instrument No. 1565152, 
Rook Broadcasti.ng to 
AGM-Nevada, 
November 20 ,1998 
33C.2 Warranty Deed 
Instrument No. 1656413 
AGM-Nevada to Capstar 
October 25, 2000 
34 Chicago Title Insurance 
Company Pol.icy No. 13 
003 5 106 00001140 
35 Deed Inst. No. 708987 
Funk to Kootenai 
Electric Coope:rati vc 
Au.£?Ust 16, l 976 
36 Deed Inst. No. 993113 
.Funk to Sonneland 
November 29, 1984 
37 Warranty Deed Inst. No. 
497858, Reynolds to 
General Telephone 
October 17, 1966 
38 Right of Way Easement 
Inst. No. 494343, 
Blossom and Mead to 
General Telephone, 
signed July 14, 1966, 
recorded .August 31, 
1966 
39 Right of Way Easement 
Inst. No. 494344, Ulrich 
to General Telephone, 
August 31, 1966 
40 Blossom Mountain 
Estates Plat Book I, Page 
42 
s 
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NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED ADMITTED REFUSED RESERVE STIP, RUUNG 
41 Record. of Survey Inst. 
No. 15421875 
42 Kootenai County 
Assessor Office 
Segregation Revisions 
Section 22 
43 Kootenai. County 
Assessor Office 
Segregation Revisions 
Section 21 
44 GLO Survey of 
Township 50 No, Range 
No. 5 West 
45 Blow up of GLO map in 
Section 15, 21 and 22 
46 1957 USGS Historical 
Map of Sections 15, 21 
and22 
47 1959 Metsker Map 
48 Mellick Road Exhibit 
Map 
49 1981 USGS mapofl975 
aerial 
50 Funk Ownership Exhibit 
51 2010 TT~C1~ 111;:ip 
52 Viewer's Report Exhibit 
53 Viewer Repo1i 271 and 
branch ch·ange Mellick 
Road 
54 Mack Affidavit 
55 Deed In.st. No. 1558483 
Zuber to Zuber 
September 11, 1998 
6 
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NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED ADMITTED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
56 Deed Inst. No. 1758296 
Zuber to Mack 
October 9, 2002 
57 Mellick Road Overlay 
58 Mellick Road Overlay 
59 Conditional Use pennit 
C-593-86 
60 Conditional. Use Permit 
No. C-658-88 
61 Conditional Use Perm.it 
No. C-686-89 
62 Conditional Use Pennit 
No. C-841-94 
63 Conditional Use Pennit 
No. C-940-97 
64 Conditional use Pennit 
No. C-1058-01 
65 Conditional Use Pennit 
No. C-1092-03 
66 Notice Inst. No. 1403054 
67 Civil Violation No. CV-
4306.06.B 
68 Harold Funk deposition 
69 Gate Pictu\'e 
70 Gate Picture 
--
71 Gate Picture 
72 Gate Picture 
73 Gate Picture 
73A Lock Pjctme 
74 Sims Liescb.e 3/ 19/99 
letter of County Officials 
7 
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NO. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED ADMITTED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. RULING 
75 2/29/00 Lawrence letter 
to Douglas 
76 5/31/99 Sjms Liesche 
Statement 
77 Lawrence 6/1/2000 
submittal to Kootenai 
County Planning 
78 6/14/99(00) Lawrence 
letter to Koote11ai County 
Prosecutor 
79 6/26/00 Lawrence letter 
to Kootenai County 
Planning Dept 
80 6/30/00 Letter to Sheriff 
81 12/5/00 Petitio11 for 
Judicial Review 
Kootenai Case CVOO-
7756 
82 10/19 Verizon key letter 
and 11/19/01 Verizon 
Key Receipt 
83 6/10/03 Verizon letter to 
Lawrence 
84 10/10/03 Stimson letter 
to LawT.ence 
85 Great N orthem 
Broadcast!\.ccess 
-Liaense Agreement 
86 Blue Sky Statement 
dated 2/1/02 
87 Tower License 
Agreement 
8 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
~·A'[ OF \0/\HO . >S5 COUHTY Of KOOH.NP..ll 
FILED: 
2013 JUN -1 PH 3: 50 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
ofdlt'4/~ /fi 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMP ANY, a Delaware corporation, 
----.... 
(/. ,~~~~No.CV~ 
_ Cas{d~·o .. CV-03-4621 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LA Vi/RENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
SPECTRA SITE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA Vi/RENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, 
And JOHN DOES 1-6, Third Party Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST - 1 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 
(CONSOLIDATED) 
ORIGINAL 
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,) 
COME NOW Defendants, and submit the attached Supplemental Exhibit List 
identifying the Defendants' proposed trial exhibits. 
Defendants reserve the right to supplement and amend this Exhibit List prior to trial. 
DATED this ih day of June, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of June, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL TRlAL EXHIBIT LIST- 2 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail X. Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 664-1684 
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Case No: CV-03-04621 I CV-02-7671 (Consolidated) Trial Date: June 11, 2013 
Title of Cases: Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence 
Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS (list numerically) 
X DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (list alphabetically) 
No. DESCRIPTION BY OFFERED RECEIVED REFUSED RESERVE STIP. 
A Warranty Deed-Lawrence 
B Access License Agreement between 
Nextel West Corp and Douglas and 
Brenda Lawrence 
C Assignment of Leases-Deposition 
Exhibit 4 from the Deposition of 
Thomas Martinich 
D Ce1iificate of Merger - Deposition 
Exhibit 5 from the Deposition of 
Thomas Martinich 
E Communications Lease Agreement -
Deposition Exhibit 3 from Deposition of 
Thomas Martinich 
F Statement signed by Don Snodgrass on 
May 8, 2000 
G May 8, 2000 statement referenced in 
incident rep01i 00-9842 
H Kootenai Count)' Sheriffs Incident 
1 - 7 Reports filed against Douglas Lawrence 
(2000-2002; 7 total) 
I April 13, 2002 SpectraSite Letter 
noticing Defendants of renewal of 
License Agreement 
J August 28, 2002 Kootenai Electric 
Letter requesting to lock Defendant's 
gate 
K October 10, 2002 signed 
acknowledgment of receipt of key by 
Nextel employee Jim Hollis 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST- 1 
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... L October 17, 2002 delivery confirmation 
of key to Tom Grapenster with AT&T 
M October 16, 2002 signed receipt of key 
to Adelphia 
N October 9, 2002 signed receipt of key to 
Kootenai Electric 
0 October 9, 2002 signed receipt of key to 
Verizon 
p October 15, 2002 email from Shelia 
Bernard (SpectraSite) to Douglas 
Lawrence - Subject [RE: Blossom 
Mountain Access Agreement] 
Q October 15, 2002 email from Shelia 
Bernard - Subject [ Attention Doug] 
R October 21, 2002 email from Pamela 
Waitman (Nextel)- Subject [Blossom 
Mtn cell site access] 
s October 24, 2002 undeliverable letter to 
Nextel Communications 
T October 24, 2002 returned (unaccepted) 
delivery confirmation 
u October 31, 2002 letter from Raymond 
Goodwin (SpectraSite) to Defendants 
V Kootenai County Sheriffs Crime 
1 - 7 Reports 2002 - 2003 by Douglas 
Lawrence (2002-2003; 7 total) 
w January 13, 2003 Letter from Raymond 
Goodwin (SpectraSite) to Defendants 
X January 9, 2003 Letter from Nextel 
noticing Defendants of assignment 
y Envelope of March 14, 2003 Letter from 
Nextel 
z Defendant Mack's Affidavit in Support 
of Defendants Lawrences' Motion in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint to Inciude 
Punitive Damages 
AA Kootenai County Sheriffs Crime Report 
03-2155.9 
·- -
filed September 16, 2003 by Douglas 
Lawrence 
BB Check receipt for April 2007 payment 
for license agreement 
cc April 16, 2007 Letter from American 
Tower offering lump sum payment 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST- 2 
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···DD July 18, 2007 Notice of Default sent to 
American Tower 
"C"C Deliver; confirmation of July 18, 2007 LL 
notice of default 
FF Kootenai County Sheriffs Department 
Law Incident Table showing incident 
07-23671 
GG License Agreement between Tower 
Asset Sub Inc and Infinity 
Communications 
HH Tower Attachment License Agreement 
between Tower Asset Sub Inc and 
Wired or Wireless, Inc. 
II Site Schedule to the Master Site Lease 
Agreement dated April 20, 1999 
JJ Affidavit of James Stillinger provided in 
CV03-5003 
KK Record of Road and Gate Locations in 
Parcel 21-8500 
LL November 17, 2000 Business 
correspondence between Colby May and 
John Rook and copied to Defendants 
MM Antenna Tower Building and Real 
Property Lease Agreement between John 
Rook and Trinity Broadcasting Network 
NN Lease agreement between Adelphia 
Cable and John Mack and the 
Defendants 
00 March 13, 2000 affidavit of Wilber 
Mead 
pp February 1, 2002 Statement from Blue 
Sky Broadcasting 
r.r. 
'-<.'-<. Access License Agreement betvveen 
Great Northern Broadcasting and the 
Defendants 
RR Copy of Metsker Map dated March 1959 
ss June 28, 2007 Affidavit of Kootenai 
County Surveyor Bruce Anderson 
TT 1907 Viewers report for Mellick Road 
uu June 17, 1910 Plat of Survey for Mellick 
Road 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST - 3 
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'' vv July 1977 Easement laaho Forest 
Industries granted to Don Johnson and 
John McHugh and recorded as 
instrument #773 3 61. 
WW August 13, 2007 Deposition Transcript 
of Harold Funk 
xx Aerial Photographs of Subject Area by 
1 - 3 Kootenai County KCWebMap (3 total) 
yy Aerial Photographs of Subject Area by 
1 - 5 GoogleEarth (5 total) 
zz Affidavit of John Mack in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Enlargement 
AAA Emails from Sheila Barnard dated 
1 - 2 10/15/2002 (2 total) 
BBB Email from Pamela Waitman dated 
10/21/2002 
CCC Email from Scott Haug dated 
10/27/2003 
DDD Aerial Photographs of Subject Area by 
GoogleEarth showing roads 
EEE Aerial Photographs of road system and 
1 - 32 gates in subject area (32 total) 
FFF Photographs of gates on subject area 
1 - 5 roads 
GGG Aerial view and mapping of Mellick 
Road 
HHH Viewer's Report-Mellick Road 
III Aerial Photograph of the Subject 
Property dated 19 51 
JJJ Aerial Photograph of the Subject 
Property dated 1970 
KKK Aerial Photograph of the Subject 
j Property dated 8-14-7 5 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST-4 
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: 
STATE 01:' 1DAHO ) 
County of Kootenai ) ss 
FILED ~-Ylm _ I\) ,. d O I ~ 
AT 3:--/0 O'clock_e_M 
CLERK OF THE rn;),RICT COURT 
JJJ.rt@J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTARRADIO OPERATING COMPANY, ) 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
After a six-day bench trial, the determination is made that Capstar proved its claims for an implied 
easement and a prescriptive easement. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's pronouncement in 
Capstar III, that in addition to proving the three material elements prnviously required to establish 
an easement by necessity, a plaintiff must also prove there is a "legal right" to be able to access a 
public road, no easement by necessity is awarded as no "legal right" to a public road was proven. A 
permanent injunction is granted in favor of the plaintiff precluding the Lawrences from interfering 
with the easement. Capstar is found to be the prevailing party and is awarded costs. 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A., represented Capstar. 
Douglas Marfice and Theron DeSmet, RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP, represented 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence. 
Memorandum Decision and Order 1 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 137 of 214
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case began on November 7, 2002, when Plaintiff, Capstar Radio Operating 
Company ("Capstar"), filed its Complaint seeking to (1) quiet title to an easement, and (2) 
permanently enjoin the Defendants, Douglas and Brenda Lawrence ("the Lawrences"), from 
interfering with the easement road that crosses their property. 
In its Complaint, Capstar alleges that it has an easement through the Lawrences' property 
on Blossom Mountain Road that allows it to access its parcel. Capstar asserts it was granted an 
easement across the Lawrences' property by the Lawrences' predecessors. Capstar set forth four 
easement theories: (1) Express easement; (2) Implied easement; (3) Easement by necessity; and 
(4) Prescriptive easement. Capstar moved for summary judgment. The trial court found there was 
an express easement and granted summary judgment. The Lawrences appealed. 
In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 152 P.3d 575 (2007) 
( Capstar 1), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Capstar did not have an express easement across 
the Lawrences' property. The matter was remanded for determination as to the other three 
theories. On remand, Capstar renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court 
again granted summary judgment as to all three of the alternative theories. The trial court also 
struck the Lawrences' defenses of laches and the statute of limitations. The Lawrences appealed, 
and in Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 623,238 P.3d 223 (2010) (Capstar 
11), the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because no final judgment had been entered. 
A final judgment was then entered and the · Lawrences appealed. In Capstar Radio 
Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 283 P.3d 728 (2012) (Capstar 111), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact in existence as to all three 
easement theories, the Court stated that "this case is highly complex and presents multiple issues 
of material fact which the lower court should address at trial." Id. at 421, 283 P.3d at 738. The 
Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court's decision to strike the affirmative defenses of laches 
and the statute of limitations, and removed the previous judge. 
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On remand, the matter was assigned to District Judge Lansing Haynes. Acting in his role 
as administrative judge, he assigned the case to Judge Steve Yerby. On June 11, 2013, a six-day 
bench trial began. It concluded on June 18, 2013. The trial was combined with Spectra Site 
Communications, Inc. v. Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, Kootenai County Case No. CV-03-
4621, as there were common issues, common witnesses, and the same defendants in each action. 
The issues tried were equitable and therefore could only be determined by the court. Other non-
equitable issues for which a jury trial was demanded were bifurcated. 
This court has carefully reviewed and considered the pleadings, evidence, and briefing, 
and now enters its Memorandum Decision and Order, which shall constitute findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52( a). Any of the following findings of fact that should 
be denominated as a conclusion of law shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. Any of the 
following conclusions of law that should be denominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a 
finding of fact. 
II. FACTS 
A. Uncontested Pertinent Facts 
1. The Location of the Respective Parcels. 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, and the plaintiff, Capstar, own real property on Blossom 
Mountain, which is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrence parcel is located in the 
southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Capstar parcel is located to the east of the Lawrence 
parcel in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Section 21 is directly west of Section 22. Both the 
Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel were part of a larger tract of land owned by Harold and 
Marlene Funk. The Funks purchased their parcel in 1969 and it consisted of land in Section 15, 
Section 21, and Section 22. All of the real property involved in this case is located in Township 
50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
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2. Access and History of Ownership 
There was no testimony contesting the following facts, which were established by the 
admission of exhibits and/or the testimony of the witnesses. For ease of understanding, these 
facts are placed in chronological order. 
The only public road providing access to the private easement road, which then accesses 
all of the real property which is subject to this litigation, is Signal Point Road. This easement 
road that connects to Signal Point Road has been referred to as Blossom Mountain Road, West 
Blossom Road, or Ski Hill Road. No testimony was provided that any real property owner or 
lessee in Section 21 or Section 22 used any other road to access their real estate. The diagram 
below shows the easement road that proceeds from the southwest quarter of Section 21 to the 
northwest quarter of Section 28 to the Southwest quarter of Section 21 to where the Capstar and 
Spectra Site properties are located in the southwest quarter of Section 22. 
Section:21 
.i i 
NWl/4 
Section 27 
The properties involved are either directly or tangentially located near "Blossom 
Mountain" which is approximately two miles as the crow flies from the City of Post Falls, Idaho. 
(a) The General Telephone Property 
On July 14, 1966, the General Telephone Company, ("GTC"), obtained an easement to 
access an acre of land in Section 22 (not the Capstar parcel) over a private road owned by Glenn 
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D. Blossom and Ethel Blossom that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Biossom's 
property), then moved south and entered the north half of Section 28 where it eventually turned 
northeast and entered the adjacent section in the southeast quarter of Section 21 ( over what is 
now the Lawrence parcel). It proceeded from Section 21 into the southwest quarter of Section 22 
(near the Capstar parcel). The easement included a condition that GTC was to erect a swing gate 
on the property. 
In order for GTC to obtain access through Section 28, on August 18, 1966, William C. 
Ulrich and Edna M. Ulrich granted GTC an easement across their real property in Section 28. 
The terms of the easement required GTC to construct "two steel swinging type gates." A few 
months later, on October 16, 1966, GTC bought real property in Section 22 for the purposes of 
communication transmissions. 
(b) The Funk Property 
In 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk entered into a real estate contract to purchase: 
Parcel A: Government Lot 3, Section 15; 
Parcel B: The Southeast Quarter of Section 21; 
Parcel C: Government Lot 4, Section 22; 
"Southwest quarter, Northwest quarter, and Southeast quarter, Section 22, all m 
Township 50 North, Range 5 west, Boise Meridian." (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3). 
Excepted from the property under contract to the Funks was the real property that was 
previously conveyed in Section 22 to GTC in 1966. 
On November 7, 1972, Wilber and Florence Mead and Ethel Blossom conveyed an 
easement for ingress and egress across the Blossom/Meads' real property for the benefit of all 
the land the Funks were purchasing. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 4). 
The Funks decided to sell the bulk of their real property to a company named Human 
Synergistics in 1975. On July 10, 1975, seven agreements were recorded which reflected the 
contracts for sale of separate parcels of all of the Funks real property in Section 21 and Section 
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15 as well as most of the real property in Section 22 except for the Southeast quarter of section 
22 which was retained by the Funks. 
In each of the seven contracts the language set forth below was included: 
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and 
adjoining property, in Said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and 
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21 
heretofore granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over existing 
roads until such time as all record owners shall agree to the relocation, 
improvement and/or abandonment of all or any portions of any roads. This 
easement is also over similar lands in section 15. 
(See Plaintiffs Exhibits 5-11 ). 
From the lack of evidence presented, it is inferred that at the time these real estate 
contracts for the purchase and sale of real property were executed, no fulfillment deeds were 
signed. 
The Funks moved out of the area and by 1986 were living in American Falls, Idaho. That 
same year, Mr. Funk applied for a Conditional Use Permit from Kootenai County in order to 
install and operate an F.M. broadcast transmitter and tower facility for radio station KCDA. He 
listed the access to the site as using Signal Point Road (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 59). The Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners approved the conditional use permit and found that: The 
proposed tower would be 280 feet tall and that the legal requirements for notification of adjacent 
property owners had been made for this proposed use on the Funks' segregated five acre parcel. 
In 1988, Harold FurJ<: requested another Conditional Use Permit to build a 40-foot tower 
for microwave and cable television. He listed the "Directions To Site" as using Signal Point 
Road and then traveling over the gravel dirt road (Blossom Mountain Road) (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 60). This site was described as being 50 feet by 200 feet and bordering the existing GTC 
site. The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners found: "4. Access is provided by a private 
road off the Signal Point Road." They further found that the legal requirements for provision of 
notice to adjacent property owners were satisfied, and that the demand for conditional use 
permits for Kootenai County microwave towers had substantially increased. 
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'1 
More than 17 years after the sales agreements with Human Synergistics were signed, on 
October 22, 1992, the Funks sold their remaining interest in Section 22 to John W. Mack (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18). On October 29, 1992, the Funks signed a warranty deed in fulfillment of 
their contract and conveyed the southeast quarter of Section 21 to Human Synergistics. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19). The deed failed to reserve or except an easement for the benefit of the 
Funks, their successors, or assigns to provide access to the remaining property in Section 22. All 
of the real properties owned by the Funks, their successors, or assigns located in the southwest 
quarter of Section 22 were thus landlocked with no recorded easement. 
On September 20, 1996, Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian, entered into a "Mutual 
Agreement Grant of Easement and Quit Claim Deed" with John W. Mack (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 23). In this agreement it states, "AND WHEREAS, MACK, and MACK'S predecessors 
in interest have used a preexisting private road traversing the most southeasterly portion of the 
FARMANIAN PROPERTY to gain access to the MACK PROPERTY. This private road is 
sometimes known as Blossom Mountain Road (hereinafter referred to as the 'ACCESS ROAD."' 
(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 23). 
( c) The Lawrence Property 
At trial, Douglas Lawrence testified that he and his wife reviewed and signed a 
preliminary title commitment. The preliminary title commitment provided notice to the 
Lawrences that there were at least three claimed ingress/egress easements across the real 
property the Lawrences were purchasing. Mr. Lawrence also testified he was aware of a private 
road that was on the real property they were buying. He went on to state that there were 
exceptions listed on the title commitment and he knew the insurance company was not going to 
cover claims made by anyone concerning the easements identified. 
On October 1, 1996, a "Memorandum of Sale Agreement" regarding the Lawrences' 
purchase of 80 acres located in the southeast comer of Section 21 was recorded (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 24). A warranty deed conveying title to the Lawrences was recorded August 27, 1998 
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(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 28). The warranty deed provided that the property was "free from aii 
encumbrances except ... easements of record or in view." 
Mr. Lawrence testified that he knew the access road he used did not stop at his property's 
eastern boundary. 
At the time the real property that eventually came into Capstar's possession was 
conveyed, it was landlocked and had no recorded easement. 
3. Chain of Title 
The essential chain of title of the Lawrence property is: Funks to Human Synergistics; 
Human Synergistics to Johnson & McHugh; Johnson & McHugh to National Associated 
Properties ("NAP"); NAP to the Farmanians; and the Farmanians to the Lawrences. 
The chain of title of the Capstar property is: in 1989, the Funks severed what is now the 
Capstar Property from the Funk Property and sold the Capstar Property to Kootenai 
Broadcasting, Inc. From there, the chain of title to the Capstar Property is as follows: Kootenai 
Broadcasting, Inc., to Rook Broadcasting; Rook Broadcasting to AGM; and AGM to Capstar. 
Capstar purchased its property in 2000. 
B. Mellick Road 
The Lawrences assert that the improved portion of Mellick Road, which started and 
finished north of the Funk Property in 1975, could have been used to provide access to the 
southwest quarter of Section 22, where the Capstar real property is located. 
The court finds that the following facts were proven. At no time did any of the owners, 
lessees, or witnesses state that access was available to any of the Funk property using Mellick 
Road in 1975 at the time the sales took place to Human Synergistics. Mellick Road, as it then 
existed as a developed road, did not access Section 15 in 197 5. Mellick Road, even if it had been 
developed, would not have provided ingress and egress to any of the Funk property in Section 21 
or 22 without going outside the Funk property boundaries that existed in 1975. 
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The Lawrences have posited that there was access to Mellick Road in 1975 from section 
15. But no persuasive testimony or evidence was submitted to establish this proposition. 
Mr. Lawrence did testify that on one occasion he rode with John Mack, who owned the 
major portion of the southwest quarter of section 22, and did eventually reach Mellick Road. 
This ride occurred long after 1975, however. Mr. Lawrence's testimony was imprecise and 
appeared clouded. His testimony did not demonstrate that access could be made to the developed 
portion of Mellick Road solely by using roads on what formerly was the Funks' real property. 
Further, Mr. Lawrence's testimony at trial was impeached by his previous testimony as well as 
by admitted exhibits. The bias shown by the way he testified was transparent. Mr. Lawrence was 
not a particularly credible witness. 
Testimony and exhibits were admitted concerning the existence of Mellick Road and 
whether it provided access to the Funks through Section 15. After a review of the evidence 
presented, the court finds that the developed portion of Mellick Road did not extend to the 
Funk's real property in Section 15 in 197 5. This factual/legal finding is based on the testimony 
of Darius Ruen, who was meticulous, precise, and inherently believable. Mr. Ruen's testimony 
was buttressed by other witness testimony. The court adopts Mr. Ruen's testimony as being 
wholly credible and finds that the facts to which he testified are controlling. The court further 
finds that those facts contradict the testimony of any defense witnesses as well as any facts 
testified to by Mr. Lawrence concerning access by way of Mellick Road. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial and competent, 
though conflicting, evidence, the appellate court will not disturb such findings. Hughes v. Fisher, 
142 Idaho 474, 479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228 (2006). The Idaho Supreme Court gives due regard to 
the district court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who personally 
appear before the court. Id. at 479-80, 129 P.3d at 1228-29 (citing Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 
225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003)). On appeal, findings of fact will be set aside only if they are 
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clearly erroneous. Id. at 479, 129 P.3d at 1228; l.R.C.P. 52(a). 
A district court's determination as to whether a claimant has established a private 
prescriptive easement involves entwined questions of law and fact. Id. 
Unlike the Supreme Court's review of a district court's factual findings, the Supreme 
Court exercises free review over a district court's conclusions of law. Id. at 480, 129 P.3d at 
1229. In reviewing the district court's decision, the Supreme Court must determine whether the 
legal requirements were correctly applied for an easement to the facts found by the district court. 
Id. 
IV. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
Case law in Idaho has referred to two types of "implied easements," an implied easement 
by prior use and an implied easement by necessity. Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 665 P.2d 
1081 (Ct. App. 1983). In this memorandum decision the term "implied easement" means an 
implied easement by prior use. The term "easement by necessity" as used in this decision is what 
has previously been referred to as an implied easement by necessity. 
A. Implied Easements 
1. Generally, There Is No Creation of an Easement Without an Express Grant or 
Prescription. 
"Implied easements are an exception to the general rule that easements can only be 
created by an express grant or prescription." 28A C.J.S. Easements§ 75. Implied easements are a 
creature of common law. Id. The law does not always favor implied easements Id. Nevertheless, 
they exist as a matter of public policy because "lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy 
or successful cultivation by a lack of access." Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 
542,681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). The primary focus with respect to whether an implied 
easement should be recognized is whether the common owner, at the time of severance, actually 
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intended to reserve or grant an easement despite the absence of an express easement. The 
implication being that the grantee, aware of the existence of the quasi-easement, can reasonably 
expect its continuance. See 28A C.J.S. Easements § 75. 
2. Tracing the History of Implied Easements in Idaho 
Recognizing the general rule that conveying an interest in real property must occur by a 
written instrument, how does the law address the inequity which results when both parties to a 
land sale are aware that the original owner (the grantor) intended to have an easement transferred 
but did not, and the use by the original owner was such that the easement is a necessary part of 
his/her/its use of the remaining real property? In this hypothetical the presumption arises that it 
was the intent of the parties to provide for an easement and thus the grant of the easement is 
"implied" by the circumstances. This presumption conflicts with the general rule that even 
though the necessary easement is apparent and known to the buyer, "[the grantor] does not intend 
to reserve the easement on the estate thus alienated without any express reservation" Wilton v. 
Smith, 40 Idaho 81,_, 231 P. 704, 705 (1924). 
The earliest Idaho case found concerning the topic of an "implied easement" is Wilton v. 
Smith, supra. In Wilton, the Court addressed the situation where an owner of two pieces of land 
failed to reserve or except an easement which was necessary for the use of his remaining parcel 
after one piece was sold. The Court mentioned that the legal principle requiring that a grantor 
demonstrate his intent by reserving an easement in the conveyance is supported by "a long line 
of authority" Id. The Wilton decision resolved the conflict between the presumed intent of the 
parties under the circumstances and the general rule of law requiring an express reservation. 
The Wilton court concluded: 
[W]e think, however, that an exception to this rule arises 
where it is clearly shown, as in this case, that the easement is one 
of necessity, and it also appears that the owner of the servient 
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Id. 
estate when he purchased the same, had full knowledge of such 
easement and the necessity of its use. 
In reaching its decision, the Wilton court relied on Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 15 8 P. 
1025 ( 1916), which found that: 
Id. 
Where the owner of one heritage consisting of several parts 
has so adapted them that one derives a benefit from the other, and 
transfers one of them without mention of the incidental burdens of 
one in respect to others, an implied understanding arises that the 
burdens and correlative advantages shall continue as before the 
separation of the title. 
The Wilton court focused on unity of ownership, necessity, the knowledge of the 
easement by the owner of the servient estate, and the intent to convey such an easement. 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Gustafson, 49 Idaho 376, 288 P. 427 (1930), our Supreme 
Court again addressed the issue of an implied easement. In Gustafson, the facts involved the sale 
of smaller pieces from a larger parcel without a specific reservation of an easement for the 
benefit of the grantor. There apparently was no testimony concerning the grantor's intent at the 
time of conveyance. Faced with conveyances that contained no easement, the court concluded: 
Id. 
True, an easement is defined as a right in the lands of 
another, and therefore one cannot have an easement in his own 
lands (19 C. J. p. 863 ), but, where the owner of an entire tract 
- - . 
employs a part thereof so that he "derives from the other a benefit 
or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one 
in favor of which such continuous and apparent quasi easement 
exists, such easement being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment 
of the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication." 19 
C. J. p. 914. See, also, 1 Thompson on Real Property, § 352; 9 R. 
C. L. p. 755, § 22; German Savings & Loan Society v. Gordon, 54 
Or. 147, 102 P. 736, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331. 
The Gustafson court relied on Thompson's treatise on real property which outlined the 
Memorandum Decision and Order 12 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 148 of 214
three material elements required to be proven to determine that an impiied easement should be 
granted when there is no other evidence of intent: 
Id. 
The rule is thus stated by Mr. Thompson: "As a general rule 
there is no implied reservation of an easement in case one sells a 
part of his land over which he has previously exercised a privilege 
in favor of the land he retains, unless the burden is apparent, 
continuous, and strictly necessary for the enjoyment of the land 
retained." 1 Thompson on Real Property, § 356. See, also, 9 R. C. 
L. p. 765, § 28; 19 C. J. p. 920, § 113; Kallenburg v. Long, 39 Cal. 
App. 731, 179 P. 730; Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 158 P. 1025. 
The California cases cited seem to hold that strict necessity is not 
essential to establish an implied reservation. 
In Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 76,501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972) the Court again quoted 
Thompson's treatise with approval as to the material elements required to establish a prima facia 
case for an implied easement. 
In Schultz v. Atkins, the Court addressed the issue of intent and again cited Thompson's 
treatise when it said: 
The creation of such an easement may 'be implied or 
inferred through the presumed intent to the parties based upon the 
circumstances of separation of land formerly under one ownership, 
or be implied by reason of public policy * * *, or inferred often 
fictitiously through long continued use of the easement'. 2 
Thompson on Real Property, s 351 (1961). In Close v. Rensink, 95 
Idaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972), this court discussed the 
requisite elements for creation of an easement by implication: 
'Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra, (151 Colo. 481, 379 P.2d 165) 
discusses the four requirements to establish an implied easement, 
as set out in 1 Thompson, Real Proper (perm. ed. 1939) s 396, at p. 
64 7, quoting therefrom: 
'(1) Unity and subsequent separation of title; (2) obvious 
benefit to the dominant and burden to the servient tenement 
existing at the time of the conveyance; (3) use of the premises by 
the common owner in their altered condition long enough before 
the conveyance to show that the change was intended to be 
permanent; and (4) necessity for the easement.' 
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97 Idaho 770, 773-74, 554 P.2d 948, 951-52 (1976) (emphasis added). 
Thus the Shultz court recognized three ways the intent may be determined in an 
implied easement case: 
1. The intent may be presumed based on the circumstances existing before 
separation; or 
2. Implied by public policy; or 
3. "[I]nferred often fictitiously through long continuous use of the easement." Id. 
at 951,554 P.2d at 948. 
The issues of intent and knowledge were discussed in the context of proving one of the 
material elements of an implied easement in Davis v. Peacock: 
One of the requirements for establishing an implied 
easement by prior use is that there has been open and continuous 
use of the easement prior to the severance of the dominant and 
servient estates. This requirement ensures that the buyer of the 
servient property will have notice of the preexisting use. 
Consequently, it is equitable to impose an easement on a buyer 
who already had notice of its existence. 
133 Idaho 637, 641, 991 P.2d 362, 366 (1999), abrogated by Spokane Structures, Inc. v. 
Equitable Inv., LLC, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010) (emphasis added). 
Intent was also an important factor in Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 352, 209 P.3d 647, 
649 (2009). In discussing intent in the context of the second material element of an implied 
easement, "apparent and continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to 
show that the use was intended to be permanent[,]" id. at 352, 209 P.3d at 649, the Court stated: 
The district court held that the Plaintiffs failed to prove the 
second element. After considering the terms of the three deeds, the 
district court found that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove that the 
[Grantors] intended to grant an easement to the Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in seeking to 
ascertain the [Grantor's J subjective intent. They argue that the 
only inquiry relevant to this element is whether the use of the road 
was apparent and continuous for a long period of time prior to the 
separation of the dominant estate. 
The second element includes as a necessary consideration 
the intent of the grantor at the time the dominant estate was 
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separated. The intent to grant or reserve the easement is presumed 
from apparent continuous use for a long period of time prior to 
that separation. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 
951 (1976). The easement is "based on the theory that when 
someone conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is 
required for the beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and 
intends to retain all that is required for the use and enjoyment of 
the land retained." Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 
362, 368 (1999). Because the intent to grant or reserve the 
easement is a necessary element, there is no logical reason to base 
the decision solely upon the grantor's presumed intent from prior 
use and to exclude other relevant evidence of that intent. 
Therefore, the district court did not err in considering that other 
evidence. 
Id., with emphasis added. 
The Idaho appellate cases involving implied easements generally discuss circumstances 
affecting an owner when there is no direct evidence of the grantor's intent presented. As can be 
seen by the above cases, intent is then inferred or implied by the long permanent use which 
results in the presumption that it was the intent of the parties to create an easement to benefit the 
remaining real estate held by the grantor. 
B. Easement by Necessity 
The material elements required to be proven in order to establish an easement by 
necessity was recently set forth in detail in Machado v. Ryan. 
In order to establish the existence of an implied easement 
by necessity, the claimant "must prove '(1) unity of title and 
subsequent separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) 
necessity of the easement at the time of severance; and (3) great 
present necessity for the easement.' " Backman v. Lawrence, l 4 7 
Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009) (quoting Bear Island 
Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 
(1994)). We have held that reasonable necessity is sufficient to 
satisfy the second element. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282,288, 
246 P.3d 391, 397 (2010) (citing Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 
39, 45-46, 205 P.3d 1175, 1181-82 (2009) (Akers II)). Reasonable 
necessity is "something less than" great present necessity. Beach 
Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130 
P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (citing Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 
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643, 991 P.2d 362,368 (1999)). 
A reasonable necessity for an easement may exist even if the 
property is not landlocked. In determining whether reasonable necessity 
exists, the district court must "balance the respective convenience, 
inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts." Thomas v. Madsen, 142 
Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006) (citing Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 
Idaho 266, 270, 215 P.2d 812, 814 (1950)) [footnote omitted]. In Thomas, 
though the subject property was adjacent to a public road, we affirmed a 
finding of reasonable necessity because, due to the nature of the property, 
constructing access from that road would have required "considerable 
expense and time." Id In contrast, where an existing road provided ready 
access to the subject property, the easement was not reasonably necessary. 
Akers II, 147 Idaho at 46, 205 P.3d at 1182. Thus, reasonable necessity 
may exist even where there is a possibility for alternate access. 
In contrast, great present necessity exists where the claimed 
easement is the only access to the claimant's property. Brown v. Miller, 
140 Idaho 439, 443, 95 P.3d 57, 61 (2004). As the Court of Appeals has 
held, an easement implied by necessity "must not be granted if there is an 
alternate access, though it be expensive or inconvenient," because the 
expense or inconvenience of an alternate access is insufficient to 
demonstrate great present necessity. Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, l 06 
Idaho 535,542,681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). 
153 Idaho 212, 219-20, 280 P.3d 715, 722-23 (2012). 
In addition, in Capstar III, 153 Idaho 411, 283 P.3d 728 (2012), the Court added a fourth 
requirement when it stated that the person/entity claiming an easement by necessity must also 
establish that any such easement must not only lead to a public road but the claimant must have a 
legal right to cross other lands to get to the public road. 
C. Prescriptive Easements 
To establish a prescriptive easement in Idaho, the claimant must show by clear and 
convincing evidence use that is (1) open and notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3) 
adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the servient 
estate owner, (5) for the statutory period. Capstar III, 153 Idaho 411, 420, 283 P.3d 728, 737 
(2012). 
Each of the material elements are dealt with separately in subsections one through five: 
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1. Open and Notorious Use 
Use of the property must be sufficiently open and notorious so that a reasonable 
landowner should be aware of its occurrence. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 396, 210 
P.3d 75, 81 (2010). "The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and notorious 
is to give the owner of the servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to assert his rights." Id. 
2. Continuous and Uninterrupted 
In Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008), the defendant argued the 
claimant's use was not continuous and uninterrupted because the claimant's use was seasonal. 
The Court disagreed; 
[I]t is generally accepted that the "continuous and 
uninterrupted" element does not require daily use or even monthly 
use. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 61 (2004). The 
acquisition of a prescriptive easement requires continuous use 
"according to the nature of the use and the needs of the claimant." 
Id. 
146 Idaho at 63, 180 P.3d at 883. 
There is little case law explaining the concept of what exactly constitutes continuity with 
respect to prescriptive easements. When deciding whether a use was "continuous" with respect to 
the apparent and continuous use element for implied easements, in Akers v. D.L. White 
Construction, Inc., the Court honed in on whether the farming use was consistent with the nature 
and character of the land. 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005) (Akers I). There, the 
predecessors, the Millsaps, use was seasonal and they only used the easement about six times a 
year. Nonetheless, the Court, however, held that this use was sufficiently continuous because it 
was "consistent with the nature of the property." Id. 
3. Adverse and Under a Claim of Right 
Use that is permissive is not adverse to the rights of the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 
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Idaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006). In order to be considered adverse, the use must 
constitute an actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner. Id. 
In Backman, the Idaho Supreme Court provided: 
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the 
servient tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, 
by definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Indeed, 
the rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or 
ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual 
invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner. Thus, the 
nature of the use is adverse if it runs contrary to the servient 
owner's claims to the property. The state of mind of the users of 
the alleged easement is not controlling; instead, the focus is on the 
nature of their use. Moreover, mere inaction and passive 
acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of the 
claimed right was with the permission of the owner of the servient 
tenement. Finally, permissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive 
easement. If a use has commenced as permissive, a user must 
make some new and independent act that would put the owner of 
the servient property on notice that the use was no longer 
perm1ss1ve. 
147 Idaho at 397-398, 210 P.3d at 82-83 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
In Akers I the Court further elaborated on the notion that passive acquiescence is 
insufficient to establish that the use was permissive because "such acquiescence is equally 
consistent with recognition of the users' claim of right." 142 Idaho at 304, 127 P.3d at 207 
(2005). 
Where there is open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the claimed 
easement for the prescriptive period, the claimant is entitled to the presumption of adverse use. 
Akers I, 142 Idaho 293, 303-04, 127 P.3d 196, 206-07 (2005). That presumption, however, does 
not occur if the use is in wild and unenclosed lands. There is a rebuttable presumption that use in 
wild and unenclosed lands is permissive. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969 976 
(2005). 
Memorandum Decision and Order 18 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 154 of 214
There is a second presumption that access that is open to the general public and is not 
exclusive to the claimant's use is permissive. Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 697 P.3d 451 (Ct. 
App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Cardenas v. Krupjuweit, 116 Idaho 739, 779 P.2d 
414 (J 989). The Hall court elaborated: "Where ... the same degree of use upon which the adverse 
claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the general public, individual acquisition 
of a prescriptive easement has generally been held impossible." Id. at 112-113, 697 P.3d at 452-
53 (1985). The reasoning behind this presumption is that it would be unfair to the owner to 
impute knowledge that one person out of the general public is making an adverse claim. 
Backman, 147 Idaho at 399,210 P.3d at 84 (2009). 
Exclusivity is not an element; rather it is generally seen more as a prerequisite to the 
establishment of a prescriptive easement. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 53. "The 
term exclusiveness does not mean that the easement must be used by the claimant only, however; 
it simply means that the claimant's right to use the easement does not depend on a similar right 
in others." Id. 
4. With the Actual or Imputed Knowledge of the Owner 
Open and notorious use goes hand in hand with imputed knowledge. If the use is 
sufficiently open and notorious then the owner's knowledge can be imputed. Backman, 147 
Idaho 390,396,210 P.3d 75, 81 (2010). However, the issue of exclusivity or use by the general 
public also fits within the paradigm of knowledge. In Hughes v. Fisher, the Court stated, "when 
the claimant is using the land along with members of the general public, it would simply be 
unfair to impute knowledge to the landowner that the claimant is making an adverse claim." 142 
Idaho 474, 481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (2006). The law in Idaho does not allow members of the 
general public to establish a prescriptive easement unless the individual commits an act to 
specifically assert his or her rights against the owner so that the owner can be put on notice. 
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Backman, 147 Idaho at 396,210 P.3d at 81 (2010). 
5. For the Statutory Period 
In 2006 the Idaho legislature amended Idaho Code § 5-203 to extend the statutory five 
year period of time to twenty years. However, the twenty-year time period does not apply to 
prescriptive easements acquired prior to the amendment. Capstar Ill, 153 Idaho 411, 420 n.2, 
283 P.3d 728, 737 n.2 (2012). 
Thus, the previous five-year statutory period is applicable in this case. 
The following legal principles are also important in any analysis of prescriptive 
easements: 
6. Burden of proof. 
In describing the burden of proof, the Idaho Supreme Court found that "clear and 
convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved 
is highly probable or reasonably certain." A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dept. Of Water Resources, 
153 Idaho 500,516,284 P.3d 225,241 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
7. Findings 
As to the findings that must be made by the trial court in regard to the five material 
elements set forth above, in Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,210 P.3d 75 (2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained: 
A determination that a claimant has established a 
prescriptive easement involves entwined questions oflaw and fact, 
since each element is essential to the claim, and the trial court must 
make findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a 
judgment on appeal; it is the province of the trial court to 
determine whether the plaintiffs presented reasonably clear and 
convincing evidence of each of the five elements. In addition, the 
creation of a private easement by prescription is not favored under 
Idaho law. 
147 Idaho at 396,210 P.3d at 81 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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8. Tacking 
In order to establish a prescriptive easement, a claimant may rely on use by a predecessor 
for the prescriptive period, or may "tack" or combine the claimant's and predecessors' use. 
Akers v. D.L. White Construction, 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) (Akers I). 
9. Presumptions 
With respect to the use of presumptions; the Supreme Court has said that in order "[t]o 
disentangle Idaho prescriptive easement law, we emphasize the need for courts to streamline 
their analysis by focusing simply on whether the five prescriptive easement elements have been 
satisfied based on the facts before them." Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 481, 129 P.3d at 
1230 (2005). 
V.ANALYSIS 
A. Implied Easement 
1. The Logical Conflict 
An implied easement arises when two logical and practical concepts collide in property 
law. The first logical concept is that the written instrument of conveyance must set forth an 
easement/subservient interest if the buyer/grantee will not receive an unencumbered fee simple 
title. Wilton, 40 Idaho 81, 231 P. 704 (1924). Flying in the face of this logic is the equitable 
underpinning of an implied easement, that is, the fact that people who draft documents make 
mistakes, forget, or do not think everything through. 1 
1 The Restatement (Third) of Property § 2.12, comment a., Rationale, states: 
Ownership of land is often split into smaller parcels after roads, utility 
lines, wells, and other facilities have been installed that benefit all or several 
parts of the original parcel. Jfthe transaction splitting the ownership is properly 
handled, the conveyances will spell out the rights of each of the new parcels to 
use these facilities. However, transactions are not always properly handled, and 
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But what if it makes logical sense for an easement to be in place? Two examples iliustrate 
this concept. First, if a seller and a buyer of real property are both aware that the seller will need 
to have access to his remaining property over an existing road, and if both parties intended to 
provide for such access yet the deed fails to provide for the required easement, the seller should 
not be denied access when the drafter of the documents fails to provide for such access. In the 
all too often, a conveyance severing the ownership is silent on the question 
whether the new parcel is entitled to continued use of the other parcel for 
access, utilities, and the like. 
The rule stated in this section is based on the assumption that people 
intend to buy and sell land with the existing utility arrangements, unless they 
make some indication to the contrary. Although grantors might be expected to 
know that they should expressly reserve any use rights they intend to retain 
after severance, experience has shown that too often they do not. Ordinarily, 
servitudes are implied in favor of the grantor as readily as in favor of the grantee 
under the rules stated in this section. However, in cases where the grantor should 
have known of the need to reserve a servitude to continue the prior use, and it 
would be unfair to burden the grantee with the consequences of the grantor's 
neglect, the court may refuse to imply a servitude in favor of the grantor, even 
though it would have implied the servitude in favor of the grantee. 
The rule stated in this section is not based solely on the presumed 
actual intent of the parties. It furthers the policy of protecting reasonable 
expectations, as well as actual intent, of parties to land transactions. It also 
promotes efficient use of resources by avoiding the unnecessary costs that would 
be involved in reestablishing entitlements to make the prior uses, or duplicating 
the facilities. In the case of underground utilities, it applies even though neither 
party knew of the prior use. 
Comment "h" provides: 
No contrary intent expressed or implied. Implication of a servitude 
under the rule stated in this section is based on v:hat the parties probably 
intended or had reasonable grounds to expect. The implication does not arise if 
the facts or circumstances of the conveyance indicate that the parties did not 
intend to create a servitude to continue the prior use, or that the parties did 
intend to .create rights to terminate the existing utility arrangements. Inclusion of 
a warranty against encumbrances may give some indication that no servitude 
was reserved in favor of the grantor, but is not conclusive. Economic 
consequences to both parties may be relevant indicators of their expectations. If 
existence of a servitude would severely limit the uses of the servient estate, and 
replacement of the utilities would not be very expensive, a servitude was 
probably neither intended or expected. Conversely, if replacement of the 
facilities would be very expensive, and the servitude's existence would have a 
negligible impact on the burdened estate, a servitude probably was intended or 
expected. 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)§ 2.12 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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second scenario, assuming again that there is a buyer and seller of reai property, but there is no 
showing of intent and no mention is made in the deed for access to the sellers' remaining 
property, it is inequitable to deny the seller access when it was obvious from a review of the 
circumstances surrounding the sale and the use of the road that access should have been 
included. In this second example, based on the facts surrounding the transaction, the law 
presumes that it was the intent of the parties to create an easement in favor of the grantor; or 
implies the easement by reason of public policy; or infers the intent fictitiously through long 
continued use. See Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773-74, 554 P.2d 948, 951-52 (1976). 
2. Applying the Facts to the Law in Capstar v. Lawrence 
In this case, the parties agree that there was unity of title and that the Funks owned the 
portions agreed to be conveyed to Human Synergistics in 1975. 
In July of 1975, there was only one practical way to access the real property owned by the 
Funks in Section 21 and 22 and that was by using Signal Point Road. From Signal Point Road there 
was only one private road in existence for ingress and egress to the Funks' Section 21 and 22 
properties, the private road which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
The seven real estate sales agreements signed by the Funks and Human Synergistics show 
that both the buyer and sellers were aware of the access and the need for an easement for the benefit 
of the Funks. This fact is demonstrated by paragraph 5 of each sales contract which provides that 
the transfer of land to Human Synergistics is "subject to ... an ingress egress easement." The grant of 
an easement to Human Synergistics is reflected in the phrase in paragraph 5 which states, "including 
an ingress egress easement." The facts presented in this case establish that the buyer, Human 
Synergistics, had knowledge of the easement road and the need for the use of the easement by both 
the buyer and sellers. (See Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 -11, which are all dated July 10, 197 5, and recorded 
as consecutive instrument numbers 672112 - 672118). 
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While the language "subject to ... an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining 
property in Said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the granter" was not enough to expressly convey an 
easement, it demonstrated the intent of the respective parties to allow the Funks to use the existing 
easement off of Signal Point Road to access their remaining real property in Section 22. 
This court recognizes that the intent of the parties to the transaction must either be 
established or implied. As explained in Davis v. Peacock, the requirement of proving "open and 
continuous use of the easement prior to the severance of the dominant and servient estates" is also to 
show that the buyer of the servient property had notice of the pre-existing use. 133 Idaho 637, 641, 
991 P.2d 362,366 (1999). 
The Funks and Human Synergistics knew of the only existing easement and intended by 
their contract to make it permanent. There is no need to resort to inferences, presumptions, or legal 
fiction to imply an easement when the parties' actual intent is proven. As stated in Bird v. Bidwell, 
"[b Jecause the intent to grant or reserve the easement is a necessary element, there is no logical 
reason to base the decision solely upon the grantee's presumed intent from prior use and to exclude 
other evidence of this intent." 147 Idaho 350,352,209 P.3d 647,649 (2009). 
Obviously, Human Synergistics had knowledge of the pre-existing use. As stated in Davis v. 
Peacock, "[c]onsequently it is equitable to impose an easement on a buyer who already had notice 
of its existence." 133 Idaho 637,641,991 P.2d 362,366 (1999). 
As to the third requirement to prove an implied easement, that "the easement must be 
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate" the facts are uncontroverted 
that the road easement in question was the only access to the real property in the southeast comer of 
Section 22 at the time of severance in 1975. This court concludes the easement was reasonably 
necessary. 
Memorandum Decision and Order 24 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 160 of 214
3. An Implied Easement is Granted 
Capstar has proven the facts required to establish that it is entitled to an implied easement 
across the existing road on the Lawrences' real property in Section 21.2 This is an appurtenant 
easement and runs with the land. See Akers I, 142 Idaho 293,302, 127 P.3d 196,205 (2005). 
4. Scope of the Easement 
The Lawrences argued that if the court grants an easement it should be limited in scope to 
the use which was occurring in 1975. In Abbott v. Nampa Schools the Court stated, "the general 
rule concerning easements is that the right of an easement holder may not be enlarged and may not 
encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the easement." 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 
1293 (1991). The Abbott Court, however, further expounds on scope by providing "an easement 
granted or reserved in general terms without any limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited 
reasonable use." Id. Therefore, as long as the use of the easement is reasonably necessary to 
provide access to the properties and tenants in Section 22, there are no strictures on such use and 
this court declines the invitation to impose restrictions at this stage of the proceedings. 
A practical consideration for the parties is the width of the easement. Plaintiffs Exhibit 15, 
which is a grant of easement from Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., to the Lawrences' predecessors in 
interest, Don E. Johnston and Fem A. Johnston (husband and wife) and John McHugh and Mary 
Anne McHugh (husband and wife) sets the easement width on the roadway at 40 feet in width. 
Further, on July 10, 1996, National Associated Properties ("NAP") signed an easement for ingress, 
egress, and utility purposes, for a road that was 40 feet in width (Plaintiffs Exhibit 22). NAP was a 
predecessor in interest of the Lawrences and the "easement" granted refers to the road in this case. 
2 The Lawrences want the court to ignore the actual intent of the parties as manifested in the seven sale agreements 
and consider only the number of times the Funks used their property to determine the actual intent and knowledge of 
the parties. This same argument was used in Bird, 147 Idaho 350, 209 P.3d 647 (2009), and rejected. It would truly 
be a bitter irony to have the Funks and their successors precluded from having an implied easement when the 
buyer's and seller's knowledge reflected not only the existence of the actual easement road but the buyer's intent for 
its real property to be subject to the easement. 
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Considering the snowfall that is faced by users, the need to clear a way through the snow so 
the road can be usable, the needs for access of equipment or cranes to service the site, and the 
previous recognition of the 40 foot wide roadway, the court establishes the width of the easement 
road through the Lawrences' real property as being 40 feet wide. 
B. Easement by Necessity 
Easements by necessity arise from implied grant or implied reservation. In Cordwell v. 
Smith, the Court of Appeals stated: 
We tum next to appellants' assertion that they have an 
implied easement by "way of necessity." Such necessity can arise 
when the owner of land conveys part thereof to another, and the 
part conveyed is without ingress or egress except over the lands 
retained. Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra; Martino v. Fleenor, 148 
Colo. 136, 365 P.2d 247 (Colo.1961). The Idaho Supreme Court, 
quoting from Martino, and from 17 A Am.Jur. 668-69, Easements, 
§ 58, said in Burley Brick & Sand Company v. Cofer, 102 Idaho 
333,335,629 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1981): 
Although a way of necessity is sometimes confused with an 
easement arising, on severance of title, from a pre-existing use, 
there is a definite distinction between them, mainly because a way 
of necessity does not rest on a pre-existing use but on the need for 
a way across the granted or reserved premises. A way of necessity 
is an easement arising from an implied grant or implied 
reservation; it is a common-law origin and is supported by the rule 
of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of the 
application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys 
property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial 
use of land he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of 
necessity is the presumption of a grant arising from the 
circumstances of the case. This presumption of a grant, however, is 
one of fact, and whether a grant should be implied depends upon 
the terms of the deed and the facts in each particular case ... 
[I]t is [ of] a common-law origin and is supported by the 
rule of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit 
for occupancy or successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of 
the application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys 
property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial 
use of land he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of 
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necessity is the presumption of a grant ansmg from the 
circumstances of the case. This presumption of a grant, however, is 
one of fact, and whether a grant should be implied depends upon 
the terms of the deed and the facts in each particular case. 
105 Idaho 71, 79,665 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Ct. App. 1983). 
1. The Material Elements for an Easement by Necessity were Proven 
The material elements for an easement by necessity are: "(1) unity of title and subsequent 
separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of the easement at the time of 
severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Machado, 153 Idaho at 219, 280 
P.3d at 722 (2012). 
The parties agree that there was unity of title when the Funks sold their property to 
Human Synergistics in July of 1975. 
As to the "reasonable" necessity at the time of severance, the facts as testified to by 
Darius Ruen and other witnesses firmly establish that there was only one way to access the 
Funks' remaining property in section 22 after it became landlocked and that was by way of 
Blossom Mountain Road, the road which is the subject of this litigation. The testimony is 
unequivocal that the Funks real property in section 22 was landlocked. Therefore, there was 
reasonable necessity at the time of severance in 1975. 
The last material element, "great present necessity for the easement" was also 
established. Presently, there is no other road or easement that provides access to the Capstar 
parcel other than the easement road that passes through · the · Lawrences' real property in the 
southeast quarter of Section 21. 
2. Access to a Public Road 
In Capstar III, the Court provided: 
Nor is it entirely clear how the district court found the 
easement by necessity over the Lawrences' land when that 
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easement would not, in fact, lead to a public road. As the 
Lawrences point out, Capstar did not have the legal right to travel 
over the road in Section 28 and where "land over which the way of 
necessity is claimed has no access to a public road," no necessity 
can arise. Rathbun v. Robson, 203 Mont. 319, 661 P.2d 850, 853 
(1983). Therefore, the district court erred in determining this issue 
on summary judgment because the conflicting evidence presented 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the evidence 
proved an easement by necessity. 
153 Idaho at 419, 283 P .3d at 736 (2012). 
Thus, in Capstar III, the Court seemingly added a fourth material element, that the party 
claiming an easement by necessity prove that the "way of necessity" results in "access to a 
public road" Id. 
From the documents submitted, the only written document that Capstar can claim 
provides "a legal right" to use the easement road across the Stimson Lumber (formerly Ulrich's 
and then Idaho Forest Industry's) real property in Section 28 comes from an October 10, 2003, 
letter sent from the "Fee Land Manager" of Stimson to Douglas Lawrence (Plaintiffs Exhibit 
84). 
In the letter, the land manager, Mr. Opp, stated: "[ w Je have no interest in obstructing the 
access rights of any party with legitimately documented access rights on this road." As such, 
there was an inadequate showing by Capstar that it had "legitimately documented access rights" 
to the portion of the road that crossed Section 28. 
This court finds that there is no oral or written agreement for Capstar ( or its predecessors 
in interest) to have a "legal right" to travel over the existing access road in Section 28. As 
Capstar did not prove it had a legal right, and because the letter does not grant any legal right to 
Capstar, it has no easement at this time on the road in section 28 as it traverses the Stimson 
property. According to the legal pronouncement made by the Montana Supreme Court in 
Rathbun v. Robson, 203 Mont. 319, 661 P.2d 850 (1983), and adopted by Idaho's Supreme 
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Court in Capstar IIL that the party claiming an easement must estabiish it has a legal right, this 
court concludes that Capstar has shown no "legal right" of access to a public road. Therefore, 
Capstar's claim for an easement by necessity fails. 
C. Prescriptive Easement 
In this portion of the decision, the five material elements necessary to prove an easement 
by prescription will be addressed in the context of the admitted evidence. In addition, the issues 
raised by the Lawrences will be evaluated. 
1. Open and Notorious Use 
This case is about access to cell phone and radio towers located on a mountain that is 
visible from Post Falls, Coeur d'Alene, and Interstate 90. A landowner on that same mountain 
who is within a quarter mile of the towers should be aware of how companies are accessing the 
towers. Also, as the access road to the towers does not stop at the servient owner's boundary line, 
the way in and out is also open and notorious. Without question, the existence and visibility of 
the towers could hardly be more open and notorious. 
John Rook's entities, Capstar's predecessors in interest, had ownership of the land from 
1989 to 1998. Mr. Rook testified that either he or his employees traveled to the tower site 
frequently. He also testified that he and his employees were fearful of damaging a tower that was 
being delivered on the rough portions of Blossom Mountain Road. Consequently, it took three 
days to bring the tower up to the site. Mr. Rook's companies also built a small cement shed, 
which went 12 to 15 feet into the ground so that it could withstand the volatile weather. The 
tower itself was about 90 feet tall. There were several satellite dishes on site, and Mr. Rook's 
company leased space at the tower out to other entities, e.g, Trinity Broadcasting. 
Mr. Rook also testified that the only road he or any of the company's personnel used was 
the private road which is the subject of this suit. The nature of the business, telecommunications 
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and radio broadcasting, as well as the fact that the towers were in plain view, shows that the use 
of Blossom Mountain Road was sufficiently open and notorious so as to put a reasonable land 
owner on notice that his, her, or its road was being used. 
2. Continuous and Uninterrupted 
Mr. Rook testified that during the construction of the tower he and/or his employees were 
at the site on a daily basis. After construction, he or his employees or contractors went up to 
Blossom Mountain to perform routine or emergency maintenance at the tower site. 
The Rook companies' use was continuous and uninterrupted. Their use was consistent 
with the character of the land. That use was building and maintaining a radio tower as well as 
other communication facilities. Therefore, the use of the road between 1989 through 1998 
satisfies the continuous and uninterrupted element. 
3. Adverse and Under Claim of Right 
Mr. Rook testified that he did not see any no-trespassing signs while using the road in 
section 21, and no one ever told him that he was not allowed to use the road. This acquiescence 
on the part of Human Synergistics did not lead to permission (See Akers I, 142 Idaho at 303-04, 
127 P.3d 206-07 (2005)). As Mr. Rook's use was open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted 
and because Human Synergistic did nothing to either indicate permission or lack thereof, 
adversity results. 
The Lawrences argue that there should be a presumption of permissive use on the part of 
John Rook because the area is wild and unenclosed. This court finds that the Blossom Mountain 
area is not wild and unenclosed. The land is only six miles from Post falls by road and two miles 
as the crow flies. Further, it can be inferred that, as there was evidence of the remnants of the 
fence lines, there was at one time a fence line along the southern and western boundaries of what 
would eventually be the Lawrences' property. In addition, it is difficult to characterize that area 
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as wild and unenclosed when access is limited by at least one locked gate. After reviewing all of 
the evidence, the court finds as a factual matter and concludes as a matter of law that the 
Blossom Mountain area in question is not wild and unenclosed and therefore there is no 
presumption of permissive use. Without the presumption of permissive use, Mr. Rook's use of 
the Blossom Mountain area is presumed to be adverse because his use was open, notorious, 
continuous, and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period. 
The Lawrences also argue that Capstar's use was not exclusive, citing the exclusivity 
issue and the public use exception discussed in Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 697 P.2d 451 
(1985). Exclusivity is relevant to the public use exception because if a claimant is using the 
property in accordance with the general public's rights there is nothing to distinguish the 
claimant from the public. Backman 147 Idaho at 399, 210 P.3d at 84 (2009). The public use 
exception, however, does not apply here because the road is not accessible to the general public. 
In Hall, the road in question was accessible to anyone who had occasion to use the road. Hall, 
108 Idaho at 113,697 P.2d at 453 (1985). In this case, there is a locked gate just off of the public 
road. The existence of the locked gate on the easement road shortly after turning off the public 
road demonstrates that the road was not available to anyone who had occasion to use the road, as 
was the case in Hall. Capstar and its predecessor companies who owned/leased the real property 
asserted their rights independently. Therefore, the exception does not apply and Mr. Rook's use 
of the road was adverse.3 
4. With Actual or Imputed Knowledge 
Human Synergistics had actual and imputed knowledge. This conclusion is facile once 
the open and notorious element has been satisfied. Furthermore, Human Synergistics had actual 
3 Even if the roadway could possibly be considered to be open to the public, Mr. Rook testified that it took three 
days to transport the tower across the easement road. A three day period of slow travel would indicate to the owner 
of the servient estate the adverse nature of such claim. See Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 113, 697 P.2d 451, 453 
(1985). 
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knowledge of the use of the road. This is evidenced by the sales agreements between Human 
Synergistics and Funk (Plaintiffs Exhibits 5-11). 
5. For the Statutory Period 
Mr. Rook's companies owned what is now the Capstar parcel from 1989-1998. At that 
time the statutory period necessary to establish a claim for a prescriptive easement was five 
years. Mr. Rook satisfied all of the elements necessary to acquire an easement by prescription. 
The court finds that all of the material elements were established by clear and convincing 
evidence. Mr. Rook's companies' acquired a prescriptive easement across the southwest comer 
of Section 21 to access what eventually became the Capstar real property in Section 22. Capstar, 
Mr. Rook's successor in interest, therefore has the same prescriptive easement. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Capstar proved its right to an easement which is 40 feet in width for ingress, egress, and 
utilities over and adjacent to the existing road across the Lawrences' property in section 21, 
Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Kootenai County Idaho. The centerline of the existing road 
shall be the centerline of the 40 foot wide easement. The easement shall be for unlimited 
reasonable use. 
In addition, Capstar is granted a permanent injunction. The Lawrences, their agents, 
servants, employees, and those persons in active concert or participation with the Lawrences are 
precluded from interfering with, impeding, or preventing Capstar, its agents, servants, 
contractors, or employees from using, developing, maintaining, improving, and/or servicing the 
easement. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Capstar III adds an additional requirement for 
Capstar to prove it is entitled to an easement by necessity: that the easement results in access to a 
public road. As to its claim for an easement by necessity, because Capstar did not prove it had a 
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legal right to use the land in Section 28 to obtain access to a public road, such an easement is not 
ordered and this claim is dismissed. 
Regarding Capstar's prescriptive easement allegations, the court determines that the five 
material elements were proven with clear and convincing evidence and Capstar is awarded a 
prescriptive easement for ingress, egress, and utilities on the existing easement. 
The court determines that Capstar is the prevailing party and awards costs to Capstar 
concerning the issues that were tried. 
To effectuate this decision, Capstar is ordered to conduct a survey of the easement as 
awarded on the real property in section 21 owned by the Lawrences and serve a copy of the 
completed survey to counsel for the Lawrences and provide a copy to the court. The Lawrences 
shall have 30 days upon receipt of the survey within which to object. If there is an objection the 
court will set the matter for hearing at a time convenient to both court and counsel. If there is no 
objection Capstar is ordered to submit a final judgment to the court for signature forthwith if no 
other court proceedings are required. 
Dated this /O-/'J.ay of September, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF QUIET TITLE 
AND PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION 
The Court having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order herein, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. The Court hereby decrees that Plaintiff has an ingress and egress easement by 
implication across Defendant's real property; located in Section 21, Township 51 North, Range 5 
West for ingress, egress, and utilities for unlimited reasonable use. Although the Court found the 
easement to be forty (40) feet in width, following issuance of the Memorandum Decision and 
Order, the parties agreed to a reduced width of thirty (30). The centerline of the easement shall 
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be the centerline of the existing road. The location of the easement is more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
2. Alternatively, the Court hereby decrees that Plaintiff has an ingress and egress 
easement by prescription across Defendant's real property; located in Section 21, Township 51 
North, Range 5 West for ingress and egress. Although the Court found the easement to be forty 
(40) feet in width, following issuance of the Memorandum Decision and Order, the parties 
agreed to a reduced width of thirty (30). The centerline of the easement shall be the centerline 
of the existing road. The location of the easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
3. Douglas Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, their heirs, successors or assigns, their 
respective agents, servants, employees and persons in active concert or participation with them, are 
enjoined from interfering with, impeding, or preventing Capstar, its heirs, successors or assigns, 
agents, servants, contractors, employees or tenants from use or maintenance of the road traversing 
the Lawrence property more commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road, described in Exhibit 
"A" hereto. 
4. Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is awarded its costs. 
DATED this l Z11ol day of~-+------' 2014. 
District Judge 
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BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD 
30' ROAD EASEMENT 
That portion of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 21, Township $0 North, Range 5 
West, .Bo1se Meridian. Kootenai Co\lll.t)', ldaho, more panitmlllrly q.esc:ribed as follows-
Commencing at lhe Southeasi comer of Section 21, monumented by a 2 Vz'' Zinc: 
cap, thence westerly along the south line of said secuon, So1.nh S9°27'43" West, 602-57 
feet: to Jhe c~nt~line of Apple BlossDm MnuntaiI1 Ro11d 'IL.1"id the POTNi OF 
BEGINNING. 
thence continuing along said section line South 899 27'43" West, 15,03 f~,t to the 
North ri,ght-of-way of Apple Blossom road, 
thence leaving said section line and contlnumg along the said North righr-of~wa.y 
the following OOU):'ses and distances; 
thence 255.30 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of7S0.23 feet, and a 
long chord that b~rs North 12°42'32'1 East, 254.07 feet; 
thence North 18°35) 46" East, 164.80 feet; 
thenc-e Narrb 26°21 '12" Easr, 43.85 feet; 
·thence 157.70 feet aloug a curve to the right, having a radius of90.06 fr:~t. and a 
long chord that bears North 79°21 ~30•· Ba:;.t, 138.32 feet; 
tbenc~ South S0°55'04" .East, 163.40 feet; 
thence South 58°4.2'22" Easr. 163.84 feet; 
thence South 61 °J2'45'' East, 54 65 feet; 
thence South 64°56120n East, 41.65 feet to the East line of Section 21; 
thence leav1ng said right~of-way along said Section bne South u0°l 9'03" East, 
33 20 feet to the: South nght"of~\Vay of Apple l31osson, Road; 
thence continuing a.long said right~of-way the following courses and distance; 
thence North 64 1156'20" West, 56.86 feeti 
thence North 6l 0 l2'4S11 West, 56.28 feer: 
thence Nonh 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet; 
thence:1 North 50°55'03n West, 165.66 feet; 
thence l 04.S2 fe~t along a curve to lhe left having a radius of 60.06 fett and a 
long chord which beuu South 79"41 '04" West, 91.82 feei; 
~hence Somh 26"21 '12" West, 40 99 fe~t. 
thence South 18°35146'' Wesi, 163.79 feet; 
""Jt; ot.M etv-r 
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S.ngmecrs Surveyi.mi Planners 
thenc¢ 244.25 feet along a curve to the left, having a radius of 720.23 feet, and a 
long chard that bears South 12°49' l t' West, 243.09 feet to tht South hne of Secrion 
21; 
thence leavinj said righ.t-of-way Westerly ::long, said Section line South 
89°27' 43•• West, 15 .03 feet to thi: POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Conlit.ining 0. 704 acres, more or less, 
END OF PESCRIPtlON 
Prepared by; 
J~U.·B ENGINEERS, Inc. 
Ronald M. Hodge, P.L.S. 
RMH/J:ll.L: 
'f \,Pril)~Cf~~0--0*.087 'WcekHilusjum MlrllbJn11.~11i_l'd.1,,cascm,mr.d0t: 
'.Ju C>(; MEN 1 
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STATE 0, jAHO ) 
County of Kootenai ) ss 
FILED \ \-\ t)- \'-\ 
~:, ~ C:::::-, O'clock Sb..__M 
K OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPS TAR RADIO OPERA TING COMP ANY, ) CASENO. CV-02-7671 
a Delaware corporation, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, ) AND ORDERRE: ) 
VS. ) 1. MOTION FOR 
) ENLARGEMENT OF TIME; 
) AND 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA ) 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, ) 2. MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement of Time is granted. Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration is denied. 
Susan Weeks, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A., represented Plaintiff. 
W. Jeremy Can-, CLARK and FEENEY, represented Defendants. 
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I. HISTORY 
After a six-day bench trial was held, a Memorandum Decision and Order was entered on 
September 10, 2013. On May 22, 2014, a Final Judgment was entered providing for a Decree of 
Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction in favor of Capstar Radio Operating Company ("Capstar".) 
The Plaintiff, Capstar, was awarded an easement through Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence's real property. Capstar prevailed on its theory of implied easement by prior use as 
well as its prescriptive easement theory. Further, although the finding was made that the 
easement was forty ( 40) feet in width, the judgment stated that the easement was thirty (30) feet 
in width based upon the stipulation of the parties. Lastly, the Lawrences were permanently 
enjoined from interfering, impeding, or preventing Cap star from using or maintaining the 
easement which is commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. 
On June 4, 2014, the Lawrences filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a supporting 
brief. On September 3, 2014, Capstar filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time and a responsive 
brief that opposed the Motion for Reconsideration. On September 4, 2014, the parties motions 
came on for hearing. After oral argument, the matters were taken under advisement. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) provides that "a motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory 
orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later 
than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." 
stated: 
In Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 281 P.3d 103 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court 
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a 
motion for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B). On a motion for reconsideration, the court 
must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on 
the correctness of an interlocutory order. However, a motion for 
reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or 
authority. When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 2 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 178 of 214
district court must apply the same standard of review that the court 
applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. 
In other words, if the original order was a matter within the trial 
court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the 
motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a 
different standard, then that standard applies to the motion for 
reconsideration. 
153 Idaho at 276,281 P.3d at 113 (citations omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Capstar's Motion for Enlargement of Time 
Capstar's Motion for Enlargement of Time was not specifically addressed at the 
September 4, 2014, hearing. The motion, however, was filed before the hearing date and the 
Lawrences did not provide any written or oral objection. In reviewing Capstar's supporting 
brief, Capstar's reasoning shows good cause and excusable neglect as required by l.R.C.P. 6(b) 
to support an extension of time to file the responsive brief to the Lawrences' Motion for 
Reconsideration. Specifically, Capstar contends in its supporting brief that it was not served 
with the Lawrences' materials and only learned that the materials had been filed shortly before 
the hearing date. The Court finds that Capstar has shown good cause and excusable neglect, and 
having received no objection, the Court in its discretion grants Capstar's Motion for an 
Enlargement of Time. 
B. The Lawrences' Motion for Reconsideration 
The Lawrences request reconsideration based upon tlrree issues: (1) Capstar had no 
standing to seek quiet title; (2) the Court erred in finding an implied easement by prior use; and 
(3) the Court erred in finding a prescriptive easement. 
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1. Capstar had standing to quiet title. 
The Lawrences assert that Capstar did not have standing to pursue a quiet title action. 
In Capstar I, our Supreme Court said, "Capstar owns its property." Capstar Radio 
Operating Company v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 707, 152 P.3d 575, 578 (2007). In the 
Memorandum Decision and Order, the finding was made that Capstar purchased its property in 
2000. 
Therefore, Capstar, as the title holder of real property, had standing to seek a quiet title 
determination in regard to the easement which went through the Lawrences' real property. 
2. The evidence proved an implied easement by prior use. 
The Lawrences argue that Harold Funk ("Funk") testified in his deposition that his parcel 
had access to what is now the Lawrences' property via Mellick Road. As such, the Lawrences 
assert the necessity element has not been satisfied. Further, the Lawrences take the position that 
because Funk testified that he only visited his property 20-30 times over a six year period, and as 
the Idaho Supreme Court, in Capstar III, concluded that Funk's frequency of use did not rise to 
the level required to establish an implied easement by prior use, no easement could be found to 
exist. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at pages 2-3. These 
arguments are addressed separately in this section of the memorandum decision. 
a. Mellick Road 
As to Mellick Road, that issue was addressed in the Memorandum Decision and Order. 
The findings on this issue were: 
Testimony and exhibits were admitted concerning 
the existence of Mellick Road and whether it provided 
access to the Funks through Section 15. After a review of 
the evidence presented, the court finds that the developed 
portion of Mellick Road did not extend to the Funk's real 
property in Section 15 in 1975. This factual/legal finding is 
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stated, 
based on the testimony of Darius Ruen, who was 
meticulous, precise, and inherently believable. Mr. Ruen's 
testimony was buttressed by other witness testimony. The 
court adopts Mr. Ruen's testimony as being wholly credible 
and finds that the facts to which he testified are controlling. 
The court further finds that those facts contradict the 
testimony of any defense witnesses as well as any facts 
testified to by Mr. Lawrence concerning access by way of 
Mellick Road. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pages 9-10. Further, the Memorandum Decision 
As to the third requirement to prove an implied 
easement, that "the easement must be reasonably necessary 
to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate" the facts 
are uncontroverted that the road easement in question was 
the only access to the real property in the southeast comer 
of Section 22 at the time of severance in 1975. This court 
concludes the easement was reasonably necessary. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at page 20. Despite the Lawrences' contention to the 
contrary, the trial testimony established that Mellick Road terminated on property which was not 
owned by Funk. There was sufficient evidence presented to support the Court's conclusion that 
the necessity element was satisfied. The Lawrences did not bring forth any additional evidence to 
support their argument that Funk's deposition testimony was the "best evidence" as to whether or 
not Mellick Road extended into his property. The Lawrences' argument on the Mellick road 
issue was rejected in the Memorandum Decision and Order and it is rejected again now. 
b. Frequency of Use 
As to Funk's frequency of use, in Capstar III, the Idaho Supreme Court provided, 
[T]he record presents genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether the Funks' use of the easement road was 
apparent and continuous and whether it was reasonably 
necessary to use the Blossom Mountain access road to 
reach their property in Section 22. 
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Capstar Radio Operating Company, 153 Idaho 411, 417, 283 P.3d 728, 734 (2012). 
While there were genuine issues of material fact in existence as to the easement road's usage 
when the matter was before our Supreme Court at the summary judgment stage of the 
proceedings, this Court resolved those issues at trial in its role as the trier of fact, and determined 
that the "usage" element was satisfied. A detailed analysis of this conclusion is contained in the 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pages 11-15 and 17-20. 
3. The evidence proved a prescriptive easement. 
Lastly, the Lawrences set forth their belief that Capstar did not prove the notice of use 
element as there was no evidence presented that any of the Lawrences' predecessors had actual 
knowledge of use of the easement road. The Lawrences also argue that there was no evidence 
presented that Capstar's use of the easement road was adverse, hostile, or without permission. 
As to the Lawrences' argument, there was evidence presented at trial that showed there 
was actual or imputed knowledge that the easement road was being used. Specifically, this 
Court found, 
Human Synergistics had actual and imputed 
knowledge. This conclusion is facile once the open and 
notorious element has been satisfied. Furthermore, Human 
Synergistics had actual knowledge of the use of the road. 
This is evidenced by the sales agreements between Human 
Synergistics and Funk (Plaintiff's Exhibits 5-11 ). 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pages 32-33. Therefore, there is evidence in the 
record that supports the conclusion of law that the actual or imputed knowledge element was 
satisfied. 
As to adverse, hostile, or permissive use, these arguments were previously considered. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 6 
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The Memorandum Decision and Order states: 
Mr. Rook testified that he did not see any no-
trespassing signs while using the road in section 21, and no 
one ever told him that he was not allowed to use the road. 
This acquiescence on the part of Human Synergistics did 
not lead to permission (See Akers I, 142 Idaho at 303-04, 
127 P.3d 206-07 (2005)). As Mr. Rook's use was open, 
notorious, continuous and uninterrupted and because 
Human Synergistic did nothing to either indicate 
permission or lack thereof, adversity results. 
The Lawrences argue that there should be a 
presumption of permissive use on the part of John Rook 
because the area is wild and unenclosed. This court finds 
that the Blossom Mountain area is not wild and unenclosed. 
The land is only six miles from Post falls by road and two 
miles as the crow flies. Further, it can be inferred that, as 
there was evidence of the remnants of the fence lines, there 
was at one time a fence line along the southern and western 
boundaries of what would eventually be the Lawrences' 
property. In addition, it is difficult to characterize that area 
as wild and unenclosed when access is limited by at least 
one locked gate. After reviewing all of the evidence, the 
court finds as a factual matter and concludes as a matter of 
law that the Blossom Mountain area in question is not wild 
and unenclosed and therefore there is no presumption of 
permissive use. Without the presumption of permissive use, 
Mr. Rook's use of the Blossom Mountain area is presumed 
to be adverse because his use was open, notorious, 
continuous, and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period. 
The Lawrences also argue that Capstar's use was 
not exclusive, citing the exclusivity issue and the public use 
exception discussed in Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 697 
P .2d 451 (1985). Exclusivity is relevant to the public use 
exception because if a claimant is using the property in 
accordance with the general public's rights there is nothing 
to distinguish the claimant from the public. Backman 147 
Idaho at 399, 210 P.3d at 84 (2009). The public use 
exception, however, does not apply here because the road is 
not accessible to the general public. In Hall, the road in 
question was accessible to anyone who had occasion to use 
the road. Hall, 108 Idaho at 113, 697 P .2d at 453 (1985). In 
this case, there is a locked gate just off of the public road. 
The existence of the locked gate on the easement road 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 7 
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shortly after turning off the public road demonstrates that 
the road was not available to anyone who had occasion to 
use the road, as was the case in Hall. Capstar and its 
predecessor companies who owned/leased the real property 
asserted their rights independently. Therefore, the 
exception does not apply and Mr. Rook's use of the road 
was adverse. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at page 31 (footnote omitted). This Court continues to 
find that Capstar proved all of the elements to support an award of a prescriptive easement. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, Capstar does have standing to pursue a quiet title 
action. Further, Capstar proved that it is entitled to an implied easement by prior use. Lastly, 
Capstar proved that it is entitled to a prescriptive easement. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration is 
denied. 
Dated this ~ay ofNovember, 2014. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this \ CJ day of November, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration to be served, with all required 
charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below, to the following person(s): 
Susan Weeks and Cynthia Meyer 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants 
D 
D 
D 
~ 
D 
D 
ij 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 9 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Via Fax: (208) 664-1684 
E-mail 
<;' 
" r:f' b U.S. Mail -S ;/9 Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Via Fax: (208) 746-9160 
E-mail 
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In the Supremi~~J!~t &'fdie State of Idaho 
etiRKOISTR\Cl COUR1 . 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERA TING COMP Afilt,t lj, /.b4fvN-+-
a Delaware corporation, i'iii.in:Y . ) ~ · · , 
· . , ) ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
DOUGLAS P. LA WREN CE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Respondents-Appel !ants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
WITH PRIOR APPEAL NOS. 
32090, 35120 AND 38300 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42326-2014 
Kootenai County No. 2002-7671 
There having been a CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS previously 
filed with this Court in each of the related appeal Nos. 32090, 35120, and 38300, Capstar Radio v. 
Lawrence (Ko.otenai County No. CV-2002-7671); therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the above entitled appeal shall be AUGMENTED to include 
the Clerk's Records and Reporter's Transcripts previously filed in related appeal Nos. 32090, 35120, 
and 38300, Capstar Radio v. Lawrence. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a LIMITED 
CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the Notice of 
Appeal in Docket No. 42326, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any documents 
filed in prior appeal Nos. 32090, 35120, and 38300. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge a 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the proceedings requested in the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL in Docket No. 42326, but shall not duplicate any proceedings included in the 
Reporter's Transcripts filed in prior appeal Nos. 32090, 35120, and 38300. The LIMITED CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS shall be filed with this Court after the settlement 
period expires. ..J1f 
DATED this~ day of February, 2015. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
Court Reporter Valerie Nunemacher 
District Judge Steven C. Yerby 
Fort 
are! A. Lehnnan, hief Deputy Clerk for 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Enfered on JS! 
By: __ _.~~....;.·---
... -:~·:.':"· ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL WITH PRIOR APPEAL NOS. 3~090, 35120 AND 38300- Docket No. 42326-2014 
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( 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County ofKootenai 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 1HE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTARRADIOOPERATINGCOMPANY, ) 
a Delaware e-orporatio~ ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LA\VR.ENCE and BRENDA 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT 
l. Plaintiff has an ingress, egress, and utility easement arising from prior use and a 
prescriptive easement across Defendants' real property locat.ed in Section 21, To""nsbip 51 North, 
Range 5 West The scope of the easement is identical under both easement theories. The easement 
is for reasonable use without limitation. The width of the easement is 30 feet and said easement is 
more particularly described in Exhibit ''A" attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
2. Douglas Lawrence and Brenda J. LawTence, their heirs, successors or assigns, their 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT l 
RI ~i7-~07-on7 l.r, l!::ti II. 1'1.&...l"\''*'71 r,.1 n,I r,I""\ I 
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respective agents, servants, employees and those persons in active concert or participation with the 
Lawrences, are enjoined from interfering with, impeding, or preventing Capstar, its agents, servants, 
contractors, employees, tenants, successors, or assigns from using, developing, maintaining, 
improving, and/or servicing the easement which crosses the Lawrence property and is more 
commonly known as ~m Mountain Road, described in Exhibit "A" hereto. 
Dated this/3 day of February, 2015. 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT 2 
CAPSTAR VS LAWRENCE SUPREMEM COURT DOCKET NO. 42326-2015 188 of 214
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 17 day of February, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this FINAL JUDGMENT to be served, vvith all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) 
indicated below, to the following person(s): 
Susan Weeks and Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way .. , 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for PlaintijJ 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGlvIENT 
I •rl 
D 
D 
~ 
D 
U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Via Fax: (208) 664-1684 
E-mail 
U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Via Fax: (208) 746-9160 
E-mail 
Jim Brannon 
Clerk of fue District Court 
By: ___ >trl~"'-"-/)"""-;,=--.-..12=--:x:fa--'-',~~·1 
Deputy Clerk 
3 
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·. 10-06-' 10 13:48 FROM-K. ~nai Dist Court 
( + 208-446-1188 ( I T-514 P003/004 F-670 
. \I 
' 
BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD 
30' ROAD EASEMENT 
That portion of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 21, Township $0 North, Range 5 
West, .B01se Meridian., Kootenai County, ldaho, more partic~Llarly described as follows· 
Commencing at lht! Southeast comer of Section 21, monumented by a 2 Vi'' Zmc 
cap, thence westerly along the south line of said seen.on, So1.nh ~9°27'43" West, 602-57 
feet to die cc:mi:,rline of Apple Blossom MoumaiI1 Rn11d 11.rut the POINT OF 
.8.SGINNING. 
thence continuing along said section line South 89927'43" West, lS,03 f~~t to the 
North right-of-way of Apple .BloSsom road, 
thence leaving $aid section line and contlnumg along the said North righ1-of~way 
the following oourses and distances; 
thence 255.30 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of7S0.23 feet, and a 
long chord that bears North 12°42'3211 East, 254.07 feet; 
thence North l 8°3S) 46" Eit~t, I 64.80 feet; 
thence Nonb 26°21 '12" East, 43.85 feet; 
thence 157. 70 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of 90.06 fc:et. and a 
long chord that bears North 79c21 '30'' Ealilt, 138.32 feet; 
thenc1: South 50°55'04" .East, 163.40 feet; 
thence South 58°4.2'22" Easr. 163.84 feet; 
thence South 61 °12'45'' East, 54 65 feet; 
thi:nce South 64°56>20" East, 4I.65 feet Io the East line of Section 21; 
thence leaving said right-of-way along said Section lme South u0° l 9'03" East, 
33 20 feet to the:: South ngh.t~of ~\Vay of Apple Blossom Road; 
thence continuing along said right~of·way the following courses and distance; 
thence North 64ci56'20" West> 56.86 feet; 
thence North 61 °l2'4511 West, 56.28 feet; 
thence Nonh 58c42'22" West, 166.54 feet; 
~henct: Nonh 50°55'0311 West, 165.66 feet; 
thence 104.52 feet along a curvt to I.he left having a radius of 60.06 fel!t and a 
long chord which bears South 79"41 '04" West, 91.82 fc:ei; 
thence South 26"21 'LZ" West, 40 99 fe~t. 
thence South 18°35146'' Wesi, 163.79 fc!i!ti 
COURT'S 
EXHIBIT No . ..:d._ 
f IDENTIFICATION/EVIDENCE 
CASE No.(, Va~ ... 7f, 11-
~ Po.~Q... I of l_ 
-- - ..... 
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(,·,,_~ 
f#J·~ 
E.ngmecrs Surveyop; Planners 
thenc~ 244.25 feet along a curve to the left, bavi11g a radius of 720.23 foet, and a 
long chard th.at bears Soutb 12°49'18)' West, 243.09 feet to th~ South hne of Section 
21; 
thence leaving said righ.t-of-way Westerly :ilon& said Section line South 
89°27'43•• West, 15.03 feet t0 tbt POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 0. 704 acr.:s, more or less. 
-gND OF PESCRlPT!ON 
Prepttred by; 
J~U.·B ENGINEERS, Inc:. 
Ronald M. Hodge, P .L.S, 
RMH/Cl,L: 
f \,Pr~)~Or~-i0~.0S7 WccllS-~iuuum M!rll!Slnn.~111.kl.l,,c:tSCRlw'llf,dOC COURT'S 
EXHIBIT NO .. _.A.____ 
IDENTIFICATION/EVIDENCE 
CASENO"-.·---..--=~-
~.J of 3 
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CA.D !"=ILE: SW•Blostam-MT ·RO 
04/IEi(Jlla-A.-l'IG). 
_.:.: ... 
CURVE TABLE 
,-·-·--·-.,--·:· ----· ···-· .. , 
CURVE# LENGTH RADIUS DELTA CHORD BEARING CHORD LENGTH 
' 
C1 255.30' 750.23' 19'29'51" S12'42'32"W 254.07' 
I-·· 
-· 
~ . ...,...,. ......... _ _, 
C2 157.71' 90.06' 100·20·14" S79'21 '30"W 138.32' 
C3 104.52' 60.06' 99·42'28" S79'41 '04"W 91.82' 
. --·--···--- ·····--- ---·--· ---··-~-···-·-
C4 244.26' 720.23' 19'25'53" S12'49'18"W 243.09' 
LINE TABLE 
]~ 
0 
I~ 
0 
150 300 
·1 __ 1 
0 
'~ SCALE IN FEET 
LINE# DIRECTION LENGTH r~ 
L1 S89' 27' 43"W 
-
L2 N26'21 '12"E 
L3 S61'12'45"E 
IA S64'56'20"E 
L5 S0'19'03"E 
L6 N64'56'20"W 
L7 N61'12' 45"W 
LB S26'21 '12"W 
L.9 S89'27'43"W 
~· 
~J·U·B.a ~
En_gln~ers, Surve_yar~, Planner• 
15.03' 
__________ .. 
43.85' 
54.65' 
41.65' 
33.20' 
.... 
56_86' 
56.28' 
40.99' 
15.03' 
·i;;.,......._,.,, .• 
-----
Lt' "t..~ 
...... ·POB 
lI) 
OJ 
N 
c.o 
N 
~ BLOSSOM MOUI\ITAIN R0/\0 
30' EASEMENT CONTAINING 
0.704 ACRES ± 
lJ') 
_J 
587.54' 
21 22. 
2646.03' ss9·27' 43"W 28 27 
COURT'S/] 
EXHIBIT N0.--1!1- ------""""ex=H~l~B1=r-----------, 
IDENTIFICATION/EVIDENCE BLOSSOM MOU.,..,,N""'T="'A""'l.,..N" ROAD 
CASE NO,..---,tl"--...---
'2. '2.. 30' ROAD EASEMENT 
lfflTI!:' .,) t) 2 SE 1/4 SECTION 21 TSON, RSW, B.M. KOOTENAI CO. IDAHO __ 
_ __:::::..:.:.:...:=:.:.:..:.:...:.:....:.:..:.:..:.:.-=.:....:...------""-----""'--'-' 
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W. JEREMY CARR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Idaho State Bar# 6827 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 7 43-9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants, 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, ) 
a Delaware Corporation, ) 
) Case No. CV02-07671 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, ) FILING FEE $129.00 
) 
TO: 
AND TO: 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, CAP ST AR RADIO OPERA TING COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, and THEIR ATTORNEY, SUSAN P. WEEKS, JAMES, VERNON 
and WEEKS, P.A. 1626 Lincoln Way, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83814: 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. The above-named Appellants, DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, 
husband and wife, appeal against the above-named Respondents, CAP ST AR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment and Decree of 
Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction entered in the above entitled action on May 22, 2014, by the Honorable 
Steve Yerby and the Memorandum Decision and Order entered in the above entitled action on September 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
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10, 2013, by the Honorable Steve Yerby. 
2. The patiy has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Cowi, and the judgments or orders 
described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(I) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert in the 
appeal include the following: 
4. 
5. 
6. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
Did the District Cowi error in determining that the plaintiff has ingress and egress 
easement by implication across the defendants' real property? 
Did the District Cowt error in determining the easement for egress and ingress and 
utilities is for unlimited reasonable use? 
Did the District Court error in determining the easement to be fo1iy ( 40) feet in 
width? 
Did the District Court error in determining the plaintiff has an ingress and egress 
easement by prescription across defendants' real propetiy? 
Did the District Court error in granting the scope of the plaintiffs easement across 
the defendants' real propetiy? 
Did the District Court error in that the defendants and their heirs, successors and 
assignees shall be enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs use or maintenance of 
the road traversing the defendant's real propetiy? 
Whether the plaintiffs had standing as tenants to bring a quiet title action against the 
defendants. 
There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
(a) 
(b) 
A reporter's transcript has been requested and the estimated fee has been paid. 
The Appellants request the preparation of the repo1ier's standard transcript as 
defined in Rule 25( c) I.A.R. of the trial held on June 11, 2013, - June 20, 2013, in 
both hard copy and electronic format. 
The Appellants do not request additional documents be added to the Clerk's Record. 
2 2 Appellant only requests the documents automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R. 
23 
24 
25 
26 NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO B350J 
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1. 
7. The Appellants request the following documents, charges, or pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Comi: All exhibits admitted into evidence. 
8. I certify: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and Address: 
Val Nunemacher 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83 816 
That the clerk of the district comi has been paid the estimated fees for 
preparation of the designated repo1ier's transcript. 
That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
·'7 ,Al,_,. 
DATED this _~JO_·_ day of June, 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
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L 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~-~y of June, 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James Vernon and Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
Val Nunemacher 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83 816 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1'&( U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
~ U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
By: _ __:::.....___-,L,,.-=--,L------.,;...=-------
W. Jeremy Carr, tto neys for Defendants/Appellants 
4 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
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W. JEREMY CARR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Idaho State Bar# 6827 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
· Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appel !ants, 
.• ·,,,. 1·. > ,[1:\HG '>SJ~ 
"'.' '", ~. . • . ~ \ I coui,(1 Y DF KOOTlN,:, · 
t::\LED: 
20\L, jUL -9 PM \O: 43 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, ) 
a Delaware Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV02-07671 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THEABOVENAMEDRESPONDENTS,CAPSTARRADIOOPERATINGCOMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, and THEIR ATTORNEY, SUSAN P. WEEKS, JAMES, VERNON 
and WEEKS, P.A. 1626 Lincoln Way, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83814: 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, DOUGLAS LA WREN CE and BRENDA J. LA WREN CE, 
husband and wife, appeal against the above-named Respondents, CAPSTAR RADIO OPERA TING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment and Decree of 
Quiet Title and Permanent Ii1}unction entered in the above entitled action on May 22, 2014, by the Honorable 
Steve Yerby and the Memorandum Decision and Order entered in the above entitled action on September 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 63501 
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I 0, 2013, by the Honorable Steve Yerby. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or orders 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( I) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to asse11 in the 
appeal include the following: 
4. 
5. 
6. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
Did the District Court error in determining that the plaintiff has ingress and egress 
easement by implication across the defendants' real prope1iy? 
Did the District Court error in determining the easement for egress and ingress and 
utilities is for unlimited reasonable use? 
Did the District Court error in determining the easement to be fo1iy (40) feet in 
width? 
Did the District Court error in determining the plaintiff has an ingress and egress 
easement by prescription across defendants' real prope1iy? 
Did the District Com1 error in granting the scope of the plaintiffs easement across 
the defendants' real property? 
Did the District Court error in that the defendants and their heirs, successors and 
assignees shall be enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs use or maintenance of 
the road traversing the defendant's real prope1iy? 
Whether the plaintiffs had standing as tenants to bring a quiet title action against the 
defendants. 
There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
(a) 
(b) 
A reporter's transcript has been requested and the estimated fee has been paid. 
The Appellants request the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript as 
defined in Rule 25( c) I.A.R. of the trial held on June 11, 2013, - June 20, 2013, in 
electronic format. 
The Appellants do not request additional documents be added to the Clerk's Record. 
Appellant only requests the documents automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R. 
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I, 
7. The Appellants request the following documents, charges, or pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: All exhibits admitted into evidence. 
8. I certify: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and Address: 
Val Nunemacher 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83 816 
That the clerk of the district comi has been paid the estimated fees for 
preparation of the designated reporter's transcript. 
That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
That service has been made upon all pa1iies required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this ~ay of July, 2014. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CLARK and FEENEY 
By: t,)~ -··"· 
W. Jeremy Carr, a member of the firm. 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence 
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II 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~~ of July, 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following: 
Susan P. Weeks ''jtl_ U.S. Mail 
James Vernon and Weeks D Hand Delivered 
1626 Lincoln Way D Overnight Mail 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 D Telecopy 
Val Nunemacher ~ U.S.Mail 
PO Box 9000 D Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83 816 D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
By tJ~ 
W. Jeremy Carr,Attorneysf1reents/ Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 
a Delaware Corporation ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
w ) 
) 
DOUGLASLAWRENCEandBRENDAJ ) 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42326-2015 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list of exhibits is a 
true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
I further certify that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the 
Record: 
1. DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS: 
(A) WARRANTY DEED-LAWRENCE 
(B) ACCESS LICENSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN NEXTEL WEST CORP 
AND DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE 
(C) ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES - DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 4 FROM THE 
DEPOSITION OF THOMAS MARTINICH 
(D) CERTIFICATE OF MERGER- DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 5 FROM THE 
DEPOSITION OF THOMAS MARTINICH 
(E) COMMUNICATIONS LEASE AGREEMENT- DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 3 
I-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
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FROM DEPOSITION OF THOMAS MARTINICH 
(F) STATEMENT SIGNED BY DON SNODGRASS ON MAY 8, 2000 
(G) MAY 8, 2000 STATEMENT REFERENCED IN INCIDENT REPORT 
00-9842 
(H) KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S INCIDENT REPORTS FILED 
AGAINST DOUGLAS LA WREN CE (2000-2002; 7 TOTAL) 
(I) APRIL 13, 2002 SPECTRASITE LETTER NOTICING DEFENDANTS 
OF RENEW AL OF LICENSE AGREEMENT 
(J) AUGUST 28, 2002 KOOTENAI ELECTRIC LETTER REQUESTING TO 
LOCK DEFENDANT'S GATE 
(K) OCTOBER 10, 2002 SIGNED ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF 
KEY BY NEXTEL EMPLOYEE TIM HOLLIS 
(L) OCTOBER 17, 2002 DELIVERY CONFIRMATION OF KEY TO 
TOM GRAPENSTER WITH AT&T 
(M) OCTOBER 16, 2002 SIGNED RECEIPT OF KEY TO ADELPHIA 
(N) OCTOBER 9, 2002 SIGNED RECEIPT OF KEY TO 
KOOTENAI ELECTRIC 
(0) OCTOBER 9, 2002 SIGNED RECEIPT OF KEY TO 
VERIZON 
(P) OCTOBER 15, 2002 EMAIL FROM SHEILA BERNARD (SPECTRASITE) 
TO DOUGLAS LA WREN CE - SUBJECT [RE: BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN 
ACCESS AGREEMENT 
(Q) OCTOBER 15, 2002 EMAIL FROM SHEILA BERNARD- SUBJECT 
[ATTENTION DOUG] 
(R) OCTOBER 21, 2002 EMAIL FROM PAMELA WAITMAN (NEXTEL) 
SUBJECT [BLOSSOM MTN CELL SITE ACCESS] 
2-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
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(S) OCTOBER 24, 2002 UNDELIVERABLE LETTER TO NEXTEL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
(T) OCTOBER 24, 2002 RETURNED (UNACCEPTED) DELIVERY 
CONFIRMATION 
(U) OCTOBER 31, 2002 LETTER FROM RAYMOND GOODWIN 
(SPECTRASITE) TO DEFENDANTS 
(V) KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S CRIME REPORTS 2002-2003 
BY DOUGLAS LAWRENCE (2002-2003; 7 TOTAL) 
(W) JANUARY 13, 2003 LETTER FROM RAYMOND GOODWIN 
(SPECTRASITE) TO DEFENDANTS 
(X) JANUARY 9, 2003 LETTER FROM NEXTEL NOTICING DEFENDANTS 
OF ASSIGNMENT 
(Y) ENVELOPE OF MARCH 14, 2003 LETTER FROM NEXTEL 
(Z) DEFENDANT MACK'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS 
LA WRENCES' MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR LEA VE TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
(AA) KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S CRIME REPORT 03-21559 FILED 
SEPTEMBER 16, 2003 BY DOUGLAS LAWRENCE 
(BB) CHECK RECEIPT FOR APRIL 2007 PAYMENT FOR LICENSE 
AGREEMENT 
(CC) APRIL 16, 2007 LETTER FROM AMERICAN TOWER OFFERING LUMP 
SUM PAYMENT 
(DD) JULY 18, 2007 NOTICE OF DEF AULT SENT TO AMERICAN TOWER 
(EE) DELIVERY CONFIRMATION OF JULY 18, 2007 NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
(FF) KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT LAW INCIDENT 
3-Clerk' s Certificate of Exhibits 
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TABLE SHOWING INCIDENT 07-23671 
(GG) LICENSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TOWER ASSET SUB INC AND 
INFINITY COMMUNICATIONS 
(HH) TOWER ATTACHMENT LICENSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TOWER 
ASSET SUB INC AND WIRED OR WIRELESS, INC 
(II) SITE SCHEDULE TO THE MASTER SITE LEASE AGREEMENT DATED 
APRIL 20, 1999 
(JJ) AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES STILLINGER PROVIDED IN CV03-5003 
(KK) RECORD OF ROAD AND GATE LOCATIONS IN PARCEL 21-8500 
(LL) NOVEMBER 17, 2000 BUSINESS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN 
COLBY MAY AND JOHN ROOK AND COPIED TO DEFENDANTS 
(MM) ANTENNA TOWER BUILDING AND REAL PROPERTY LEASE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN JOHN ROOK AND TRlNlTY 
BROADCASTING NETWORK 
(NN) LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ADELPHIA CABLE AND JOHN 
MACK AND THE DEFENDANTS 
(00) MARCH 13, 2000 AFFIDAVIT OF WILBER MEAD 
(PP) FEBRUARY 1, 2002 STATEMENT FROM BLUE SKY BROADCASTING 
(QQ) ACCESS LICENSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT NORTHERN 
BROADCASTING AND THE DEFENDANTS 
(RR) COPY OF METSKER MAP DATED MARCH 1959 LARGER VERSION 
(SS) JUNE 28, 2007 AFFIDAVIT OF KOOTENAI COUNTY SURVEYOR 
BRUCE ANDERSON 
(TT) 1907 VIEWERS REPORT FOR MELLICK ROAD 
(UU) JUNE 17, 1910 PLAT OF SURVEY FOR MELLICK ROAD 
(VV) JULY 1977 EASEMENT IDAHO FOREST INDUSTRIES GRANTED TO 
4-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
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DON JOHNSON AND JOHN MCHUGH AND RECORDED AS 
INSTRUMENT #773361 
(WW) AUGUST 13, 2007 DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF HAROLD 
FUNK 
(XX) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT AREA BY KOOTENAI 
COUNTY KCWEBMAP (3 TOT AL) 
(YY) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT AREA BY GOOGLEEARTH 
(5 TOTAL) 
(ZZ) AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN MACK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR ENLARGEMENT 
(AAA) EMAILS FROM SHEILA BARNARD DATED 10/15/2002 (2 TOTAL) 
(BBB) EMAIL FROM PAMELA WAITMAN DATED 10/21/2002 
(CCC) EMAIL FROM SCOTT HAUG DATED 10/27/2003 
(DDD) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBJECT AREA BY GOOGLEEARTH 
SHOWING ROADS 
(EEE) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF ROAD SYSTEM AND GATES 
IN SUBJECT AREA (32 TOTAL) 
(FFF) PHOTOGRAPHS OF GATES ON SUBJECT AREA ROADS 
(GGG) AERIAL VIEW AND MAPPING OF MELLICK ROAD 
(HHH) VIEWER'S REPORT - MELLICK ROAD 
(III) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DATED 1951 
(JJJ) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DATED 1970 
(KKK) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DATED 8/14/75 
(LLL) 2ND AMENDMENT TO FRITZ HEATH ESTATES PLAT 
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2. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS: 
(1) ILLUSTRATIVE DEPICTION OF SECTIONS 15, 22 AND 21 
(2) REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACT, FILED IN BOOK 55, 
PAGE 118 ON AUGUST 28, 1968, REYNOLDS TO RADEN 
(3) REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, FILED IN BOOK 57, PAGE 119, 
RADEN TO FUNK, APRIL 14, 1969 
(4) WARRANTY DEED FILED AS INSTRUMENT NO. 613471 
MEAD TO FUNK, NOVEMBER 9, 1972 
(5) SALE AGREEMENT INSTRUMENT NO. 672112 
FUNK TO HUMAN SYNERGISTICS, INC. ruLY 10, 1975 
(6) SALE AGREEMENT INSTRUMENT NO. 672113 
FUNK TO HUMAN SYNERGISTICS, INC. ruL Y 10, 1975 
(7) SALE AGREEMENT INSTRUMENT NO. 672114 
FUNK TO HUMAN SYNERGISTICS, INC. ruL Y 10, 1975 
(8) SALE AGREEMENT INSTRUMENT NO. 672115 
FUNK TO HUMAN SYNERGISTICS, INC. mLY 10, 1975 
(0\ SALE A .. GREEMENT lJ'.lSTRID.1ENT NO. 672116 \-'! 
FUNK TO HUMAN SYNERGISTICS, INC. mLY 10, 1975 
(10) SALE AGREEMENT INSTRUMENT NO. 672117 
FUNK TO HUMAN SYNERGISTICS, INC. JULY 10, 1975 
(11) SALE AGREEMENT INSTRUMENT NO. 672118 
FUNK TO HUMAN SYNERGISTICS, INC. ruLY 10, 1975 
(12) STATUTORY WARRANTY DEED INSTRUMENT NO. 653865 
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RYNOLDS TO RADEN ANDMARCOE, SIGNED APRIL 15, 1974, 
RECORDED JULY 25, 1974 
(13) STATUTORY WARRANTY DEED INSTRUMENT NO. 653864 
RADEN AND MARCOE TO FUNK, RECORDED JULY 25, 1974 
(14) MEMORANDUM OF CONTRACT, FILED ON AS INSTRUMENT 
NO. 732027 HUMAN SYNERGISTICS TO JOHNSTON AND 
MCHUGH SIGNED MAY 16, 1977, RECORDED JUNE 1, 1977 
(15) ROADWAY EASEMENT INST. NO. 773361, IFI TO JOHNSTON 
AND MCHUGH SIGNED JULY 11, 1977 RECORD JULY 6, 1978 
(16) MEMORANDUM OF SALE AGREEMENT INST. NO. 1098895, 
JOHNSTON AND MCHUGH TO NAP, SIGNED 
(17) CORPORATION DEED INST. NO. 1114689, HUMAN 
SYNERGISTICS TO JOHNSTON AND MCHUGH, SIGNED MAY 
16, 1977, RECORDED APRIL 21, 1988 
(18) WARRANTY DEED INST. NO. 1279685, FUNK TO MACK 
OCTOBER 22, 1992 
(19) WARRANTY DEED INST. NO. 1283911, FUNK TO HUMAN 
SYNERGISTICS, SIGNED OCTOBER 29, 1992, RECORDED 
NOVEMBER 29, 1992 
(20) DEED INST. NO. 1452670 NAP TO FARMANIAN JULY 3, 1996 
(21) CORPORATION DEED INST. NO. 1452959, NAP TO 
F ARMANIAN, JULY 8, 1996 
(22) EASEMENT INST. NO. 1454068, NAP TO OTHER PROPERTY 
7-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
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JULY 16, 1996 
(23) MUTUAL AGREEMENT GRANT OF EASEMENT AND QUIT 
CLAIM DEED INST. NO. 1462711, FARMANIAN TO 
MACK, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 
(24) MEMORANDUM OF SALE AGREEMENT INST. NO. 1464206, 
F ARMANIAN TO LAWRENCE, SIGNED JULY 12, 1996, 
RECORDED OCTOBER 1, 1996 
(25) QUITCLAIM DEED INST. NO. 1533768, LAWRENCE TO 
LA WREN CE, APRIL 17, 1998 
(26) QUITCLAIM DEED INST. NO. 1543875, LAWRENCE TO 
LAWRENCE, JUNE 29, 1998 
(27) WARRANTY DEED INST. NO. 1551840, JOHNSTON AND 
MCHUGH TO NAP, SIGNED JULY 16, 1996, RECORDED 
AUGUST 27, 1998 
(28) WARRANTY DEED INST. NO. 1551841, FARMANIANTO 
LAWRENCE, SIGNED JULY 5, 1996, RECORDED 
AUGUST 27, 1996 
(29) DEED INST. NO. 720411, FUNK TO RASMUSSEN AND 
CHAMBERLAIN, SIGNED AUGUST 26, 1976, 
RECORDED JANUARY 7, 1977 
(30) WARRANTYDEEDINSTRUMENTN0.1161438AND 
RE-RECORDED AS INSTRUMENT NO. 1167510 FUNK 
TO IDAHO BROADCASTING, SEPTEMBER 25, 1989 
8-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
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(31 C) QUITCLAIM DEED INSTRUMENT NO. 1168384, 
IDAHO BROADCASTING TO KOOTENAI BROADCASTING, 
NOVEMBER 29, 1989 
(32C) QUITCLAIM DEED INSTRUMENT NO. 1326440 KOOTENAI 
BROADCASTING TO ROOK BROADCASTING, 
OCTOBER 25, 1993 
(33C.l)WARRANTY DEED INSTRUMENT NO. 1565152, 
ROOK BROADCASTING TO AGM-NEV ADA, 
NOVEMBER 20, 1998 
(33C.2)WARRANTY DEED INSTRUMENT NO. 1656413 AGM-NEV ADA 
TO CAPSTAR OCTOBER 25, 2000 
(34) CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMP ANY POLICY NO. 13 
003 5 106 00001140 
(35) DEED INST. NO 708987 FUNK TO KOOTENAI ELECTRIC 
COOPERATIVE AUGUST 16, 1976 
(36) DEED INST. NO. 993113 FUNK TO SONNELAND 
NOVEMBER 29, 1984 
(37) WARRANTY DEED INST. NO. 497858, REYNOLDS TO GENERAL 
TELEPHONE OCTOBER 17, 1966 
(38) RIGHT OF WAY EASEMENT INST. NO 494343, BLOSSOM AND 
MEAD TO GENERAL TELEPHONE, SIGNED JULY 14, 1966, 
RECORDED AUGUST 31, 1966 
(39) RIGHT OF WAY EASEMENT INST. NO. 494344, ULRICH TO 
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GENERAL TELEPHONE, AUGUST 31, 1966 
( 40) BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ESTATES PLAT BOOK 1, PAGE 42 
(41) RECORD OF SURVEY INST. NO. 15421875 
( 42) KOOTENAI COUNTY ASSESSOR OFFICE SEGREGATION 
REVISIONS SECTION 22 
(43) KOOTENAI COUNTY ASSESSOR OFFICE SEGREGATION 
REVISIONS SECTION 21 
(44) GLO SURVEY OF TOWNSHIP 50 NO, RANGE NO. 5 WEST 
(45) BLOW UP OF GLO MAP IN SECTION 15, 21 AND 22 
(46) 1957 USGS HISTORICAL MAP OF SECTIONS 15, 21 AND 22 
(47) 1959 METSKER MAP 
(48) MELLICK ROAD EXHIBIT MAP 
(49) 981 USGS MAP OF 1975 AERIAL 
(50) FUNK OWNERSHIP EXHIBIT 
(51) 2010 USGS MAP 
(52) VIEWER'S REPORT EXHIBIT 
(53) VIEWER REPORT 271 AND BRANCH CHANGE MELLICK 
ROAD 
(54) MACKAFFIDAVIT 
(55) DEED INST. NO. 1558483 ZUBER TO ZUBER 
SEPTEMBER 11, 1998 
(56) DEED INST. NO. 1758296 ZUBER TO MACK 
OCTOBER 9, 2002 
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(57) MELLICK ROAD OVERLAY 
(58) MELLICK ROAD OVERLAY 
(59) CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT C-593-86 
(60) CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO. C-658-88 
(61) CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO. C-686-89 
(62) CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO. C-841-94 
(63) CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO. C-940-97 
(64) CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO. C-1058-01 
(65) CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO. C-1092-03 
(66) NOTICE INST. NO. 1403054 
(67) CIVIL VIOLATION NO. CV-4306.06.B 
(68) HAROLD FUNK DEPOSITION 
(69) GATE PICTURE 
(70) GATE PICTURE 
(71) GATE PICTURE 
(72) GATE PICTURE 
(73) GATE PICTURE 
(73A) LOCK PICTURE 
(74) SIMS LIESCHE 3/19/99 LETTER OF COUNTY OFFICIALS 
(75) 2/29/00 LAWRENCE LETTER TO DOUGLAS 
(76) 5/31/99 SIMS LIESCHE STATEMENT 
(77) LA WREN CE 6/1/2000 SUBMITTAL TO KOOTENAI COUNTY 
PLANNING 
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(78) 6/14/99(00) LAWRENCE LETTER TO KOOTENAI COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR 
(79) 6/26/00 LAWRENCE LETTER TO KOOTENAI COUNTY 
PLANNING DEPT 
(80) 6/30/00 LETTER TO SHERIFF 
(81) 12/5/00 PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW KOOTENAI CASE 
CV00-7756 
(82) 10/19 VERIZON KEY LETTER AND 11/19/01 VERIZON 
KEY RECEIPT 
(83) 6/10/03 VERIZON LETTER TO LAWRENCE 
(84) 10/10/03 STIMSON LETTER TO LA WREN CE 
(85) GREAT NORTHERN BROADCAST ACCESS LICENSE 
AGREEMENT 
(86) BLUE SKY STATEMENT DATED 2/1/02 
(87) TOWER LICENSE AGREEMENT 
ANY EXHIBIT ON DEFENDANTS' LIST 
(88) PICTURES 
(89) PICTURES 
(104) MAP OF MELLICK RD 1996-1997 
(i05) SALES/CLOSING INFORMATION 
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In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai 
County, Idaho this L day of ~ fu.j / , 2015. 
Jim Brannon 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 
a Delaware Corporation ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
w ) 
) 
DOUGLAS LA WREN CE and BRENDA J ) 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
AUGMENTED 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42326-2015 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671 
I, Jim Hannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in 
and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the 
above entitled cause was electronically filed, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings 
and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Defendants were notified that the Clerk's 
Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were 
mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on the 6th day of April 2015. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court. 
In witness whereof; I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai 
County, Idaho this 6th day of April 2015 
JIM BRANNON 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 
a Delaware Corporation ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
vs ) 
) 
DOUGLASLAWRENCEandBRENDAJ ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
AUGMENTED 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42326-2015 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to the attorneys ofrecord in this 
cause as follows: 
Attorney - Plaintiff 
Susan P Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorney - Defendant 
William J Carr 
PO Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this April 6, 2015. 
JIM BRANNON 
